Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy,
(202) 463-8270 x102
Updated:
July 2019
Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif,
U.S. Secretary of State' John Kerry, and European Union High Representativ
Catherine Ashton meet Sept. 25 at the Waldorf Astoria in New York.
Iran and six world powers known as
the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States) reached a historic nuclear deal on July 14, 2015 that limited Iran's
nuclear program and enhanced monitoring in exchange for relief from nuclear
sanctions. Prior to that, Iran had been engaged in efforts to acquire the
capability to build nuclear weapons for more than two decades. Although it
remained uncertain whether Tehran would have made the final decision to build
nuclear weapons, it had developed a range of technologies, including uranium
enrichment, warhead design, and delivery systems, that would give it this
option in a relatively short time frame. Tehran maintains that its nuclear
activities are entirely peaceful.
What follows is a chronological
recount of the most significant developments in Iran’s nuclear program,
international efforts to negotiate a settlement to address this controversial
issue, and implementation of the agreement reached by Iran and the P5+1 on July
14, 2015.
Skip To: 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019
November 1967: Iran’s first nuclear reactor, the U.S. supplied
five-megawatt Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) goes critical. It operates on
uranium enriched to about 93 percent (it is converted to run on 20 percent in
1993,) which the United States also supplies.
|
February 1970: The Iranian parliament ratifies the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
1974: Shah Reza Pahlavi establishes the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran (AEOI) and announces plans to generate about 23,000
megawatts of energy over 20 years, including the construction of 23 nuclear
power plants and the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle.
1979: The Iranian Revolution and the seizure of the U.S.
embassy in Tehran result in a severing of U.S.-Iranian ties and damages Iran’s
relationship with the West. Iranian nuclear projects are halted.
January 19, 1984: The U.S. Department of State adds Iran to its list
of state sponsors of terrorism, effectively imposing sweeping sanctions on
Tehran.
1987: Iran acquires technical schematics for building a
P-1 centrifuge from the Abdul Qadeer Khan network.
1992: Congress passes the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation
Act of 1992, which prohibits the transfer of controlled goods or technology
that might contribute “knowingly and materially” to Iran’s proliferation of
advanced conventional weapons.
1993: Conversion of the TRR is completed by Argentina’s
Applied Research Institute. It now runs on fuel enriched to just less than 20
percent, 115 kilograms of which is provided by Argentina; the contract for the
conversion was signed in 1987.
August 5, 1996: The U.S. Congress passes the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act, also known as the Iran Sanctions Act, that penalizes foreign and
U.S. investment exceeding $20 million in Iran’s energy sector in one year.
August 2002: The National Council of Resistance on Iran, the
political wing of the terrorist organization Mujahideen-e Khalq (MeK), holds a
press conference and declares Iran has built nuclear facilities near Natanz and
Arak.
September 12, 2003: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board
of Governors adopts a resolution calling for Iran to suspend all enrichment –
and reprocessing- related activities. The resolution requires Iran to declare
all material relevant to its uranium-enrichment program and allow IAEA
inspectors to conduct environmental sampling at any location. The resolution
requires Iran to meet its conditions by October 31st 2003.
October 21, 2003: Iran agrees to meet IAEA demands by the October 31st deadline.
In a deal struck between Iran and European foreign ministers, Iran agrees to
suspend its uranium–enrichment activities and ratify an additional protocol requiring
Iran to provide an expanded declaration of its nuclear activities and granting
the IAEA broader rights of access to sites in the country.
June 18, 2004: The IAEA rebukes Iran for failing to cooperate with
IAEA inspectors. Iran responds by refusing to suspend enrichment-related
activities as it had previously pledged.
November 14, 2004: Iran notifies the IAEA that it will suspend
enrichment-related activities following talks with France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom. According to the so-called Paris Agreement, Iran would maintain
the suspension for the duration of talks among the four countries. As a result,
the IAEA Board of Governors decides not to refer Tehran to the UN Security
Council.
February 27, 2005: Russia and Iran conclude a nuclear fuel supply
agreement in which Russia would provide fuel for the Bushehr reactor it is
constructing and Iran would return the spent nuclear fuel to Russia. The
arrangement is aimed at preventing Iran from extracting plutonium for nuclear
weapons from the spent nuclear fuel.
August 8, 2005: Iran begins producing uranium hexafluoride at its
Isfahan facility. As a result, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom halt
negotiations with Tehran.
September 24, 2005: The IAEA adopts a resolution finding Iran in
noncompliance with its safeguards agreement by a vote of 22-1 with 12 members
abstaining. The resolution says that the nature of Iran’s nuclear activities
and the lack of assurance in their peaceful nature fall under the purview of
the UN Security Council, paving the way for a future referral.
February 4, 2006: A special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors
refers Iran to the UN Security Council. The resolution “deems it necessary for
Iran to” suspend its enrichment-related activities, reconsider the construction
of the Arak heavy-water reactor, ratify the additional protocol to its
safeguards agreement, and fully cooperate with the agency’s investigation.
February 6, 2006: Iran tells the IAEA that it will stop voluntarily
implementing the additional protocol and other non-legally binding inspection
procedures.
April 11, 2006: Iran announces that it has enriched uranium for the
first time. The uranium enriched to about 3.5 percent was produced at the
Natanz pilot enrichment plant.
June 6, 2006: China, France, Germany, Russia the United Kingdom, and
the United Sates (the P5+1, referring to the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council and Germany) propose a framework agreement to Iran offering
incentives for Iran to halt its enrichment program for an indefinite period of
time.
July 31, 2006: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1696,
making the IAEA’s calls for Iran to suspend enrichment –related and
reprocessing activities legally binding for the first time.
August 22, 2006: Iran delivers a response to the P5+1 proposal,
rejecting the requirement to suspend enrichment but declaring that the package
contained “elements which may be useful for a constructive approach.”
December 23, 2006: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution
1737, imposing sanctions on Iran for its failure to suspend its
enrichment-related activities. The sanctions prohibit countries from
transferring sensitive nuclear- and missile-related technology to Iran and
require that all countries freeze the assets of ten Iranian organizations and
twelve individuals for their involvement in Iran’s nuclear and missile
programs.
March 24, 2007: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts
Resolution 1747 in response to Iran’s continued failure to comply with the council’s
demand to suspend Uranium enrichment.
August 21, 2007: Following three rounds of talks in July and August,
the IAEA and Iran agree on a “work plan” for Iran to answer long-standing
questions about its nuclear activities, including work suspected of being
related to nuclear weapons development.
December 3, 2007: The United States publicly releases an
unclassified summary of a new National Intelligence Estimate report on Iran’s
nuclear program. The NIE says that the intelligence community judged “with high
confidence” that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003
and assessed with moderate confidence that the program had not resumed as of
mid-2007. The report defines Iran’s nuclear weapons program as “design and
weaponization work” as well as clandestine uranium conversion and enrichment.
The NIE also said that Iran was believed to be technically capable of producing
enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon between 2010 and 2015.
March 3, 2008: The UN Security Council passes Resolution 1803,
further broadening sanctions on Iran. It requires increased efforts on the part
of member states to prevent Iran from acquiring sensitive nuclear or missile
technology and adds 13 persons and seven entities to the UN blacklist.
June 14, 2008: The P5+1 present a new comprehensive proposal to Iran
updating its 2006 incentives package. The new proposal maintained the same
basic framework as the one in 2006, but highlighted an initial
“freeze-for-freeze” process wherein Iran would halt any expansion of its
enrichment activities while the UN Security Council agreed not to impose
additional sanctions.
February 3, 2009: Iran announces that it successfully carried out its
first satellite launch, raising international concerns that Iran’s ballistic
missile potential was growing.
April 8, 2009: Following an Iran policy review by the new Obama
administration, the United States announces that it would participate fully in
the P5+1 talks with Iran, a departure from the previous administration’s policy
requiring Iran to meet UN demands first.
June 12, 2009: Iran holds presidential elections. Incumbent
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is declared the winner amid many indications that the
election was rigged. This sparks weeks of protests within Iran and delays
diplomatic efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program.
September 25, 2009: United States President Barack Obama,
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy
announced that Iran has been constructing a secret, second uranium-enrichment
facility, Fordow, in the mountains near the holy city of Qom. IAEA spokesman
Marc Vidricaire said that Iran informed the agency September 21 about the
existence of the facility, but U.S. intelligence officials said Iran offered
the confirmation only after learning that it had been discovered by the United
States.
October 1, 2009: The P5+1 and Iran agree “in principle” to a
U.S.-initiated, IAEA-backed, proposal to fuel the TRR. The proposal entails
Iran exporting the majority of its 3.5 percent enriched Uranium in return for
20 percent-enriched uranium fuel for the TRR, which has exhausted much of its
supply. This agreement was later met with domestic political opposition in
Iran, resulting in attempts by Tehran to change the terms of the “fuel swap.”
February 9, 2010: Iran begins the process of producing 20 percent
enriched uranium, allegedly for the TRR.
May 17, 2010: Brazil, Iran, and Turkey issue a joint declaration
attempting to resuscitate the TRR fuel-swap proposal. In the declaration, Iran
agrees to ship 1,200 kilograms of 3.5 percent enriched uranium to Turkey in
return for TRR fuel from France and Russia. France, Russia, and the United
States reject the arrangement, citing Iran’s larger stockpile of 3.5
percent-enriched uranium and the failure of the declaration to address Iran’s
enrichment to 20 percent.
June 9, 2010: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1929,
significantly expanding sanctions against Iran. In addition to tightening
proliferation-related sanctions and banning Iran from carrying out
nuclear-capable ballistic missile tests, the resolution imposes an arms embargo
on the transfer of major weapons systems to Iran.
June 24, 2010: Congress adopts the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act; tightening U.S. sanctions against firms
investing in Iran’s energy sector, extending those sanctions until 2016, and
imposing new sanctions on companies that sell refined petroleum to Iran.
July 26, 2010: The EU agrees to further sanctions against Iran. A
statement issued by EU member state foreign ministers refers to the new
sanctions as “a comprehensive and robust package of measures in the areas of
trade, financial services, energy, [and] transport, as well as additional
designations for [a] visa ban and asset freeze.
September 16, 2010: The Stuxnet computer virus is first identified by a
security expert as a directed attack against an Iranian nuclear-related
facility, likely to be the Natanz enrichment plant.
January 21-22, 2011: Following a December meeting in Geneva, the P5+1 meets
with Iran in Istanbul, but the two sides do not arrive at any substantive
agreement. Iran’s two preconditions for further discussions on a fuel-swap plan
and transparency measures, recognition of a right to enrichment and the lifting
of sanctions, were rejected by the P5+1.
February 16, 2011: U.S. intelligence officials tell a Senate
committee that Iran has not yet decided whether it wants to develop nuclear
weapons but is keeping that option open through development of its material
capabilities.
May 8, 2011: Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant begins
operations and successfully achieves a sustained chain reaction two days later,
according to Atomstroyexport, the Russian state-owned company constructing and
operating the plant.
June 8, 2011: Iran announces that it intends to triple the
rate of 20 percent-enriched uranium production using more-advanced centrifuge
designs. It also says it will move production to the Fordow enrichment plant
near Qom, which is still under construction.
July 12, 2011: Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov unveils a
proposal wherein Iran would take steps to increase cooperation with the IAEA
and carry out confidence-building measures in return for a gradual easing of
sanctions.
October 21, 2011: EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, sends
a letter to Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili calling for “meaningful
discussions on concrete confidence-building steps” to address international
concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
November 8, 2011: The IAEA releases a report detailing a range of
activities related to nuclear weapons development in which Iran is suspected to
have engaged as part of a structured program prior to 2004. The report raises
concerns that some weapons-related activities occurred after 2003. The
information in the report is based primarily on information received from other
countries, but also includes information from the agency’s own investigation.
The findings appear consistent with the U.S. 2007 National Intelligence
Estimate on Iran.
December 31, 2011: As part of the fiscal year 2012 National Defense
Authorization Act, Congress passes legislation that will allow the United
States to sanction foreign banks if they continue to process transactions with
the Central Bank of Iran.
January 2012: The EU passes a decision that will ban all member
countries from importing Iranian oil beginning July 1, 2012. Other provisions
of the decision will prevent member countries from providing the necessary
protection and indemnity insurance for tankers carrying Iranian oil.
January 29-31, 2012: Following an exchange of letters between Iran and the
IAEA, it was agreed that an Agency team would travel to Tehran to begin
discussions on the IAEA’s investigations into the possible military dimensions
of Iran’s nuclear program laid out in the November 2011 IAEA report.
February 15, 2012: Jalili responds to Ashton’s Oct. 21 letter,
while Iran simultaneously announces a number of nuclear advances, including the
domestic production of a fuel plate for the TRR.
April 14, 2012: Iran meets with the P5+1 in Istanbul for talks
both sides call “positive.” They agree on a framework of continuing
negotiations with a step-by-step process and reciprocal actions.
May 23-24, 2012: Iran and the P5+1 meet in Baghdad for a second set of
talks.
June 18-19, 2012: Talks between Iran and the
P5+1 continue in Moscow. Representatives discuss the substance of a P5+1
proposal and an Iranian proposal. Ashton and Jalili announce that will
determine if political-level talks will continue after a technical-level
meeting in July.
July 3, 2012: Experts representing the six parties meet in Istanbul
to discuss the technical aspects of the P5+1 proposal and the Iranian proposal.
July 24, 2012: Schmid and Bagheri meet in Istanbul to discuss
the outcome of the technical level experts meeting and confirm that Ashton and
Jalili will talk to determine the future of the negotiations.
August 30, 2012: The IAEA reports that Iran increased the number of
centrifuges installed at the Fordow enrichment plant and is continuing to
produce uranium enriched to 20 percent in excess of its needs for the Tehran
Research Reactor.
September 2012: Ashton and Jalili meet in Istanbul to assess “common
points” reached at the low-level expert talks held in early July. The meeting
was not considered a formal negotiation.
September 27, 2012: In a speech to the UN General Assembly, Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu draws a red-line for an Israeli attack on
Iran. Netanyahu defines his red-line as Iran amassing enough uranium enriched
to 20 percent (approximately 250 kilograms), which, when further enriched, will
be enough for one bomb.
November 16, 2012: The IAEA reports that since August, Iran completed
installation of the approximately 2,800 centrifuges that Fordow is designed to
hold, although the number enriching remains constant. The number of cascades
producing 20 percent enriched uranium remains constant at Fordow. The report
also notes that Iran installed more centrifuges at Natanz, and continued producing
uranium enriched to 20 percent.
February 26, 2013: Iran and the P5+1 resume negotiations in Almaty,
Kazakhstan over Iran's nuclear program. The P5+1 offers Iran an updated
proposal based largely on the 2012 package.
April 5-6, 2013: Iran and the P5+1 meet again in Almaty for a second
round of talks. At the end of the meetings, negotiators announce that no
further meetings are scheduled and the sides remain far apart.
June 3, 2013: At the quarterly meeting of the IAEA Board of
Governors, Director General Yukiya Amano says that the agency's talks with Iran
over clarifying the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program have
not made any progress.
June 14, 2013: Hassan Rouhani is elected president of Iran. A former
nuclear negotiator, he asserts that Iran will maintain its nuclear program, but
offers to be more transparent.
August 6, 2013: Three days after his inauguration, Iran's President
Hasan Rouhani calls for the resumption of serious negotiations with the P5+1 on
Iran's nuclear program.
September 26, 2013: The P5+1 foreign ministers meet with Iranian Foreign
Minister Javad Zarif on the sidelines on the UN General Assembly meeting in New
York. Zarif presents the P5+1 with a new proposal that U.S. Secretary of State
John Kerry describes as “very different in the vision” of possibilities for the
future. Zarif and Kerry meeting for a bilateral exchange after the larger group
meeting. Zarif later says he and Kerry move to agree “first, on the parameters
of the end game.” Zarif says Iran and the P5+1 will think about the order of
steps that need to be implemented to “address the immediate concerns of [the]
two sides” and move toward finalizing a deal within a year. The parties agree
to meet again on October 15 in Geneva.
September 27, 2013: President Barack Obama calls Iranian President Hassan
Rouhani, marking the highest level contact between the U.S. and Iran since
1979. While President Obama says that there will be significant obstacles to
overcome, he believes a comprehensive resolution can be reached.
In Vienna, Iran's new envoy to the
IAEA, Reza Najafi, meets with IAEA deputy director Herman Nackaerts to resume
negotiations on the structured approach to resolving the agency's concerns
about the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. Both sides
describe the meeting as constructive and agree to meet again on October 28.
October 15-16, 2013: Iran and the P5+1 meet in Geneva to resume
negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. At the end of the talks, the parties
release a joint statement describing the meetings as "substantive and
forward looking." The statement also says that Iran presented a new
proposal that the P5+1 carefully considered as an "important
contribution" to the talks. The proposal is understood to contain a broad
framework for a comprehensive agreement and an interim confidence building
measure to be instituted over the next 3-6 months, but no details are given as
the parties agreed to keep the negotiations confidential.
Wendy Sherman, Undersecretary of
State for Political Affairs, says after the talks that Iran approached the
meetings "with a candor" she had not heard in her two years of
negotiating with Tehran. The parties agree to meet again November 7-8 in Geneva
with an experts level meeting October 30-31.
October 28-29, 2013: Iran meets with the IAEA to continue discussions over
the agency's investigations into Iran's past nuclear activities with possible
military dimensions. According to a joint statement, Iran presented a new
proposal at the talks that contained "practical measures" to
"strengthen cooperation and dialogue with a view to future resolution of
all outstanding issues." Iran and the IAEA agree to meet again in Tehran
on November 11.
November 7-10, 2013: The P5+1 and Iran meet in Geneva to continue negotiations
over Iran's nuclear program. On November 8, with the expectation that a deal is
close, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry flies to Geneva to join the talks, as
do the foreign ministers from the other P5+1 countries. The parties fail to
reach an agreement on a first-phase deal, but announce that talks will continue
on November 20 in Geneva.
Secretary Kerry says in Nov. 10 press
conference that the parties "narrowed the differences" and made
significant progress toward reaching an agreement during the talks.
November 11, 2013: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and Ali Akbar
Salehi meet in Tehran to continue talks on an approach for the agency's
investigations into Iran's past nuclear activities with possible military
dimensions. Amano and Salehi sign a Framework for Cooperation Agreement. The
framework lays out initial practical steps to be take by Iran within three
months, including allowing IAEA access to the Heavy Water Production Plant at
Arak and the Gchine uranium mine, and providing the agency with information on
new research reactors and nuclear power plants that Iran intends to build. The
statement commits the parties to cooperation "aimed at ensuring the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through the resolution
of all outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the
IAEA."
November 20-24, 2013: Iran and the P5+1 meet again in Geneva to continue
negotiations. On November 23, the foreign ministers from the P5+1 join the
negotiations. Early on November 24, Iranian Minister Javad Zarif and Catherine
Ashton, leader of the P5+1 negotiating team, sign an agreement called the Joint
Plan of Action. It lays out specific steps for each side in a six-month,
first-phase agreement, and the broad framework to guide negotiations for a
comprehensive solution.
The first-phase pauses further
developments in Iran's nuclear program, rolls back significant elements like
the stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium, and requires more extensive IAEA
monitoring and access to nuclear sites. In return, Iran receives limited
sanctions relief, repatriation of limited assets frozen abroad, and a
commitment that no new nuclear-related sanctions will be imposed on Iran for
the duration of the agreement. For more details on the agreement, click here.
The plan will establish a Joint
Commission to monitor the agreement and work with the IAEA. The six month
period can be extended by mutual consent of both parties.
December 8, 2013: Under the terms of the Framework for Cooperation
Agreement the IAEA visits the Arak Heavy Water Production Plant.
December 9-12, 2013: The P5+1 and Iran meet in Geneva at the technical
level to begin discussions on the implementation of the Nov. 24 Joint Plant of
Action.
December 11, 2013: Iran and the IAEA meet again in Vienna to review
progress made on the six actions that Iran agreed to take as part of the
Framework for Cooperation Agreement. The parties also begin discussing the next
practical steps for Iran to take and initially plan to meet again on Jan. 21 to
finalize the measures. The meeting is later postponed at the request of Iran to
Feb. 8.
December 30-31, 2013: Technical level discussions between Iran and the P5+1
on implementing the Joint Plan of Action continue in Geneva.
January 9-10, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 meet for a third time in Geneva to
discuss implementation. The parties reach an agreement and return to their
respective capitals for approval.
January 12, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 announce that implementation of the
Joint Plan of Action will begin on Jan. 20.
January 20, 2014: Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action begins. The
IAEA issues a report on Iran's compliance with the deal. The report states that
Iran is adhering to the terms of the agreement, including, halting enrichment
of uranium to 20 percent, beginning to blend down half of the stockpile of 20
percent enriched uranium to 3.5 percent, and halting work on the Arak Heavy
Water Reactor. The IAEA also begins more intrusive and frequent inspections.
The United States and the European
Union also issue statements saying they have taken the necessary steps to waive
the specific sanctions outlined in the Nov. 24 deal and release a schedule of
payments for Iran to receive oil money held up in the other countries.
February 9, 2014: Iran and the IAEA meet to discuss further actions for
Iran to take under the November 11 framework agreement to resolve the agency’s
concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. They agree on additional actions,
including Iran’s past work on exploding bridgewire detonators, one of the past
activities with possible military dimensions.
February 17-20, 2014: Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 on the
comprehensive agreement begin in Vienna. The parties agree on an agenda and
framework to guide the talks
March 17-20, 2014: The P5+1 and Iran meet in Vienna to continue
negotiations.
April 7-9, 2014: Another round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 take
place in Vienna.
May 13-16, 2014: The P5+1 and Iran begin drafting the comprehensive
agreement.
May 21, 2014: Iran and the IAEA announce an additional five actions
for Iran to complete before August 25. Two of the activities that Iran agrees
to provide information on relate to possible military dimensions.
June 2-6, 2014: At the IAEA board meeting Director General Yukiya
Amano says that Iran is complying with the terms of the interim agreement and
the agency's investigation into the unresolved concerns about Iran's nuclear
program. The agency's quarterly report shows that Iran has neutralized nearly
all of its stockpile of 20 percent uranium gas by dilution or conversion
to powder form.
June 16-20, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 hold another round of negotiations
in Vienna.
July 2-19, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 continue talks in Vienna on a
comprehensive nuclear agreement. Early on June 19, the parties announce that
they will extend the talks through November 24 and keep the measures agreed to
in the interim agreement in place. The parties also announce additional actions
that Iran will take, namely converting 25 kg of uranium powder enriched to 20
percent into fuel plates and blending down about 3 tons of uranium enriched to
less than 2 percent. The P5+1 will also repatriate $2.8 billion in funds. The
parties agree to resume talks in August.
August 25, 2014: Iran misses a deadline to complete actions on five
areas of concern to the IAEA as part of the agreement that Iran and the agency
reached in November 2013.
September 5, 2014: The IAEA's quarterly report on Iran's nuclear program
shows that Iran is complying with the interim deal, but did not provide the
IAEA with information about past activities with possible military dimensions
(PMDs) by the Aug. 25 deadline.
September 18, 2014: Talks between Iran and the P5+1 resume in New York
City on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Both sides say that little
progress was made at the end of the talks.
October 14-16, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 meet in Vienna to continue
negotiations. Officials say that they remain focused on reaching an agreement
by the Nov. 24 deadline and progress was made during the talks.
November 9-10, 2014: Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif and U.S. Secretary of
State Kerry meet in Muscat, Oman to continue talks. P5+1 lead negotiator
Catherine Ashton is also present.
November 18-24, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 meet in Vienna to continue
negotiations on an comprehensive agreement. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
joins the talks on Nov. 20. French Foreign Minister Fabiusu, British Foreign
Secretary Hammond, and German Foreign Minister Steinmeier all join the talks
between Nov. 20 and 22. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov arrives on Nov. 23 and
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang on Nov. 24.
November 24, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 announce that negotiations will be
extended because progress was made on the difficult issues and both sides see a
path forward. The parties announce that they now aim to reach a political
agreement by March and then complete the technical annexes by June 30. Both
sides will continue to implement the conditions of the interim Joint Plan of
Action from November 2013. Iran and the P5+1 also make additional commitments.
December 15, 2014: Talks between the P5+1 and Iran continue in Geneva.
U.S. State Department officials say the talks are "good and
substantive." Parties plan to meet again in January.
December 24, 2014: Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif says in
a letter to his foreign counterparts that Iran’s goal remains to reach a
comprehensive nuclear deal that assures the world its nuclear program is
exclusively peaceful.
January 15-18, 2015: The P5+1 and Iran meet in Geneva to continue
negotiations.
January 21, 2015: In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on Jan. 21, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken says:
"We assess that we still have a credible chance of reaching a deal that is
in the best interest of America's security, as well as the security of our
allies."
January 23-24, 2015: Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman and European
Union Political Director Helga Schmid meet again with Iranian Deputy Foreign
Minister Abbas Araghchi in Zurich, Switzerland.
February 18-20, 2015: Talks between the P5+1 and Iran resume in
Vienna.
February 19, 2015: A report by the Director General of the IAEA
confirms that Iran is upholding its commitments under the interim deal,
including additional provisions from the November 2014 extension. The report
notes “Iran has continued to provide the Agency with managed access to
centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and
storage facilities.”
March 3, 2015: Prime Minister Netanyahu delivers a speech to a
joint session of Congress. His speech claims that the Iran deal “would
all but guarantee that Iran gets [nuclear] weapons, lots of them.”
March 9, 2015: Senator Tom Cotton and 46 other senators sign an
open letter to the Parliament of Iran. The letter warns that any deal reached
without legislative approval could be revised by the next president “with the
stroke of a pen.”
March 17-20, 2015: Talks between the P5+1 and Iran continue in
Lausanne. The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, says
to reporters "We have made progress on technical issues… One or two issues
remain and need to be discussed."
March 25-April 2, 2015: Negotiations continue in Lausanne. By March 29, all of
the Foreign Ministers from the seven countries involved and EU foreign policy
chief Federica Mogherini are present.
April 2, 2015: Iran and the P5+1 announce agreement on a general
framework that outlines the broad parameters of a nuclear deal. The United
States issues a more specific factsheet on the details. Iran and the P5+1 agree
to continue meeting to finalize a deal before June 30.
April 14, 2015: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously passes
legislation authored by Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) that will require the
President to submit the deal to Congress for a vote of approval or disapproval.
According to the legislation, the President will not be able to waive sanctions
during the 30 day Congressional review period.
April 15, 2015: Iran and the IAEA meet in Tehran to continue
discussing the agency's investigations into the possibly military dimensions of
Iran's nuclear program.
April 27, 2015: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign
Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif meet in New York on the sidelines of the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. Technical drafting work on the
annexes of the agreement is underway.
May 7, 2015: The Senate passes the Corker legislation 98-1 on
congressional review of an Iran nuclear deal.
May 12, 2015: EU and Iranian negotiators meet in Vienna to continue
drafting a comprehensive agreement.
June 26, 2015: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry arrives in
Vienna to continue negotiations on a nuclear deal with Iran and the P5+1. U.S.
Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz joins Kerry.
July 14, 2015: Iran and the P5+1 announce a comprehensive deal. Iran
and the IAEA announce a roadmap for the agency's investigation into the
possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.
July 19, 2015: The Obama administration sends the comprehensive deal
and supporting documents to Congress, beginning the 60 day review period
mandated by the Iran Nuclear Deal Review Act.
July 20, 2015: The UN Security Council unanimously passes a
resolution endorsing the nuclear deal and the lifting of UN Security Council
nuclear sanctions once key steps are taken in the deal.
August 15, 2015: The IAEA confirms that Iran submitted documents and
explanations to answer the agency's unresolved concerns about past activities
that could be related to nuclear weapons development.
September 2, 2015: The 34th Senator announces support for the
nuclear deal with Iran, meaning that Congress will not have the support to
override a presidential veto on a resolution disapproving of the deal.
September 8, 2015: Four additional Senators announce that they will
support the nuclear deal with Iran, bringing the total number to 42. This
important milestone will prevent the Senate from reaching the 60 vote threshold
required for ending debate and moving to vote on a resolution of disapproval.
September 9, 2015: The IAEA announces that is submitted follow-up
questions to Iran based on the information provided by Iran on Aug. 15. The
IAEA is ahead of its Sept. 15 deadline to submit the questions.
September 10, 2015: A vote to end debate and move to vote on a resolution
of disapproval fails to reach the required 60 votes on the Senate floor. The
measure fails 58-42. Four democrats joined the 54 Republicans in favor of
moving to vote on the resolution of disaproval. Similar votes fail on Sept. 15
and Sept. 17.
September 11, 2015: A vote on a resolution of approval fails in the House
of Representatives, 269-162, with 25 Democrats voting joining the Republicans
in voting against the measure.
September 17, 2015: The congressional review period ends without passage
of a resolution of approval or a resolution of disapproval.
September 20, 2015: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and Deputy Director
General Tero Varjoranta visit the Parchin site at Iran. The IAEA has concerns
about Iran conducting explosive activities there relevant to a nuclear device.
Amano and Varjoranta confirm that environmental sampling was done at the site
under IAEA surveillance and the agency is now testing the samples.
October 4, 2015: A panel of Iranian lawmakers reviewing the JCPOA
release their assessment of the deal. The report issued says that the agreement
contains some security threats, such as allowing inspectors access to military
sites, but should go ahead.
October 10, 2015: Iran tests a medium-range ballistic missile, the Emad.
The Emad is a more precise version of the Shahab-3, believed to be capable of
carrying a 750 kg payload over 1,700 kilometers. The test is a violation of UN
Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010), which prohibits Iran from testing
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.
October 10, 2015: Iran's parliament approves a preliminary bill
supporting the Iran deal.
October 13, 2015: Iran's parliament approves a detailed bill supporting
the Iran deal.
October 14, 2015: Iran's Guardian Council ratifies the bill approved by
the parliament, completing Iran's internal review of the agreement.
October 15, 2015: The IAEA announces the activities laid out in the July
14 roadmap for the investigation into the past possible military dimensions of
Iran's nuclear program has been completed. The IAEA aims to complete its report
by Dec. 15.
October 18, 2015: Iran and the P5+1 formally adopt the nuclear deal.
Iran begins taking steps to restrict its nuclear program. The United States
issues waivers on nuclear-related sanctions to come into effect on
implementation day. The EU announces it passed legislation to lift
nuclear-related sanctions on implementation day.
October 18, 2015: Iran notifies the IAEA of that it will provisionally
implement its additional protocol and modified Code 3.1 to its safeguards
agreement as of implementation day.
October 19, 2015: The first meeting of the Joint Commission takes place
in Vienna. One of the purposes of the meeting is to set up working groups
called for under the deal, such as the working group on procurement and the
Arak reactor modification.
October 20, 2015: The Supreme Leader issues a statement endorsing the
nuclear deal and bill passed by the Iranian parliament.
October 21, 2015: The United States raises Iran's ballistic missile test
as a possible violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 at a meeting of
the Security Council.
November 21, 2015: Iran tests another medium-range ballistic missile in
violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1929.
December 2, 2015: The IAEA issues its assessment of Iran's past
activities related to nuclear weapons development (PMDs). The IAEA assess that
Tehran had an organized weapons program prior to 2003 and that some activities
continued, although not as an organized effort, through 2009. The report says
that the agency has no credible indication that nuclear material was diverted
from Iran's declared program or that any activities continued after 2009.
December 15, 2015: The IAEA Board of Governors holds a special meeting to
consider the Dec. 2 report on Iran's weaponization activities. The board passes
a resolution terminating past resolutions on Iran's nuclear program and ending
the investigation. The board requests that the IAEA continue reporting on
Iran's nuclear activities under the nuclear deal and report immediately on any
concerns that arise with Iran's implementation.
December 28, 2015: Iran announces that it shipped 8.5 tonnes of low-enriched
uranium, including the 20 percent enriched material in scrap and waste, out of
the country to Russia. In return, Iran receives 140 tonnes of uranium
yellowcake.
January 11, 2016: Iranian officials announce that the Arak reactor core
is being disabled. Iranian and P5+1 officials say that implementation day is
close.
January 16, 2016: The IAEA verifies that Iran met its nuclear related
commitments. Based on the IAEA report, Zarif and Mogherini announce
implementation day, triggering the lifting of sanctions. UN Security Council
Resolution 2231, which the Council passed in July to endorse the deal and
trigger the lifting of UN sanctions comes into effect. Prior resolutions on
Iran's nuclear program are terminated.
January 17, 2016: The U.S. Treasury Department issues an announcement
that new sanctions will be imposed on 11 individuals and entities involved with
Iran's ballistic missile programs. U.S. President Barack Obama says that
with implementation of the nuclear deal Iran will not obtain nuclear weapons
and that "the region, the United States, and the world will be more
secure." Iranian President Hassan Rouhani gives a speech saying that
"Iran's nuclear rights have been accepted by all."
January 26, 2016: Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, says that Iran and China had signed a basic agreement to
formalize China’s assistance in redesigning the Arak reactor during Chinese
President Xi Jinping’s visit to Iran the previous week.
February 11, 2016: Abbas Qaidaari, director of the Defense and Security
Studies Department at the Center for Strategic Studies in the Office of the
Iranian President, writes in a piece for the Atlantic Council that “Iran’s
strategic defense plan currently sees no justification” for missile ranges
greater than 2,000-2,300 kilometers. Qaidaari said that although Tehran is
committed to developing its “deterrent conventional defense capabilities,” it
will limit its ballistic missiles to that range.
February 26, 2016: The IAEA issues its first quarterly report on Iran's
post-implementation day nuclear activities. The report notes that Iran is
meeting its nuclear obligations, although it slightly exceeded a cap set on the
stockpile of heavy water allowed under the agreement. The IAEA notes that Iran
had 130.9 metric tons of heavy water, slightly above the 130 metric ton limit
set by the deal, but shipped out 20 metric tons on February 24 to stay below
the limit.
March 9, 2016: Iran test launches two different variations of
the Qadr medium-range ballistic missile.
March 14, 2016: U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power says she
raised Iran's ballistic missile tests at a Security Council meeting, saying
that the tests are inconsistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2231.
March 15, 2016: Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif defends
Iran's missile launches saying that the missiles are permissible under UN
Security Council Resolution 2231 because the missiles are not designed to be
capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
March 21, 2016: Then-candidate Trump delivers remarks to the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s annual conference, noting his
“number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”
April 22, 2016: Officials from Iran and the United States meet in
Vienna, signing a purchase agreement for Washington to buy 32 metric tons of
heavy water for $8.6 million. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif meet in New York to discuss
implementation of the deal. In remarks after the meeting Kerry says that
Washington is working to clarify confusion amongst foreign banks about the
sanctions lifted in January.
May 27, 2016: The IAEA issues its quarterly report on Iran's
implementation of the nuclear deal. The report shows Iran is abiding by
restrictions under the agreement and inspectors have been able to access
certain Iranian sites using complimentary access visits.
July 18, 2016: Iran's research and development plan for advanced
centrifuge machines, leaked to the AP, is reported on in the press.
July 29, 2016: In a statement, the IAEA notes it sent a letter
to Iran denying it was the source of leaked information about Iranian plans for
phasing in advanced centrifuges in 2027.
September 8, 2016: The IAEA releases its third quarterly report
since JCPOA implementation day, showing Iran continues to abide by its
restrictions under the JCPOA. The report notes that Iran removed 96 IR-1
centrifuges from the storage area at Natanz to replace damaged centrifuges that
were enriching uranium.
September 21, 2016: The U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of
Foreign Assets Control grants Airbus and Boeing permission to sell planes to
Iran. The licenses were made possible by sanctions waived as part of the
JCPOA.
September 22, 2016: Iran and the P5+1 meet in New York to review
progress on JCPOA implementation and the pace of sanctions relief. The meeting
marks the first ministerial-level meeting since the announcement of the deal’s
implementation in January. Speaking to the UN General Assembly on the same day,
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani expresses concern over the slow pace of
sanctions relief and claims the U.S. has been in lack of compliance.
September 26, 2016: Sergei Kireienko, head of Rosatom, the state-run
Russian nuclear energy company, announces that Moscow purchased 38 tons of
heavy-water from Iran. The material was delivered to Russia in mid-September.
November 2, 2016: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano expresses
concern to Iranian leaders regarding the size of Iran’s heavy water stock. On
November 8th, the Agency confirms that Iran’s heavy water stock, at
130.1 tons, exceeds the 130 metric ton limit outlined in the deal, marking the
second time Iran has exceeded the limit. On November 9th, Iran
informs the IAEA of plans to remain in compliance by transferring heavy water
out of the country.
November 8, 2016: Donald Trump is elected as the 45th President
of the United States. During the presidential campaign, Trump referred to the
JCPOA as the worst deal ever negotiated and pledged to renegotiate it. The
U.S.’s European allies in the P5+1 previously signaled they would resist
efforts to renegotiate the deal.
November 20, 2016: IAEA releases its fourth quarterly report on
Iranian nuclear program since JCPOA implementation day. The report notes that
Iran had 130.1 metric tons of heavy water, slightly over the 130 metric tons
permitted under the deal. The IAEA report says Iran plans to transfer heavy
water out of the country.
December 1, 2016: Congress passes a 10-year extension of the Iran
Sanctions Act (ISA), which becomes law on December 15th. Extension
of the ISA is consistent with U.S. obligations under the JCPOA, although many
of the ISA’s provisions are being waived under Washington’s commitments under
the agreement.
December 6, 2016: IAEA verifies that all 11 metric tons of heavy
water shipped out of Iran have reached their destination and are in storage,
bringing Iran back within the limit on heavy water of 130 metric tons
established by the JCPOA.
December 13, 2016: President Rouhani announces Iran will respond to
Washington’s extension of the Iran Sanctions Act by researching and developing
nuclear propulsion for marine vessels.
December 15, 2016: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry reissues
sanctions waivers early, on the same day that the ISA renewal comes into
effect, to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the JCPOA.
December 18, 2016: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano visits Iran,
meeting with President Rouhani and Ali Akhbar Salehi, head of Iran’s Atomic
Energy Organization. Amano and Salehi discussed issues related to
implementation. Further, Amano sought clarification on Iran’s announcement
regarding naval nuclear reactor research and development.
December 23, 2016: The IAEA, at the request of Federica Mogherini,
circulates decisions made by the Joint Commission set up to oversee
implementation of the nuclear deal. The documents contain additional
information on hot cells, recovering waste uranium, describing and calculating
efficiency for advanced centrifuges, and utilizing the procurement channel.
January 12, 2017: In his confirmation hearing for the position of
Secretary of Defense, General Jim Mattis tells Congress that, while he believes
the JCPOA is an imperfect agreement, “when America gives her word, we have to
live up to it and work with our allies.” His remarks echo a previous statement
in April, when he noted there is “no going back” on the deal absent a clear
violation of the agreement.
Iran receives the first shipment in
an order of 100 planes purchased from Airbus. Sanctions waived as part of the
nuclear deal allow Iran to purchase new commercial aircraft.
January 15, 2017: IAEA verifies that Tehran has taken certain
steps to remove infrastructure and excess centrifuges from Fordow within the necessary
timeframe required by the JCPOA (one year after Implementation Day). Secretary
of Energy Moniz releases a statement noting “Iran successfully met the
milestone of removing excess centrifuges and infrastructure from Fordow,
demonstrating that the deal continues to limit Iran’s nuclear program so as to
provide confidence that Iran is not developing a nuclear weapon and maintain at
least a one year breakout time.”
January 28, 2017: Iran test fires a medium-range ballistic
missile, in defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. The test prompts
former NSA Michael Flynn, on February 1, to declare the United States has
placed Iran “on notice.”
February 9, 2017: EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini
travels to Washington for meetings with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,
former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, and members of Congress.
Mogherini notes that the JCPOA is key for the security of Europe given its
geographic proximity to Iran.
February 24, 2017: IAEA releases its first quarterly report on
Iranian nuclear activity in 2017, reporting on the size of Iran’s stockpile of
uranium enriched to 3.67 percent for the first time. The report notes that the
stockpile was 101.7 kilograms. The limit established by the deal is 300
kilograms.
March 23, 2017: Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) introduces a new
Iran sanctions bill, the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of
2017, targeting Iran’s ballistic missile program and support for terrorism.
March 31, 2017: Former Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken
and six former Obama administration officials release an op-ed in Foreign
Policy outlining their opposition to the Countering Iran’s
Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017.
April 18, 2017: Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, in a letter to
speaker of the House Paul Ryan, certifies to Congress that Iran is compliant in
meeting its obligations under the JCPOA.
April 23, 2017: Iran and China resolve a price dispute and
complete an agreement to modify Iran’s Arak reactor. China will work with Iran
to carry out modifications stipulated by the JCPOA to reduce the reactor’s
output of weapons-grade plutonium.
May 16, 2017: Ambassador Wendy Sherman, the lead U.S.
negotiator for the JCPOA, states her opposition to the Countering Iran’s
Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, noting its potential to undermine the
nuclear accord.
May 17, 2017: The U.S. renews sanctions waivers as required by
its JCPOA obligations, marking the first time the Trump administration has
waived sanctions and taken a proactive step to implement the deal.
May 19, 2017: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is re-elected
to a second term. EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini congratulates
Rouhani on Twitter and reaffirms the EU’s commitment to full JCPOA
implementation.
June 2, 2017: The IAEA releases its second quarterly report in 2017 on Iran’s implementation of the JCPOA,
reporting that Iran is meeting its obligations under the nuclear deal.
June 15, 2017: Countering Iran’s Destabilizing
Activities Act of 2017 (S.722)
passes the Senate by a vote of 98-2. The bill was amended to correct sections that violated the JCPOA,
but Iran continued to assert that the bill contradicts the spirit of the
deal.
June 20, 2017: The UN Secretary General releases the biannual report on UN Security Council Resolution 2231,
affirming that Iran is complying with the JCPOA but raising concerns about Iran’s ballistic
missile activity.
July 10, 2017: White House Spokesperson Sarah Huckabee
Sanders says that at the G20 summit, President Trump
encouraged foreign leaders not to do business with Iran, which Iranian Foreign
Minister Javad Zarif later cited as a failure on the part of the United States
to “implement its part of the bargain” in an interview.
July 17, 2017: The Trump administration reluctantly certifies Iran's
compliance with the JCPOA, delaying the announcement for hours and
issuing new non-nuclear sanctions on Iran the next day.
July 21, 2017: The Joint Commission of the JCPOA meets for the sixth time to address the implementation
of the agreement.
July 25, 2017: The U.S. House of Representatives passes H.R. 3364, the Countering Adversarial Nations
Through Sanctions Act, which
would impose new sanctions on Iran, North Korea and Russia.
August 31, 2017: In its third quarterly report, the IAEA finds that as
of Aug. 21, Iran’s stock of low-enriched uranium was 88.4 kg (194.89 pounds),
well below a 202.8-kg limit, and the level of enrichment did not exceed a 3.67
percent cap. Iran’s stock of heavy water, stood at 111 tons, below the 130 ton
limit.
September 20, 2017: The foreign ministers of China, France, Germany, Iran,
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States meet on the sidelines of the
UN General Assembly for the ministerial meeting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran. In
remarks following the meeting, EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini states that all agreed that all sides are implementing
the JCPOA.
September 22, 2017: Iran parades its new medium-range ballistic
missile tested in January, the Khoramshahr, with a range of about 2,000
km, in a military parade.
October 13, 2017: Trump declares that, as part of a broader new strategy
toward Iran, he will not certify under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
(INARA) that the suspension of sanctions under the JCPOA is "appropriate
and proportionate" to measures taken by Iran under the deal. Trump's
decertification itself does not violate the JCPOA. However, decertification
opens up a window of 60 days where Congress may re-introduce sanctions waived
under the nuclear deal with Iran under an expedited process. In his address,
Trump encourages Congress to enact legislation against the JCPOA's "sunset
clauses" which set dates after which certain restrictions under the deal
on Iran's nuclear program will no longer apply. Trump says if his concerns
about the deal are not resolved he will terminate the agreement.
Trump also states that he will
further sanction the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for its support
for terrorism, but does not designate the group as a terrorist organization.
Immediately following the
announcement, UK Prime Minister Theresa May, German Chancellor Angela Merkel
and French President Emmanuel Macron released a joint statement expressing
their continued support for the JCPOA.
November 13, 2017: The IAEA issues its fourth quarterly report for 2017
on Iran's implementation of the JCPOA. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano tells
the agency's Board of Governors that the nuclear-related commitments are being
implemented and that IAEA inspectors have had access to all locations they have
needed to visit.
December 13, 2017: The JCPOA Joint Commission meets for the seventh time to oversee the
implementation of the agreement.
December 15, 2017: UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres issues
the biannual report on the implementation of Resolution 2231. The
report notes that the nuclear deal is being implemented but finds that Iran has
violated the arms embargo provisions of Resolution 2231. The report also notes
that the secretariat is continuing to investigate allegations that ballistic
missiles launched at Saudi Arabia from Yemen were transferred by Iran to
the Houthis in violation of 2231. Iran denies the claims.
January 12, 2018: The Trump administration announces that it will re-issue waivers on nuclear-related
sanctions on Iran to meet U.S. obligations under the agreement. However, Trump
says he will not re-issue the waivers again and will withdraw from the deal
unless Congress passes legislation addressing what he describes as flaws in the
agreement. Trump says his administration is also engaging with European allies
on a supplemental agreement of unlimited duration that would impose sanctions
if Iran tests long-range missiles, thwarts inspections, or makes progress
toward a nuclear weapon.
January 26, 2018: The UN panel of experts assessing implementation
of sanctions on Yemen finds Iran in noncompliance with its obligations under
the arms embargo established by Resolution 2216. The report notesthat Iran did not take "necessary measures to
prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer” of short-range
ballistic missiles and other equipment. Iran disputes the report and argues that the evidence is
fabricated.
February 22, 2018: The IAEA issues its first quarterly report for 2018 on Iran's
implementation of the JCPOA. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano tells the
agency's Board of Governors that the nuclear-related commitments are being
implemented and that IAEA inspectors have had access to all locations they have
needed to visit. As of Feb. 12, 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched
up to 3.67% U-235 was 109.5 kg. The report notes that Iran informed the agency
of its intention to pursue naval nuclear propulsion in the future.
March 15, 2018: State Department Director of Policy Planning
Brian Hook meets with representatives from the E3 (France,
Germany, and the UK) in Berlin to continue discussions on the JCPOA and Trump's
demand for a 'supplemental' agreement with the Europeans that addresses
sunsets, ballistic missiles, and inspections.
March 16, 2018: The JCPOA Joint Commission meets to oversee implementation of the agreement.
March 19, 2018: EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini says at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council that
the EU is not considering new sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile activities,
amid reports that the E3 are developing such measures.
April 11, 2018: Political directors from the E3 (France, Germany, and
the UK) and the United States meet in Washington, DC to continue talks on
Trump's demand for a supplemental agreement that addresses sunsets, ballistic
missiles, and inspections.
April 11, 2018: China and Iran hold a seminar on civil
nuclear cooperation under the JCPOA in Beijing.
April 19, 2018: 500 British, French and German parliamentarians
urge U.S. members of Congress to help "keep the JCPOA alive" in
a letter.
April 24, 2018: U.S. President Trump hosts French President
Emmanuel Macron for his first state visit. Macron reports having very frank discussions with Trump about
the JCPOA and said that he and President Trump had agreed to work on a
"new deal" that keeps the JCPOA, but incorporates additional
measures, including on Iranian ballistic missiles.
May 8, 2018: President Trump announces that he is withdrawing the United States from
the JCPOA and signs a presidential memorandum to institute the "highest
level" of economic sanctions on Iran. In a statement, Secretary of the
Treasury Steve Mnuchin states that sanctions will be reimposed subject to
certain 90 day and 180 day "wind-down periods." In an address
following Trump's announcement Iranian President Rouhani announces that
Iran will continue negotiations with the other states in the agreement in
order to try to continue the deal without the United States. British Prime
Minister May, German Chancellor Merkel and French President Macron re-state their continued commitment to the deal and
pledge to work with all parties to make sure its terms are upheld. EU
foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini states that the EU is committed to the JCPOA as long as
Iran continues to implement its nuclear related commitments, as it has so far.
May 15, 2018: EU High Representative Federica Mogherini meets with
the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the
three European countries and Iran in two separate meetings to
discuss future coordinated work following the U.S. violation of the
JCPOA. They agree to "launch intensive expert
discussions" to find practical solutions to the following issues in
the next few weeks:
- "Maintaining and deepening economic relations
with Iran;
- The continued sale of Iran's oil and gas
condensate petroleum products and petrochemicals and related transfers;
- Effective banking transactions with Iran;
- Continued sea, land, air and rail transportation
relations with Iran;
- The further provision of export credit and
development of special purpose vehicles in financial banking, insurance
and trade areas, with the aim of facilitating economic and financial
cooperation, including by offering practical support for trade and
investment;
- The further development and implementation of
Memoranda of Understanding and contracts between European companies and
Iranian counterparts;
- Further
investments in Iran;
- The protection of European Union economic
operators and ensuring legal certainty;
- And last but not least, the further development
of a transparent, rules-based business environment in Iran."
May 17, 2018: The European Commission meets in Sofia and announces that it will pursue a "blocking
statute" to ban European companies and courts from complying with
U.S. sanctions against Iran.
May 21, 2018: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo presents the Trump administration's new strategy on
Iran after the U.S. violation of the JCPOA in a speech at the
Heritage Foundation, promising to "apply unprecedented financial pressure
on the Iranian regime" and work with allies to deter Iranian aggression.
If the United States were to pursue a new deal, Pompeo lists 12 demands
for Iran, including stopping enrichment, ending the proliferation of ballistic
missiles and the development of nuclear-capable missile systems
and allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency to have "unqualified
access to all sites throughout the entire country." In exchange, the
United States would be prepared to end "the principal components of every
one of our sanctions against the regime," as well as
re-establish full diplomatic and commercial relationships and allow
Iran to have "advanced technology."
May 24, 2018: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports
that Iran is implementing all nuclear related commitments under the
JCPOA in a quarterly report. Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67
percent uranium-235 is 123.9 kg, below the 300 kg limit set by the accord,
according to the report. The report notes that Iran is implementing the
Additional Protocol but that “timely and proactive cooperation by Iran in
providing such access would facilitate implementation of the Additional
Protocol and enhance confidence.”
June 6, 2018: Iran opens a new facility for centrifuge
production, an act which does not violate the JCPOA. Reza Najafi, Iran’s
ambassador to the IAEA, tells press June 6 that the decision to open the facility is the
“preparatory works for a possible scenario” if the JCPOA fails and reiterated
that Iran will not start “any activities contrary to the JCPOA” at this time.
The European Commission
adopts an update of the Blocking Statute to include extraterritorial
sanctions that the United States re-imposed on Iran and an update of the
European Investment Bank (EIB)'s External Lending Mandate to make Iran eligible
for investment activities by the EIB. "These measures are meant to help
protecting the interests of EU companies investing in Iran and to demonstrate
the EU's commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),"
reads a European Commission press release.
July 6, 2018: The JCPOA Joint Commission meets in Vienna and releases a statement on "the
way forward to ensure the continued implementation of the JCPOA in all its
aspects following the withdrawal of the United States from the
deal."
July 16, 2018: EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini confirms at a press conference that the United States
refused a request by France, Germany, the UK and the EU to exempt entities
doing legitimate business with Iran from U.S. sanctions penalties.
July 18, 2018: Iran's head of the Atomic Energy Organization,
Ali Akbar Salehi, announces that Iran built a new factory to produce rotors
for up to 60 IR-6 centrifuges a day. Salehi says building the facility does not
violate the JCPOA.
July 26, 2018: Ten Republican Senators write a letter to the French,
German, and British ambassadors to the United States urging compliance with the
sanctions reimposed by Trump and warning against efforts to block or circumvent
the measures. The letter says it would be "particularly troubling if you
sought to evade or undermine American statutes" and doing so "could
well prompt Congressional action."
August 6, 2018: In a joint statement the EU, French, German, and British foreign
ministers say they "deeply regret the re-imposition of sanctions by the
US" and note that they are "determined to protect European economic
operators engaged in legitimate business with Iran, in accordance with EU law
and with UN Security Council resolution 2231." They
reiterate that preserving the JCPOA is a "matter of respecting
international agreements and a matter of international security."
August 7, 2018: Certain sanctions measures reimposed by Trump May 8
come into full effect. The measures include restricting
Iran's purchase of U.S. dollars, trade in gold, precious metals,
aluminum, steel, coal, software, and transactions related to sovereign debt and
the automotive sector. Licenses allowing certain foodstuffs to be exported to
the United States and Iran to purchase commercial aircraft are also revoked.
August 16, 2018: Secretary of State Pompeo announces the creation of the Iran
Action Group,
responsible for "directing, reviewing, and coordinating all aspects"
of the State Department's Iran strategy and led by Brian Hook with
the title Special Representative for Iran.
August 22, 2018: Iran says that the UK will help with the re-design of
the Arak heavy water nuclear reactor to limit the amount of plutonium byproduct
it produces, a task the United States had committed to under the JCPOA.
Sen. Cruz (R-Texas), along with 15
republican senators, sends a letter to Treasury Secretary Mnuchin urging him to take
all necessary steps to ensure the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT) disconnects the Central Bank of Iran and all other
designated Iranian financial institutions.
August 23, 2018: The European Commission adopts an €18 million package for Iran, the first part of a larger €50 million
package, including €8 million assistance to the private sector.
August 27-28: The International Court of Justice hears
arguments from Iran and
the United States on Tehran's allegation that the U.S. reimposition of
sanctions violates the 1955 U.S.-Iranian Treaty of Amity and Economic
Relations. The United States contends that the court does not have jurisdiction
to hear the case.
September 12, 2018: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports
that Iran is implementing all nuclear-related commitments under the
JCPOA in a quarterly report. Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67
percent uranium-235 is 139.4 kg, below the 300 kg of UF6 limit set by the
accord, according to the report. Iran's stock of heavy water is 122.9 metric
tons, below the 130 metric ton limit.
September 24, 2018: The foreign ministers of China, France,
Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and EU foreign policy chief Federica
Mogherini meet in New York to discuss the implementation of the
JCPOA. The participants decide to establish a Special Purpose Vehicle "to
facilitate payments related to Iran's export (including oil) and imports, which
will assist and reassure economic operators pursuing legitimate business with
Iran."
September 25, 2018: U.S. President Donald Trump speaks at the UN General Assembly in New York.
"Iran’s leaders sow chaos, death, and destruction," he says, adding
that many countries in the Middle East supported his decision to withdraw from
the JCPOA and reimpose nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. "Additional
sanctions will resume November 5th, and more will follow. And we’re working
with countries that import Iranian crude oil to cut their purchases
substantially.... We ask all nations to isolate Iran’s regime as long as its
aggression continues. And we ask all nations to support Iran’s people as they
struggle to reclaim their religious and righteous destiny."
On the sidelines of the UN General
Assembly, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton, U.S.
Speical Representative for Iran Brian Hook, and representatives from Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, UAE and Israel attend the United Against Nuclear Iran summit. Pompeo
unveiled a new reportby the State Department's Iran Action Group which
chronicles "Iran's destructive activities." In his remarks,
Bolton warns "there will be hell to pay" if Iran
doesn't change its behavior.
September 26, 2018: U.S. President Donald Trump chairs a summit-level UN Security Council meeting,
officially about WMD non-proliferation, but which he tweeted would be
about Iran. While Trump criticizes the JCPOA in the meeting, nearly every other
leader in the council expresses support for the accord and encourages Iran to
continue to comply.
September 27, 2018: In his address to the UN General Assembly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
reveals what he describes as a secret nuclear warehouse “storing
massive amounts of equipment and material from Iran’s secret nuclear weapons
program.” Netanyahu also called on the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano to “do the right thing” and inspect the
warehouse “immediately” before Iran finished clearing it out. He charged that
Iran removed 15 kilograms of radioactive material from the warehouse in August,
but did not specify if the material was uranium, plutonium, or another
radioactive source. One intelligence official quoted in Reuters says that the facility has been known to
the U.S. intelligence community for some time and it is full of documents, not
nuclear equipment. The official says that “so far as anyone knows, there
is nothing in it that would allow Iran to break out” of the nuclear deal any
faster.
October 2, 2018: IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano says in
a statement that the agency does not take any information at
“face value.” While Amano did not mention Netanyahu directly, he said that all
material, including that received from third parties, is subject to a rigorous
and independent assessment. Amano said the IAEA’s nuclear verification work
“must always be impartial, factual, and professional” and that the agency’s
independence is “of paramount importance.”
October 3, 2018: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rules unanimously that the United States “must remove, by means of
its choosing, any impediments” to the export of food, agricultural products,
medicine, aircraft parts, and other humanitarian goods. The 15-member panel
concludes that Trump’s decision to reimpose sanctions on Iran was
unfounded given Tehran’s compliance with the JCPOA, but the court did not order
the United States to remove all sanctions or compensate Iran for damages.
November 5, 2018: The second round of sanctions on
Iran following Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA, targeting Iran's
banking, oil, shipping and ship-building sectors, come back into effect. In addition to redesignating entities removed from
the SDN list under the JCPOA, United States designates an
additional 300 new entities. The administration grants temporary waivers to
China, India, Italy, Greece, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey to
continue importing Iranian oil at reduced levels, as well as waivers to allow nonproliferation projects at Arak,
Bushehr and Fordow to continue.
November 22, 2018: The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran is implementing its nuclear-related
committments. The IAEA's quarterly report finds that Iran's stockpile of heavy
water is 122.8 metric tons, below the 130-ton limit and that Iran's stockpile
of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235 is 149.4 kilograms, below the
300-kilogram limit.
November 26-27, 2018: EU and Iranian officials meet in Brussels for the
third High-Level Summit on International
Nuclear Cooperation. The EU
and Iran review past nuclear cooperation projects and discuss ongoing
modifications of the Arak reactor and conversion of the Fordow facility to a
research site.
December 12, 2018: The UN Security Council meets to discuss the biannual
UN Secretary-General report on the implementation of UN Security Council
Resolution 2231. The report welcomes Iran's implementation of its
nuclear-related commitments "in the face of considerable challenges"
from the U.S. withdrawal of the JCPOA. The report also notes Iranian
activities that might violate the ballistic transfer provision in the
resolution. At the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announces that the United States will work with other UN
Security Council members to reimpose on Iran the ballistic missile restrictions
outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1929.
January 15, 2019: Iran attempts to launch a satellite using its Simorgh
launch vehicle, but the satellite fails to enter orbit. U.S. Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo characterizes the launch as “continued defiance of the
international community and UN Security Council Resolution 2231," although
the launch does not violate the resolution.
January 29, 2019: The annual Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community assesses that "Iran is not currently undertaking the
key nuclear weapons-development activities we judge necessary to produce a
nuclear device." It adds that "Iran’s continued implementation of the
JCPOA has extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile
material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about one year."
January 30, 2019: IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano
reiterates that Iran is implementing its nuclear-related obligations
under the JCPOA and states that attempts to "micro-manage or put
pressure on the agency in nuclear verification" are
"counter-productive and extremely harmful" in remarks to the IAEA staff. Although Amano doesn't name who was
putting pressure on the agency, he is likely referencing Israeli and U.S.
efforts to persuade the IAEA to investigate what they deem a
"secret atomic warehouse" in Iran, which Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu described in his September UN General
Assembly speech.
January 31, 2019: Germany, France and the United Kingdom establish a "special purpose vehicle" to
facilitate transactions for non-sanctioned trade with Iran, called the
"Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges" (INSTEX).
February 13-14, 2019: The United States and Poland host a ministerial
summit on the Middle East in Warsaw where U.S. Vice President Mike
Pence explicitly calls on “our European partners to withdraw from the Iran
nuclear deal.” Several European foreign ministers boycott the summit.
March 6, 2019: The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran is implementing its nuclear-related
commitments. The IAEA's quarterly report finds that Iran's stockpile of heavy
water is 124.8 metric tons, below the 130-ton limit and that Iran's stockpile
of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235 is 163.8 kilograms, below
the 300-kilogram limit.
The JCPOA Joint Commission also
meets in Vienna March 6 and all parties reiterate their commitment to the full implementation of the JCPOA.
March 19, 2019: Iran announces that it registered its counterpart to the
Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX).
March 22, 2019: The U.S. Treasury Department designates 31 Iranian entities and individuals for past
involvement in Iran’s nuclear weapons program under an executive order
targeting the proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.
April 8, 2019: The United States designates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization.
April 9, 2019: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces that Iran will install a cascade of 20 IR-6
centrifuges at Natanz.
April 22, 2019: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announces that the United States will not issue any
additional sanctions waivers for states to continue importing Iranian oil on
May 2.
May 3, 2019: The United States announces that it will extend waivers to allow certain
nuclear cooperation projects in Iran to proceed, but end others. The United
States extends waivers for the Arak reactor conversion, the Fordow facility
conversion, the Bushehr nuclear reactor and the Tehran research reactor for 90
days, but ends waivers for the transfer of enriched uranium out of Iran, the
transfer and storage of heavy water outside of Iran and the construction of
additional reactor units at Bushehr.
May 5, 2019: U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton announces that the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike
Group and a bomber task force are being deployed to the U.S. Central Command
region to "send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime
that any attack on United States interests or on those of our allies will be
met with unrelenting force.” Some news outlets report that officials in the intelligence community
claim Bolton is exaggerating the threat posed by Iran.
May 8, 2019: Iran announces that it will no longer be bound by stockpiles
limitations on enriched uranium and heavy water reserves in the JCPOA
and could restart construction on its unfinished heavy water reactor at Arak
and resume higher level enrichment in the future if the other parties to the
agreement do not deliver on sanctions relief. In late April, Iranian Foreign
Minister Javad Zarif told state broadcaster IRIB that Iran was considering
leaving the NPT as one of Iran's numerous choices.
The United States also announces new sanctions targeting Iran's industrial metal
exports.
May 9, 2019: EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini and the
French, German and UK foreign ministers urge Iran to continue to meet its
commitments under the JCPOA and reject "any ultimatums" in a joint statement. The leaders also urge countries not party to the
JCPOA "to refrain from taking any actions that impede the remaining
parties' ability to fully perform their commitments."
May 20, 2019: Iran announces it will quadruple uranium enrichment
output at Natanz and says it will soon surpass the 300 kilogram limit on
uranium gas enriched to 3.67 percent set by the deal.
June 3, 2019: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo says the United
States is willing to engage with Iran with no preconditions.
June 6, 2019: Russian President Vladimir Putin says there has not
been "a single violation" of the JCPOA by Iran.
June 10, 2019: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano tells the agency's
Board of Governors that he is "worried about increasing tensions over the
Iranian nuclear issue." He says the JCPOA represents a "significant
gain for nuclear verification" and says full implementation is essential.
The IAEA's report on Iran's implementation of the deal finds that Iran's
stockpile of heavy water was 125 metric tons, below the 130 ton limit, and
that the low-enriched uranium stockpile was 174 kilograms, below the 202
kilogram limit (which is equivalent to 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride
gas). The report notes that Iran has installed 33 IR-6 advanced
centrifuges and says there are technical discussions over the IR-6 ongoing. The
report notes that inspectors have had access to all sites and locations they
have requested to visit.
German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas
travels to Tehran and says Germany will not accept a "less-for-less"
agreement on implementation of the JCPOA. An INSTEX delegation travels with
Maas to discuss efforts process transactions using the channel.
June 11, 2019: U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Jackie Wolcott says that
Iran is "reported to be in clear violation of the deal," citing the
number of IR-6 centrifuges installed.
June 12-13, 2019: Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visits Tehran and
delivers a message from U.S. President Donald Trump to Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei. Khamenei says Trump is "not deserving to exchange messages
with" and says he will not send a response. Khamenei says that there is no
sense in negotiating with the United States after Trump has "thrown away
everything that was agreed upon."
June 13, 2019: The United States accuses Iran of attacking two
tankers in the Gulf of Oman. Iran denies that it is behind the attack.
June 17, 2019: Iran announces it will breach the 300 kilogram limit
on uranium gas enriched to 3.67 percent within 10 days.
June 20, 2019: Iran shoots down a U.S. surveillance drone. Iran
claims the drone was in Iranian airspace. The United States says the drone was
in international airspace.
June 24, 2019: The United States sanctions the Supreme Leader of Iran
and his office.
June 26, 2019: The UN Secretary General's office briefs the UN
Security Council on his biannual report assessing the implementation of
Resolution 2231. The report expresses regret for the U.S. decision not to renew
waivers on nuclear nonproliferation projects and says U.S. actions are
"contrary to the goals" of the nuclear deal. The report also
expresses regret over Iran's May 8 announcement that Tehran will no longer be
bound by the deal's limits on heavy water and low-enriched uranium. The report
notes that the Secretary General's office investigated several interdicted
shipments of conventional arms and missiles, as well as missile debris, and
determined that in several cases that components originated in Iran, but was
unable to determine if the transfers took place before or after Resolution 2231
came into effect in January 2016.
June 28, 2019: The JCPOA's Joint Commission meets in Vienna. The
chair's statement says that INSTEX transactions are being processed and that
there has been positive progress on the conversion of the Arak and Fordow
facilities. The statement says that experts will looking to solutions for Iran
to transfer heavy water and low-enriched uranium out of Iran now that the
United States is sanctioning those actions.
Seven European states issue a
statement reiterating their support for the JCPOA and their intention to
participate in INSTEX.
July 1, 2019: Iran announces that it breached the 300 kilogram limit
on uranium gas enriched to 3.67 percent (202 kilograms of uranium by weight).
The IAEA confirms that Iran has exceeded the limit. The White House issues a
statement saying that "maximum pressure on the Iranian regime will
continue until its leaders alter their course of action" and that the
United States "must restore the longstanding nonproliferation standard of
no enrichment for Iran."
July 2, 2019: The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom and the EU High Representative issue a statement expressing
regret for Iran's decision to breach the limit on low-enriched uranium. The
ministers state that "we have been consistent and clear that our
commitment to the nuclear deal depends on full compliance by Iran" and
state that they are "urgently considering next steps under the terms of
the JCPOA."
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.