OCTOBER
12, 2019 00:15 IST
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Prime Minister Narendra Modi
with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Mamallapuram on October 11, 2019. |
Photo Credit: PTI
The challenge before India
is to deepen the tactical engagement with China keeping strategic glitches at
bay.
Every government will have
to factor in three geopolitical constituents while setting its broader foreign
policy trajectory — immediate neighbourhood, extended neighbourhood and great
powers. Realistically, an emerging power should stay focussed on building
capacities while maintaining good ties with the neighbours, deep engagement
with the extended neighbours and balancing between great powers. India’s
current government has sent mixed signals on this. It has a hostile
relationship with Pakistan, but has cultivated strong partnerships with the
other neighbouring countries. It has deepened engagement with the extended
neighbourhood, which, for India is both a source of energy and a transit to the
rest of the world. Though there’s a pro-American tilt in its foreign policy,
New Delhi has been wary of not disturbing the equilibrium between the great
powers and rising great powers.
Of this, relations with
Beijing are doubly critical for India as China is both a neighbour and a rising
great power. To be sure, there are structural problems in ties — the boundary
dispute, the Pakistan factor, and historical mistrust. The conventional
understanding of the India-China relationship is centred around these
challenges. These factors were more or less at play in the run-up to the second
“informal summit” between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi
Jinping at Mamallapuram on Friday and Saturday. An Indian military exercise in
Arunachal Pradesh had irked the Chinese. And China hosted Pakistan Prime
Minister Imran Khan in the same week that Mr. Xi is visiting India. However,
India-China ties have hardly been unidimensional. That both leaders went ahead
with the planned summit despite the bad optics itself points to their quest to
deepen the engagement.
The Rajiv momentum
India-China ties have seen a
turnaround over the past three decades, since Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s
1988 visit to Beijing, to be specific. Since then, the countries have decided
to strengthen ties in areas that were not constrained by structural issues.
Economy was the chosen field, as in the early 1990s, India, following China’s
footsteps, started liberalising its economy. Trade ties between the two
countries boomed over the years (it touched $95 billion last year), though it’s
largely skewed towards China as the latter was fast emerging as an industrial
and technological powerhouse. The border has been largely peaceful during this
period.
Even when the Chinese and
Indian militaries were in a standoff in Doklam at the India-China-Bhutan
tri-junction in the Himalayas in 2017, both governments were careful enough not
to let the situation spiral out of control. That the Doklam incident was
followed by the first informal summit in Wuhan in 2018 between Mr. Modi and Mr.
Xi, with an aim of dialling down tensions and rebooting ties, showed how New
Delhi and Beijing look at each other. They don’t share the antagonism of
conventional wisdom. The Mamallapuram summit should be seen against this
background.
Tactical engagement
Arguably, India and China
are still in a tactical engagement, not in a strategic partnership. But it’s a
tactical engagement with depth, not a short-term foreign policy adjustment. The
challenge before Mr. Modi and Mr. Xi is to deepen this further, and for that
they should not allow strategic glitches dictate terms for a bilateral
partnership. In this, they face fresh challenges today. India and China warmed
up to each other in a different world. The U.S. and China were in a better
relationship. Beijing’s focus was entirely on economic development and
“peaceful rise”. It was also the beginning of the golden age of globalisation
and free trade that softened borders between big trading and investment
partners. Now, U.S.-China ties have turned hostile at a time when India is
steadily enhancing its strategic partnership with Washington. China under Mr.
Xi is also a more assertive and confident power. Both the U.S. and China see
India as “a swing power”. Washington wants India to swing to its side and join
its Indo-Pacific strategy, the undeclared aim of which is to contain China’s
rise. Beijing, obviously, doesn’t want India to swing to the other side.
Second, the Pakistan factor looms large over ties. With Mr. Modi’s
hyper-nationalist government taking an aggressive approach towards Pakistan and
cracking down on Kashmir, Beijing’s Pakistan card is now stronger. Third, the
border disputes remain unresolved, and are unlikely to be resolved in the near
future.
So it’s a complex
relationship, which is what Shivshankar Menon, India’s former National Security
Adviser, called “a bivalent relationship”. But it doesn’t mean that China and
India are hostile powers or a threat to each other.
Taking it to the next level
There are four constituents
in the multidimensional India-China partnership that can take ties to the next
level. The avenues of economic cooperation between the two countries are still
wide open. China is keen to make investments in India, especially in building
infrastructure and fifth generation technology architecture. India, on the
other side, wants greater market access in China, and action by Beijing to
address the trade imbalance. At the Wuhan summit, both Mr. Modi and Mr. Xi had,
in principle, agreed to India-China cooperation in projects in third countries.
They could perhaps come up with a plan to take economic ties to the next level,
addressing mutual concerns. Take the example of the U.S. and China. In the
1950s and ’60s, the U.S. tried everything it could to weaken and isolate Mao
Zedong’s China, a policy that mirrors its approach towards nuclear North Korea
now. But it didn’t stop President Nixon from visiting China in 1972 that led to
a remarkable turnaround in Sino-American ties.
Second, India and China are
pillars of an emerging world order. Both countries see the unilateral world
order in decline, and are champions of multilateralism. Security and stability
in Asia, which is billed to be the 21th century’s continent, is in the common
interests of both countries, and they are already cooperating on global issues
like tackling climate change.
Third, China had shown in
the recent past that when it comes to deal-making and tackling international
pressure, the Pakistan card is negotiable. When India is patient, has the
international opinion in its favour, and is cautiously bargaining for China’s
action against Pakistan, Beijing has taken U-turns on its “iron friend”. Last
year, it agreed to Pakistan being placed on the FATF grey list, after India
offered support for China’s vice-chair push at the FATF. Earlier this year,
amid mounting international pressure, China removed its technical hold on the
declaration of Masood Azhar as an international terrorist. If it’s driven by
realism, India should actually engage with Pakistan, which will not only calm
down its borders but also weaken China’s Pakistan card. But since it appears
impossible with the current government in New Delhi, it’s critical for New
Delhi to stay engaged patiently with Beijing on issues related to Pakistan.
Last, and most important,
there has to be a doctrinal consensus in India’s foreign policy thinking.
Should it compete with China for dominance of Asia or should it stay focussed
on its own rise in which competition with China will be a part? India should
perhaps learn from both China’s rise and its engagement with the U.S. post
Nixon’s visit. For decades, China hid its strength, bid for time. It was
building capacities without letting external strains to derail the process.
When a mightier U.S. reached out to China, Beijing knew that Washington was
trying to exploit the rift within the communist bloc. China played along. Now
it’s confidently challenging the U.S., at least in the sphere of the economy.
India should also turn the focus to its rise and building capacities, not on
conflicts and rivalries. If it’s driven by such a broader but a realist vision,
India could expand the avenues of deep tactical engagement with a powerful
China. As the saying goes, a nation can pick its friends, but not its
neighbours.
stanly.johny@thehindu.co.in
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