U.S.-Russian
Nuclear Arms Control Watch, May 2019
Authored
by Kingston Reif and Shervin Taheran on May 24, 2019
U.S.-Russian Arms Control Talks to Begin Amid Uncertainty
Following
a May 14 meeting in Sochi, Russia with Russian President Vladimir Putin and
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told reporters that
the two countries “agreed that … we will gather together teams that will begin
to work not only on [the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] New START
and its potential extension but on a broader range of arms control issues that
each of our two nations have.”
But it
remains unclear when such talks will begin, who will lead the U.S. negotiating
team, what the Trump administration would be willing to put on the table in
return for bigger concessions from Russia and China as part of broader arms
control talks, and whether New START would be extended in the absence of
progress on a more comprehensive deal.
Last
month, a senior administration official told reporters that
President Donald Trump had directed his administration to seek a new arms
control agreement with Russia and China. The official told CNN that the
agreement should include “all the weapons, all the warheads, and all the
missiles.” The official criticized New START for only limiting U.S. and
Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
At a May
15 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on
the future of nuclear arms control, Andrea Thompson, undersecretary of state
for arms control and international security, said that the Trump administration
“has not made any decision on a potential extension of New START.” An
interagency review of the treaty and whether to extend it has been ongoing for
about a year.
Thompson
added that several issues would have an impact on an extension decision,
including Russia’s development of new types of strategic weapons systems and
modernization of its large stockpile of non-strategic (or tactical) nuclear
weapons, Russia’s record of violating arms control agreements, and “China’s
lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization
program” and unwillingness to discuss nuclear weapons issues with the United
States.
Russia
has repeatedly expressed interest in extending New START, but it has
raised concerns about
U.S. procedures to remove submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers
and some B-52 bombers from treaty accountability.
Moscow
has also expressed a willingness to begin a dialogue with the United States on
broader strategic stability issues, but it has its own list of
concerns about U.S. policies and weapons systems – including missile defense
systems, cyber weapons, weapons development in space, and advanced conventional
arms.
The
Trump administration has shown no indication that it would be willing to limit
these weapons in an agreement with Russia or China. Even if it were willing to
do so, it is highly unlikely an agreement could be reached before New START
expires in less than two years.
Trump
told reporters May
3 that he had already spoken to China about a trilateral nuclear arms control
deal, and that “they very much would like to be a part of that deal.” But a
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said
May 6 that China “will not take part in any trilateral negotiations on
a nuclear disarmament agreement.”
In a May
6 interview in
Finland, Pompeo acknowledged that a trilateral deal involving China and that
covers all types of U.S. and Russia nuclear weapons might be “too ambitious.”
He noted that “there’s just a couple years left before New START expires” and
that it may be necessary to address the expiration of the treaty “on a
bilateral basis.”—KINGSTON REIF, director for disarmament and threat
reduction policy, and SHERVIN TAHERAN, research assistant
NEW
START
Several
Democratic Senators expressed exasperation at a May 15 hearing about
the unwillingness of Andrea Thompson and David Trachtenberg, the deputy
undersecretary of defense for policy, to provide their or the administration’s
views on what the implications would be for U.S. security without New START.
Asked by
Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), the ranking Democrat on the committee, whether
Russia could target the United States with “hundreds or perhaps thousands of additional
nuclear warheads in the absence of the treaty, Thompson replied: “That is a
great question for Russia, Senator.”
“No,”
Menendez erupted in response. “[T]hat is a great question for you.”
Democratic
Senators also pressed the witnesses to explain the administration’s strategy
for negotiating new arms control deals with Russia and China.
Asked at
the hearing why he believed that China would want to engage in disarmament
talks with the United States and Russia given its much smaller nuclear arsenal,
Trachtenberg replied that he couldn’t “get into the mind of the Chinese
leadership.” But he said that “China should accept the responsibilities of a
major power in the world today” by “engaging with respect to its nuclear
arsenal.”
China
is estimated to
possess roughly 300 nuclear warheads according to the Federation of American
Scientists. In contrast, the United States and Russia are believed to
possess over 6,000 warheads each.
“To be
clear, I welcome the administration's efforts to expand the scope of arms
control negotiations,” Menendez noted. “However, given the challenges inherent
in reaching new agreements with Russia and China, I strongly believe the
limitations and verification measures of New START must remain in place while
any such negotiation occurs.”
He added
that any “new initiative must not serve as an excuse for suddenly withdrawing
from another international agreement,” referring to earlier administration
decisions to withdraw from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
Sen.
James Risch (R-Idaho), the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
made several questionable claims about New START and related issues at the May
15 arms control hearing. Below are rebuttals to some of those claims.
CLAIM:
“We have had four agreements with Russia – New START, the INF Treaty, the Open
Skies Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Russian compliance is
problematic across the board. ”
FACT:
The United States alleges Russia to be in noncompliance with several arms
control agreements. But New START is not one of them. Thompson stated in her
written testimony that
“We are implementing the New START Treaty and verifying Russian compliance.”
CLAIM:
“Russia also claims to be enhancing their strategic systems, developing a new
high-yield warhead, and new delivery systems that can carry multiple warheads.
Why would Russia build a new ballistic missile that can carry more warheads
than allowed by New START?”
FACT:
New START limits the total number of accountable deployed strategic warheads
and missiles each party can field. The treaty does not limit that number of
warheads an individual strategic delivery system can carry.
CLAIM:
“Ms. Thompson, would you agree with me that in order for New START to give U.S.
the protections that we want and expect from it that Russia would have to allow
the kind of surveillance and the–and the kind of verifications that are given
to U.S. under the Open Skies Treaty? Would you agree with that?”
FACT:
Risch implied during the hearing that the data gathered by the United States as
part of the Treaty on Open Skies is necessary to verify New START. But the Open
Skies Treaty and New START are two different agreements. The United States
doesn’t rely on the Open Skies Treaty to verify New START. The United States
has raised concerns about Russia’s compliance with the Open Skies Treaty. But
those concerns have no impact on the ability of the United States to verify
Russia’s compliance with New START.
CLAIM:
“And a number of us were adamantly opposed to it [New START] for a lot of the
reasons.... And one of them was … modernization. And we were promised … these
modernization efforts. And it's been a real disaster in that regard. We just
haven't followed through on it and it's–it's very unfortunate. One of the many
reasons why I oppose … a gratuitous five-year extension, given where we are.”
FACT: In
November 2010, when the Senate was debating New START, the Obama administration
pledged to spend about $85 billion between fiscal years 2011 and 2020 on
nuclear weapons activities at the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA). (Separately the Defense Department identified $100 billion in planned
spending on delivery system sustainment and modernization, though it was never
entirely clear what this number included).
Spending
on NNSA weapons activities over the 10-year period between fiscal years 2011
and 2020 will exceed what was projected (see chart at right). The Obama
administration initially kept pace with the pledged levels, then had to cut
back due to the unwillingness of House Republican appropriators to fund the
requested amounts and later the 2011 Budget Control Act, and then returned to
the pledged levels in fiscal years 2016 and 2017. The Trump administration for
its part has blown way above the levels projected in 2010. Spending on nuclear
weapons by the Defense Department has greatly exceeded $100 billion since fiscal
year 2011.
A
new poll published
in May by the Center for International and Security Studies at the University
of Maryland showed that an overwhelming 82 percent of Americans support
extending New START. According to the poll, 89 percent of Democrats and 77
percent of Republicans support extension. In addition, 83 percent of
respondents said they approve of continuing to have arms control treaties with
Russia.
STRATEGIC
STABILITY
The
deaths in late April of Senator
Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), former chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and Ellen
Tauscher, former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security, sent shockwaves throughout Washington and the arms control community.
In honor of their achievements in the area of nuclear weapons risk reduction,
several Members of Congress have signed on to bills praising Lugar and Tauscher
for their work.
On May
15 Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) and Todd Young (R-Ind.) introduced a resolution(S.Con.Res.16)
noting Lugar’s “indispensable contributions to international security and reducing
nuclear weapons-related risks,” and expressing the sense of Congress that the
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) “continues to make an invaluable
contribution to United States and international security.” A House version of
the resolution (H.Con.Res.39)
was introduced by Reps. Brad Sherman (D-Calif.), Jim Banks (R-Ind.), Bill
Foster (D-Ill.), Jeff Fortenberry (R-Neb.), Ben Ray Lujan (D-N.M.), and Chuck Fleischmann
(R-Tenn.).
Additionally,
the Chair and Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Reps.
Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.) and Michael McCaul (R-Texas), respectively, renamed their
bipartisan legislation on New START the “Richard
G. Lugar and Ellen O. Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nuclear Forces.”
The bill
expresses the Sense of Congress that New START should be extended by five years
unless Russia is determined to be in material breach of the agreement or the
treaty is replaced by a pact that contains equal or greater verifiable
constraints on Russia’s nuclear forces.
The
chairmen of three key House national security committees sent a May 16 letter
to Secretary of State Pompeo raising concerns about “the abuse of
classification and politicization of intelligence regarding Iran and other
countries” in the department’s annual report on “Adherence to and Compliance
with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments.”
Reps.
Adam Smith (D-Wash.), Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), and Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.), the
heads of the House Armed Services, Intelligence, and Foreign Affairs
Committees, respectively, warned of
the “perils of ignoring and ‘cherry-picking’ intelligence” and asserted that
the unclassified version of the report did not comply with the department’s
legal requirements.
The
letter from House committee leaders followed a May
2 letter to Pompeo spearheaded by Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), which
also demanded answers on the alleged politicization of the compliance report.
The 2019 State Department
report was shorter than it had been in the past and
included a major focus on Iran and almost no focus on nuclear arms control with
Russia, including the INF Treaty. Reuters
reported that the preparation of the report provoked a dispute between
U.S. intelligence agencies and some State Department officials who were
concerned that the document politicized and slanted assessments about Iran.
On May
13, The Washington Post reported that
the State Department official in charge of the compliance report, Yleem
Poblete, had resigned for unexplained reasons. Aides and officials familiar
with the situation noted that Poblete clashed frequently with her boss,
Undersecretary Thompson, including on the compliance report.
|
Key
dates and events relevant to U.S.-Russian arms control and disarmament:
|
June
26
|
NATO
Defense Ministers will discuss Post-INF Treaty issues, Brussels.
|
|
June
28-29
|
G-20
Meeting in Osaka, Japan. Trump, Putin, and Xi to meet.
|
|
Aug. 2
|
The
date by which the United States will formally withdraw from the INF Treaty if
the compliance dispute with Russia is not resolved.
|
|
December
2019
|
NATO
Heads of State and Government Meeting, London.
|
New
Resources and Analyses
- “The
relationship between the US and Russia in the Trump Era,” by Dmitri
Trenin, InsideOver, May 14, 2019.
- “Backgrounder:
Pompeo-Lavrov to Discuss Nuclear Arms Control,” Arms Control
Association press release, May 13, 2019.
- “The
INF Treaty and the New START Crisis and the Future of the NPT,” Statement
of NGO Representatives and Experts to the 2019 NPT Prep Com for the 2020
Review Conference, United Nations, May 1, 2019.
- “Trump
Arms Control Gambit: Serious or a Poison Pill?” by Daryl G.
Kimball, Arms Control Today, May 2019.
- “Trump
Increases Budget for Banned Missiles,” by Kingston Reif, Arms Control
Today, May 2019.
- “REMARKS:
Gorging at the Nuclear Buffet Table,” by Sen. Chris Van Hollen, Arms
Control Today, May 2019.
- “U.S.
Seeks Broader Nuclear Arms Pact,” by Kingston Reif and Shervin
Taheran, Arms Control Today, May 2019.
- “Americans
on Nuclear Weapons,” by Steven Kull, Nancy Gallagher, Evan Fehsenfeld,
Evan Charles Lewitus, and Emmaly Read, Center for International and
Security Studies, University of Maryland, May 2019.
- “United
States nuclear forces, 2019,” by Hans M. Kristensen and Matt
Korda, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 29, 2019.
- “Does
Russia have a launch-on-warning posture? The Soviet Union Didn’t,” by
Pavel Podvig, Russian strategic nuclear forces blog, April 29, 2019.
- “An
EU-Russia deal to replace the INF Treaty?” by Sico van der Meer and
Michal Onderco, European Leadership Network, March 8, 2019.
- “Russian
nuclear forces, 2019,” by Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, March 4, 2019.
Also on
ArmsControl.org
May 17,
2019
May 16,
2019
May 20,
2019
May 3, 2019
May 2, 2019
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