Unrestricted Warfare
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui
(Beijing: PLA Literature and
Arts Publishing House, February 1999)
Unrestricted Warfare, by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (Beijing: PLA
Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999)
[FBIS Editor's
Note: The following selections are taken from "Unrestricted Warfare,"
a book published in China in February 1999 which proposes tactics for
developing countries, in particular China, to compensate for their military
inferiority vis-à-vis the United States during a high-tech war. The selections
include the table of contents, preface, afterword, and biographical information
about the authors printed on the cover. The book was written by two PLA senior
colonels from the younger generation of Chinese military officers and was
published by the PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House in Beijing,
suggesting that its release was endorsed by at least some elements of the PLA
leadership. This impression was reinforced by an interview with Qiao and
laudatory review of the book carried by the party youth league's official
daily Zhongguo Qingnian Bao on 28 June.
Published prior to the
bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade, the book has recently drawn the
attention of both the Chinese and Western press for its advocacy of a multitude
of means, both military and particularly non-military, to strike at the United
States during times of conflict. Hacking into websites, targeting financial
institutions, terrorism, using the media, and conducting urban warfare are
among the methods proposed. In the Zhongguo Qingnian Bao interview,
Qiao was quoted as stating that "the first rule of unrestricted warfare is
that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden." Elaborating on this
idea, he asserted that strong countries would not use the same approach against
weak countries because "strong countries make the rules while rising ones
break them and exploit loopholes . . .The United States breaks [UN rules] and
makes new ones when these rules don't suit [its purposes], but it has to
observe its own rules or the whole world will not trust it." (see FBIS translation
of the interview, OW2807114599).
[End FBIS Editor's
Note]
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface 1
Part One: On New Warfare 8
Chapter 1: The Weapons Revolution Which
Invariably Comes First 15
Chapter 2: The War God's Face Has Become
Indistinct 36
Chapter 3: A Classic That Deviates From the
Classics 61
Chapter 4: What Do Americans Gain By Touching
the Elephant? 84
Part Two: A Discussion of New Methods of
Operation 114
Chapter 5: New Methodology of War Games 124
Chapter 6: Seeking Rules of Victory: The Force
Moves Away From the Point of the Enemy's Attack 152
Chapter 7: Ten Thousand Methods Combined as
One: Combinations That Transcend Boundaries 179
Chapter 8: Essential Principles 204
Conclusion 220
Afterword 225
Authors' Background 227
Preface
[pp 1-5 in original]
[FBIS Translated
Text] Everyone who has lived through the last decade of the 20th century will
have a profound sense of the changes in the world. We don't believe that there
is anyone who would claim that there has been any decade in history in which
the changes have been greater than those of this decade. Naturally, the causes
behind the enormous changes are too numerous to mention, but there are only a
few reasons that people bring up repeatedly. One of those is the Gulf War.
One war changed the world.
Linking such a conclusion to a war which occurred one time in a limited area
and which only lasted 42 days seems like something of an exaggeration. However,
that is indeed what the facts are, and there is no need to enumerate one by one
all the new words that began to appear after 17 January 1991. It is only
necessary to cite the former Soviet Union, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, cloning,
Microsoft, hackers, the Internet, the Southeast Asian financial crisis, the
euro, as well as the world's final and only superpower -- the United States.
These are sufficient. They pretty much constitute the main subjects on this
planet for the past decade.
However, what we want to say
is that all these are related to that war, either directly or indirectly.
However, we definitely do not intend to mythicize war, particularly not a
lopsided war in which there was such a great difference in the actual power of
the opposing parties. Precisely the contrary. In our in-depth consideration of
this war, which changed the entire world in merely half a month, we have also
noted another fact, which is that war itself has now been changed. We
discovered that, from those wars which could be described in glorious and
dominating terms, to the aftermath of the acme of what it has been possible to
achieve to date in the history of warfare, that war, which people originally
felt was one of the more important roles to be played out on the world stage,
has at one stroke taken the seat of a B actor.
A war which changed the
world ultimately changed war itself. This is truly fantastic, yet it also
causes people to ponder deeply. No, what we are referring to are not changes in
the instruments of war, the technology of war, the modes of war, or the forms
of war. What we are referring to is the function of warfare. Who could imagine
that an insufferably arrogant actor, whose appearance has changed the entire
plot, suddenly finds that he himself is actually the last person to play this
unique role. Furthermore, without waiting for him to leave the stage, he has
already been told that there is no great likelihood that he will again handle
an A role, at least not a central role in which he alone occupies center stage.
What kind of feeling would this be?
Perhaps those who feel this
most deeply are the Americans, who probably should be counted as among the few
who want to play all the roles, including savior, fireman, world policeman, and
an emissary of peace, etc. In the aftermath of "Desert Storm," Uncle
Sam has not been able to again achieve a commendable victory. Whether it was in
Somalia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, this has invariably been the case. In
particular, in the most recent action in which the United States and Britain
teamed up to carry out air attacks on Iraq, it was the same stage, the same
method, and the same actors, but there was no way to successfully perform the
magnificent drama that had made such a profound impression eight years earlier.
Faced with political, economic, cultural, diplomatic, ethnic, and religious
issues, etc., that are more complex than they are in the minds of most of the military
men in the world, the limitations of the military means, which had heretofore
always been successful, suddenly became apparent. However, in the age of
"might makes right" -- and most of the history of this century falls
into this period -- these were issues which did not constitute a problem.
The problem is that the U.S.-led multinational forces brought this period to a
close in the desert region of Kuwait, thus beginning a new period.
At present it is still hard
to see if this age will lead to the unemployment of large numbers of military
personnel, nor will it cause war to vanish from this world. All these are still
undetermined. The only point which is certain is that, from this point on, war
will no longer be what it was originally. Which is to say that, if in the days
to come mankind has no choice but to engage in war, it can no longer be carried
out in the ways with which we are familiar. It is impossible for us to deny the
impact on human society and its soul of the new motivations represented by
economic freedom, the concept of human rights, and the awareness of
environmental protection, but it is certain that the metamorphosis of warfare
will have a more complex backdrop. Otherwise, the immortal bird of warfare will
not be able to attain nirvana when it is on the verge of decline: When people
begin to lean toward and rejoice in the reduced use of military force to
resolve conflicts, war will be reborn in another form and in another arena,
becoming an instrument of enormous power in the hands of all those who harbor
intentions of controlling other countries or regions. In this sense, there is
reason for us to maintain that the financial attack by George Soros on East
Asia, the terrorist attack on the U.S. embassy by Usama Bin Laden, the gas attack
on the Tokyo subway by the disciples of the Aum Shinri Kyo, and the havoc
wreaked by the likes of Morris Jr. on the Internet, in which the degree of
destruction is by no means second to that of a war, represent semi-warfare,
quasi-warfare, and sub-warfare, that is, the embryonic form of another kind of
warfare.
But whatever you call them,
they cannot make us more optimistic than in the past. We have no reason for
optimism. This is because the reduction of the functions of warfare in a pure
sense does not mean at all that war has ended. Even in the so-called
post-modern, post-industrial age, warfare will not be totally dismantled. It
has only re-invaded human society in a more complex, more extensive, more
concealed, and more subtle manner. It is as Byron said in his poem mourning
Shelley, "Nothing has happened, he has only undergone a sea change."
War which has undergone the changes of modern technology and the market system
will be launched even more in atypical forms. In other words, while we are
seeing a relative reduction in military violence, at the same time we
definitely are seeing an increase in political, economic, and technological
violence. However, regardless of the form the violence takes, war is war, and a
change in the external appearance does not keep any war from abiding by the
principles of war.
If we acknowledge that the
new principles of war are no longer "using armed force to compel the enemy
to submit to one's will," but rather are "using all means, including
armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and
non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one's interests."
This represents change. A
change in war and a change in the mode of war occasioned by this. So, just what
has led to the change? What kind of changes are they? Where are the changes
headed? How does one face these changes? This is the topic that this book
attempts to touch on and shed light on, and it is also our motivation in
deciding to write this book.
[Written on 17 January 1999,
the 8th anniversary of the outbreak of the Gulf War]
[pp. 1-9 in original]
"Although ancient
states were great, they inevitably perished when they were fond of war" --
Sima Rangju, Technology is the Totem of Modern Man [1]
Stirred by the warm breeze
of utilitarianism, it is not surprising that technology is more in favor with
people than science is. The age of great scientific discoveries had already
been left behind before Einstein's time. However, modern man is increasingly
inclined to seeing all his dreams come true during his lifetime. This causes
him, when betting on his own future, to prostrate himself and expect wonders
from technology through a 1000-power concave lens. In this way, technology has
achieved startling and explosive developments in a rather short period of time,
and this has resulted in innumerable benefits for mankind, which is anxious for
quick success and instant rewards. However, we proudly term this technological
progress, not realizing that at this time we have already consigned ourselves
to a benighted technological age in which we have lost our hearts [2].
Technology today is becoming
increasingly dazzling and uncontrollable. Bell Labs and Sony continue to put
out novel toys, Bill Gates opens new "Windows" each year, and
"Dolly," the cloned sheep, proves that mankind is now planning to
take the place of God the Creator. The fearsome Russian-built SU-27 fighter has
not been put to use on any battlefield, and already the SU-35 has emerged to
strike a pose [3], but whether or not, once it has exhausted its time in the
limelight, the SU-35 will be able to retire having rendered meritorious service
is still a matter of considerable doubt. Technology is like "magic
shoes" on the feet of mankind, and after the spring has been wound tightly
by commercial interests, people can only dance along with the shoes, whirling
rapidly in time to the beat that they set.
The names Watt and Edison
are nearly synonymous with great technical inventions, and using these great
technological masters to name their age may be said to be reasonable. However,
from then on, the situation changed, and the countless and varied technological
discoveries of the past 100 years or so makes it difficult for the appearance
of any new technology to take on any self-importance in the realm of human
life. While it may be said that the formulations of "the age of the steam
engine" and "the age of electrification" can be said to be names
which reflect the realities of the time, today, with all kinds of new
technology continuously beating against the banks of the age so that people
scarcely have the time to accord them brief acclaim while being overwhelmed by
an even higher and newer wave of technology, the age in which an era could be named
for a single new technology or a single inventor has become a thing of the
past. This is the reason why, if one calls the current era the "nuclear
age" or the "information age," it will still give people the
impression that you are using one aspect to typify the whole situation.
There is absolutely no doubt
that the appearance of information technology has been good news for human
civilization. This is because it is the only thing to date that is capable of
infusing greater energy into the technological "plague" that has been
released from Pandora's box, and at the same time it also provides a magic
charm as a means of controlling it [technology]. It is just that, at present,
there is still a question of who in turn will have a magic charm with which to control
it [information technology]. The pessimistic viewpoint is that, if this
technology develops in a direction which cannot be controlled by man,
ultimately it will turn mankind into its victim [4]. However, this frightening
conclusion is totally incapable of reducing people's ardor for it.
The optimistic prospects
that it displays itself are intensely seductive for mankind, which has a thirst
for technical progress. After all, its unique features of exchanging and
sharing represent the light of intelligence which we can hope will lead mankind
out of the barbarism of technology, although this is still not sufficient to
make us like those futurists who cannot see the forest for the trees, and who
use its name to label the entire age. Its characteristics are precisely what
keep it from being able to replace the various technologies that we already
have in great quantity, that are just emerging, or which are about to be born,
particularly those such as biotechnology, materials technology, and
nanotechnology, these technologies which have a symbiotic relationship with
information technology in which they rely on and promote one another.
Over the past 300 years,
people have long since become accustomed to blindly falling in love with the
new and discarding the old in the realm of technology, and the endless pursuit
of new technology has become a panacea to resolve all the difficult questions
of existence. Infatuated with it, people have gradually gone astray. Just as
one will often commit ten other mistakes to cover up one, to solve one
difficult problem people do not hesitate to bring ten more on themselves [5].
For example, for a more convenient means of transportation, people invented
cars, but a long string of problems followed closely on the heels of the automobile
-- mining and smelting, mechanical processing, oil extraction, rubber refining,
and road-building, etc., which in turn required a long string of technical
means to solve, until ultimately it led to pollution of the environment,
destroying resources, taking over farmland, traffic accidents, and a host of
thornier problems. In the long run, comparing the original goal of using cars
for transportation with these derivative problems, it almost seems unimportant.
In this way, the irrational expansion of technology causes mankind to
continually lose his goals in the complex ramifications of the tree of
technology, losing his way and forgetting how to get back. We may as well dub
this phenomenon the "ramification effect." Fortunately, at this time,
modern information technology made its appearance. We can say with certainty
that this is the most important revolution in the history of technology. Its
revolutionary significance is not merely in that it is a brand new technology
itself, but more in that it is a kind of bonding agent which can lightly
penetrate the layers of barriers between technologies and link various
technologies which appear to be totally unrelated. Through its bonding, not
only is it possible to derive numerous new technologies which are neither one
thing nor the other while they also represent this and that, and furthermore it
also provides a kind of brand new approach to the relationship between man and
technology.
Only from the perspective of
mankind can mankind clearly perceive the essence of technology as a tool, and
only then can he avoid becoming a slave to technology -- to the tool -- during
the process of resolving the difficult problems he faces in his existence.
Mankind is completely capable of fully developing his own powers of imagination
so that, when each technology is used its potential is exhausted, and not being
like a bear breaking off corncobs, only able to continually use new technology
to replace the old. Today, the independent use of individual technologies is
now becoming more and more unimaginable. The emergence of information
technology has presented endless possibilities for match-ups involving various
old and new technologies and among new and advanced technologies. Countless
facts have demonstrated that the integrated use of technology is able to
promote social progress more than even the discovery of the technology [6].
The situation of loud solo
parts is in the process of being replaced by a multi-part chorus. The general
fusion of technology is irreversibly guiding the rising globalization trend,
while the globalization trend in turn is accelerating the process of the
general fusion of technology, and this is the basic characteristic of our age.
This characteristic will
inevitably project its features on every direction of the age, and naturally
the realm of war will be no exception. No military force that thirsts for
modernization can get by without nurturing new technology, while the demands of
war have always been the midwife of new technology. During the Gulf War, more
than 500 kinds of new and advanced technology of the 80s ascended the stage to
strike a pose, making the war simply seem like a demonstration site for new
weaponry. However, the thing that left a profound impression on people was not
the new weaponry per se, but was rather the trend of systemization in the
development and use of the weapons. Like the "Patriots" intercepting
the "Scuds," it seemed as simple as shooting birds with a shotgun,
while in fact it involved numerous weapons deployed over more than half the
globe:
After a DSP satellite
identified a target, an alarm was sent to a ground station in Australia, which
was then sent to the central command post in Riyadh through the U.S. Cheyenne
Mountain command post, after which the "Patriot" operators were
ordered to take their battle stations, all of which took place in the mere
90-second alarm stage, relying on numerous relays and coordination of
space-based systems and C3I systems, truly a "shot heard 'round the
world."
The real-time coordination
of numerous weapons over great distances created an unprecedented combat
capability, and this was precisely something that was unimaginable prior to the
emergence of information technology. While it may be said that the emergence of
individual weapons prior to World War II was still able to trigger a military
revolution, today no-one is capable of dominating the scene alone.
War in the age of
technological integration and globalization has eliminated the right of weapons
to label war and, with regard to the new starting point, has realigned the
relationship of weapons to war, while the appearance of weapons of new
concepts, and particularly new concepts of weapons, has gradually blurred the
face of war. Does a single "hacker" attack count as a hostile act or
not? Can using financial instruments to destroy a country's economy be seen as
a battle? Did CNN's broadcast of an exposed corpse of a U.S. soldier in the
streets of Mogadishu shake the determination of the Americans to act as the
world's policeman, thereby altering the world's strategic situation? And should
an assessment of wartime actions look at the means or the results? Obviously,
proceeding with the traditional definition of war in mind, there is no longer
any way to answer the above questions. When we suddenly realize that all these
non-war actions may be the new factors constituting future warfare, we have to
come up with a new name for this new form of war: Warfare which transcends all
boundaries and limits, in short: unrestricted warfare.
If this name becomes
established, this kind of war means that all means will be in readiness, that
information will be omnipresent, and the battlefield will be everywhere. It
means that all weapons and technology can be superimposed at will, it means
that all the boundaries lying between the two worlds of war and non-war, of
military and non-military, will be totally destroyed, and it also means that
many of the current principles of combat will be modified, and even that the
rules of war may need to be rewritten.
However, the pulse of the
God of War is hard to take. If you want to discuss war, particularly the war
that will break out tomorrow evening or the morning of the day after tomorrow,
there is only one way, and that is to determine its nature with bated breath,
carefully feeling the pulse of the God of War today.
Footnotes
[1] In Man and Technology,
O. Spengler stated that "like God, our father, technology is eternal and
unchanging, like the son of God, it will save mankind, and like the Holy
Spirit, it shines upon us." The philosopher Spengler's worship for
technology, which was just like that of a theologian for God, was nothing but a
manifestation of another type of ignorance as man entered the great age of
industrialism, which increasingly flourished in the post-industrial age.
[2] In this regard, the
French philosopher and scientist Jean Ladrihre has a unique viewpoint. He
believes that science and technology have a destructive effect as well as a
guiding effect on culture. Under the combined effects of these two, it is very
difficult for mankind to maintain a clear-headed assessment of technology, and
we are constantly oscillating between the two extremes of technical fanaticism
and "anti-science" movements. Bracing oneself to read through his The
Challenge Presented to Cultures by Science and Technology, in which the
writing is abstruse but the thinking recondite, may be helpful in observing the
impact of technology on the many aspects of human society from a broader
perspective.
[3] Although the improvement
of beyond visual range (BVR) weapons has already brought about enormous
changes in the basic concepts of air combat, after all is said and done it has
not completely eliminated short-range combat. The SU-27, which is capable of
"cobra" maneuvers and the SU-35, which is capable of "hook"
moves, are the most outstanding fighter aircraft to date.
[4] F. G. Ronge [as
published 1715 2706 1396 2706] is the sharpest of the technological pessimists.
As early as 1939, Ronge had recognized the series of problems that modern
technology brings with it, including the growth of technological control and
the threat of environmental problems. In his view, technology has already
become an unmatched, diabolical force. It has not only taken over nature, it
has also stripped away man's freedom. In Being and Time, Martin
Heidegger termed technology an "outstanding absurdity," calling for
man to return to nature in order to avoid technology, which posed the greatest
threat. The most famous technological optimists were [Norbert] Wiener and
Steinbuch. In Wiener's Cybernetics, God and Robots, and The
Human Use of Human Beings and Steinbuch's The Information
Society, Philosophy and Cybernetics, and other such works, we can see the
bright prospects that describe for human society, driven by technology.
[5] In David Ehrenfeld's
book, The Arrogance of Humanism, he cites numerous examples of
this. In Too Clever, Schwartz states that "the resolution of
one problem may generate a group of new problems, and these problems may
ultimately preclude that kind of resolution." In Rational
Consciousness, Rene Dibo [as published 3583 0355 6611 0590] also discusses
a similar phenomenon.
[6] In The Age of
Science and the Future of Mankind, E. Shulman points out that "during
the dynamic development of modern culture, which is based on the explosive
development of modern technology, we are increasingly faced with the fact of
multidisciplinary cooperation...it is impossible for one special branch of
science to guide our practice in a sufficiently scientific manner."
[pp. 10-33 in original]
"As soon as
technological advances may be applied to military goals, and furthermore are
already used for military purposes, they almost immediately seem obligatory,
and also often go against the will of the commanders in triggering changes or
even revolutions in the modes of combat" -- Engels
The weapons revolution
invariably precedes the revolution in military affairs by one step, and
following the arrival of a revolutionary weapon, the arrival of the revolution
in military affairs is just a matter of time. The history of warfare is
continually providing this kind of proof: bronze or iron spears resulted in the
infantry phalanx, and bows and arrows and stirrups provided new tactics for
cavalry [1]. Black powder cannons gave rise to a full complement of modern
warfare modes....from the time when conical bullets and rifles [2] took to the
battlefield as the vanguard of the age of technology, weapons straightaway
stamped their names on the chest of warfare.
First, it was the enormous
steel-clad naval vessels that ruled the seas, launching the "age of
battleships," then its brother the "tank" ruled land warfare,
after which the airplane dominated the skies, up until the atomic bomb was
born, announcing the approach of the "nuclear age." Today, a
multitude of new and advanced technology weapons continues to pour forth, so
that weapons have solemnly become the chief representative of war. When people
discuss future warfare, they are already quite accustomed to using certain
weapons or certain technologies to describe it, calling it "electronic
warfare," "precision-weapons warfare," and "information
warfare."
Coasting along in their
mental orbit, people have not yet noticed that a certain inconspicuous yet very
important change is stealthily approaching.
No One Has the Right to
Label Warfare
The weapons revolution is a
prelude to a revolution in military affairs. What is different than in the past
is that the revolution in military affairs that is coming will no longer by
driven by one or two individual weapons. In addition to continuing to stimulate
people to yearn for and be charmed by new weapons, the numerous technological
inventions have also quickly eradicated the mysteries of each kind of weapon.
In the past, all that was needed was the invention of a few weapons or pieces
of equipment, such as the stirrup and the Maxim machine gun [3], and that was
sufficient to alter the form of war, whereas today upwards of 100 kinds of
weapons are needed to make up a certain weapons system before it can have an
overall effect on war.
However, the more weapons
are invented, the smaller an individual weapon's role in war becomes, and this
is a paradox that is inherent in the relationship between weapons and war.
Speaking in that sense, other than the all-out use of nuclear weapons, a
situation which is more and more unlikely and which may be termed nuclear war,
none of the other weapons, even those that are extremely revolutionary in
nature, possesses the right to label future warfare.
Perhaps it is precisely
because people recognize this point that we then have formulations such as
"high-tech warfare" and "information warfare" [4], whose
intent is to use the broad concept of technology to replace the concept of
specific weapons, using a fuzzy-learning approach to resolve this knotty
problem. However, it seems that this still is not the way to resolve the
problem.
When one delves deeply into
this, the term "high-technology"[5], which first appeared in the
architectural industry in the United States, is in fact a bit vague. What constitutes
high technology? What does it refer to? Logically speaking, high and low are
only relative concepts. However, using an extremely mutable concept in this
irrational manner to name warfare, which is evolving endlessly, in itself
constitutes a considerable problem. When one generation's high technology
becomes low technology with the passage of time, are we still prepared to again
dub the new toys that continue to appear as being high tech? Or is it possible
that, in today's technological explosion, this may result in confusion and
trouble for us in naming and using each new technology that appears? Not to
mention the question of just what should be the standard to determine whether
something is high or not? With regard to technology itself, each technology has
specific aspects, which therefore means that each has its time limits.
Yesterday's "high" is very possibly today's "low," while
today's "new" will in turn become tomorrow's "old."
Compared to the M-60 tank,
the "Cobra" helicopter, and the B-52, the main battle weapons of the
60s-70s, the "Abrams" tank, the "Apache" helicopter
gunship, the F-117, the "Patriot" missiles, and the
"Tomahawk" cruise missiles are high tech. However, faced with the
B-2, the F-22, the "Comanche" helicopter, and the "J-Stars"
joint-surveillance target-attack radar system, they in turn seem outmoded. It
is as if to say there is the concept of high-tech weapons, which is a variable
throughout, and which naturally becomes the title of the "bride."
Then, as the "flowers bloom each year, but the people change," all
that is left is the empty shell of a name, which is continually placed on the
head of the girl who is becoming the next "bride." Then, in the chain
of warfare with its continuous links, each weapon can go from high to low and
from new to old at any time and any place, with time's arrow being unwilling to
stop at any point; nor can any weapon occupy the throne of high technology for
long. Since this is the case, just what kind of high technology does this
so-called high-tech warfare refer to?
High technology, as spoken
of in generalities, cannot become a synonym for future warfare, nor is
information technology -- which is one of the high technologies of the present
age and which seems to occupy an important position in the makeup of all modern
weapons -- sufficient to name a war. Even if in future wars all the weapons
have information components embedded in them and are fully computerized, we can
still not term such war information warfare, and at most we can just call it
computerized warfare [6]. This is because, regardless of how important
information technology is, it cannot completely supplant the functions and
roles of each technology per se. For example, the F-22 fighter, which already
fully embodies information technology, is still a fighter, and the
"Tomahawk" missile is still a missile, and one cannot lump them all
together as information weapons, nor can war which is conducted using these
weapons be termed information warfare [7]. Computerized warfare in the broad
sense and information warfare in the narrow sense are two completely different
things. The former refers to the various forms of warfare which are enhanced
and accompanied by information technology, while the latter primarily refers to
war in which information technology is used to obtain or suppress information.
In addition, the contemporary myth created by information worship has people
mistakenly believing that it is the only rising technology, while the sun has
already set on all the others. This kind of myth may put more money in the
pockets of Bill Gates, but it cannot alter the fact that the development of
information technology similarly relies on the development of other technology,
and the development of related materials technology is a direct constraint on
information technology breakthroughs. For example, the development of
biotechnology will determine the future fate of information technology [8].
Speaking of bio-information technology, we may as well return to a previous
topic and again make a small assumption:
If people use
information-guided bio-weapons to attack a bio-computer, should this be counted
as bio-warfare or information warfare? I fear that no one will be able to
answer that in one sentence, but this is something which is perfectly capable
of happening. Actually, it is basically not necessary for people to wrack their
brains over whether or not information technology will grow strong and unruly
today, because it itself is a synthesis of other technologies, and its first
appearance and every step forward are all a process of blending with other
technologies, so that it is part of them, and they are part of it, and this is
precisely the most fundamental characteristic of the age of technological
integration and globalization. Naturally, like the figures from a steel seal,
this characteristic may leave its typical imprint on each modern weapon. We are
by no means denying that, in future warfare, certain advanced weapons may play
a leading role. However, as for determining the outcome of war, it is now very
difficult for anyone to occupy an unmatched position. It may be leading, but it
will not be alone, much less never-changing. Which is also to say that there is
no one who can unblushingly stamp his own name on a given modern war.
"Fighting the Fight
that Fits One's Weapons" and "Making the Weapons to Fit the
Fight"
These two sentences,
"fight the fight that fits one's weapons" and "build the weapons
to fit the fight" show the clear demarcation line between traditional
warfare and future warfare, as well as pointing out the relationship between
weapons and tactics in the two kinds of war. The former reflects the
involuntary or passive adaptation of the relationship of man to weapons and
tactics in war which takes place under natural conditions, while the latter
suggests the conscious or active choice that people make regarding the same
proposition when they have entered a free state. In the history of war, the
general unwritten rule that people have adhered to all along is to "fight the
fight that fits one's weapons." Very often it is the case that only after
one first has a weapon does one begin to formulate tactics to match it. With
weapons coming first, followed by tactics, the evolution of weapons has a
decisive constraining effect on the evolution of tactics. Naturally, there are
limiting factors here involving the age and the technology, but neither can we
say that there is no relationship between this and the linear thinking in which
each generation of weapons making specialists only thinks about whether or not
the performance of the weapon itself is advanced, and does not consider other
aspects. Perhaps this is one of the factors why a weapons revolution invariably
precedes a revolution in military affairs.
Although the expression
"fight the fight that fits one's weapons" is essentially negative in
nature because what it leaves unsaid reflects a kind of helplessness, we have
no intention of belittling the positive meaning that it has today, and this
positive meaning is seeking the optimum tactics for the weapons one has. In
other words, seeking the combat mode which represents the best match for the
given weapons, thereby seeing that they perform up to their peak values. Today,
those engaged in warfare have now either consciously or unconsciously completed
the transition of this rule from the negative to the positive. It is just that
people still wrongfully believe that this is the only initiative that can be
taken by backward countries in their helplessness. They hardly realize that the
United States, the foremost power in the world, must similarly face this kind
of helplessness. Even though she is the richest in the world, it is not
necessarily possible for her to use up her uniform new and advanced technology
weapons to fight an expensive modern war [9]. It is just that she has
more freedom when it comes to the selection and pairing up of new and old
weapons.
If one can find a good point
of agreement, which is to say, the most appropriate tactics, the pairing up and
use of new and older generation weapons not only makes it possible to eliminate
the weakness of uniform weaponry, it may also become a "multiplier"
to increase the weapons' effectiveness. The B-52 bomber, which people have
predicted on many occasions is long since ready to pass away peacefully, has
once again become resplendent after being coupled with cruise missiles and
other precision guided weapons, and its wings have not yet rested to date. By
the use of external infrared guided missiles, the A-10 aircraft now has night-attack
capabilities that it originally lacked, and when paired with the Apache
helicopter, they complement each other nicely, so that this weapons platform
which appeared in the mid-70s is very imposing.
Obviously, "fight the
fight that fits one's weapons" by no means represents passive inaction.
For example, today's increasingly open weapons market and multiple supply
channels have provided a great deal of leeway with regard to weapons selection,
and the massive coexistence of weapons which span multiple generations has
provided a broader and more functional foundation for trans-generation weapons
combinations than at any age in the past, so that it is only necessary to break
with our mental habit of treating the weapons' generations, uses, and
combinations as being fixed to be able to turn something that is rotten into
something miraculous. If one thinks that one must rely on advanced weapons to
fight a modern war, being blindly superstitious about the miraculous effects of
such weapons, it may actually result in turning something miraculous into
something rotten. We find ourselves in a stage where a revolutionary leap
forward is taking place in weapons, going from weapons systems symbolized by
gunpowder to those symbolized by information, and this may be a relatively
prolonged period of alternating weapons. At present we have no way of
predicting how long this period may last, but what we can say for sure is that,
as long as this alternation has not come to an end, fighting the kind of battle
that fits one's weapons will be the most basic approach for any country in
handling the relationship between weapons and combat, and this includes the
United States, the country which has the most advanced weapons. What must be
pointed out is that, the most basic thing is not the thing with the greatest
future. Aggressive initiatives under negative preconditions is only a specific
approach for a specific time, and by no means constitutes an eternal rule. In
man's hands, scientific progress has long since gone from passive discovery to
active invention, and when the Americans proposed the concept of "building
the weapons to fit the fight," it triggered the greatest single change in
the relationship between weapons and tactics since the advent of war.
First determine the mode of
combat, then develop the weapons, and in this regard, the first stab that the
Americans took at this was "Air-Land battle," while the currently
popular "digitized battlefield" and "digitized units" [10]
which have given rise to much discussion represent their most recent attempt.
This approach indicates that the position of weapons in invariably preceding a
revolution in military affairs has now been shaken, and now tactics come first
and weapons follow, or the two encourage one another, with advancement in a
push-pull manner becoming the new relationship between them. At the same time,
weapons themselves have produced changes with epoch-making significance, and
their development no longer looks only to improvements in the performance of
individual weapons, but rather to whether or not the weapons have good
characteristics for linking and matching them with other weapons. As with the
F-111, which was in a class by itself at the time, because it was too advanced,
there was no way to pair it up with other weapons, so all they could do was
shelve it. That lesson has now been absorbed, and the thinking that tries to
rely on one or two new and advanced technology weapons to serve as "killer
weapons" which can put an end to the enemy is now outmoded.
"Building the weapons
to fit the fight," an approach which has the distinctive features of the
age and the characteristics of the laboratory, may not only be viewed as a kind
of active choice, it can also be taken as coping with shifting events by
sticking to a fundamental principle, and in addition to being a major
breakthrough in the history of preparing for war, it also implies the potential
crisis in modern warfare: Customizing weapons systems to tactics which are
still being explored and studied is like preparing food for a great banquet
without knowing who is coming, where the slightest error can lead one far
astray. Viewed from the performance of the U.S. military in Somalia, where they
were at a loss when they encountered Aidid's forces, the most modern military
force does not have the ability to control public clamor, and cannot deal with
an opponent who does things in an unconventional manner. On the battlefields of
the future, the digitized forces may very possibly be like a great cook who is
good at cooking lobsters sprinkled with butter, when faced with guerrillas who
resolutely gnaw corncobs, they can only sigh in despair. The "generation
gap"[11] in weapons and military forces is perhaps an issue that requires
exceptional attention. The closer the generation gap is, the more pronounced
are the battle successes of the more senior generation, while the more the gap
opens, the less each party is capable of dealing with the other, and it may
reach the point where no one can wipe out the other. Looking at the specific
examples of battles that we have, it is difficult for high-tech troops to deal
with unconventional warfare and low-tech warfare, and perhaps there is a rule
here, or at least it is an interesting phenomenon which is worth studying[12].
Weapons of New Concepts and
New Concepts of Weapons
Compared to new-concept
weapons, nearly all the weapons that we have known so far may be termed
old-concept weapons. The reason they are called old is because the basic
functions of these weapons were their mobility and lethal power. Even things
like precision-guided bombs and other such high-tech weapons really involve
nothing more than the addition of the two elements of intelligence and
structural capabilities. From the perspective of practical applications, no change
in appearance can alter their nature as traditional weapons, that is, their
control throughout by professional soldiers and their use on certain
battlefields. All these weapons and weapons platforms that have been produced
in line with traditional thinking have without exception come to a dead end in
their efforts to adapt to modern warfare and future warfare. Those desires of
using the magic of high-technology to work some alchemy on traditional weapons
so that they are completely remade have ultimately fallen into the high-tech
trap involving the endless waste of limited funds and an arms race. This is the
paradox that must inevitably be faced in the process of the development of
traditional weapons: To ensure that the weapons are in the lead, one must continue
to up the ante in development costs; the result of this continued raising of
the stakes is that no one has enough money to maintain the lead. Its ultimate
result is that the weapons to defend the country actually become a cause of
national bankruptcy.
Perhaps the most recent
examples are the most convincing. Marshal Orgakov, the former chief of the
Soviet general staff, was acutely aware of the trend of weapons development in
the "nuclear age," and when, at an opportune time, he proposed the
brand-new concept of the "revolution in military technology," his
thinking was clearly ahead of those of his generation. But being ahead of time
in his thinking hardly brought his country happiness, and actually brought
about disastrous results [13]. As soon as this concept -- which against the
backdrop of the Cold War was seen by his colleagues as setting the pace for the
time -- was proposed, it further intensified the arms race which had been going
on for some time between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was just
that, at that time no one could predict that it would actually result in the
breakup of the Soviet Union and its complete elimination from the superpower
contest. A powerful empire collapsed without a single shot being fired, vividly
corroborating the lines of the famous poem by Kipling, "When empires
perish, it is not with a rumble, but a snicker." Not only was this true
for the former Soviet Union, today the Americans seem to be following in the
footsteps of their old adversary, providing fresh proof of the paradox of
weapons development that we have proposed. As the outlines of the age of
technology integration become increasingly clear, they are investing more and
more in the development of new weapons, and the cost of the weapons is getting
higher and higher. The development of the F-14 and F-15 in the 60s-70s cost one
billion dollars, while the development of the B-2 in the 80s cost over $10
billion, and the development of the F-22 in the 90s has exceeded $13 billion.
Based on weight, the B-2 [14], which runs $13-$15 billion each, is some three
times more expensive than an equivalent weight of gold [15]. Expensive weapons
like that abound in the U.S. arsenal, such as the F-117A bomber, the F-22 main
combat aircraft, and the Comanche helicopter gunship. The cost of each of these
weapons exceeds or approaches $100 million, and this massive amount of weapons
with unreasonable cost-effectiveness has covered the U.S. military with
increasingly heavy armor, pushing them step by step toward the high-tech
weapons trap where the cost stakes continue to be raised. If this is still true
for the rich and brash United States, then how far can the other countries, who
are short of money, continue down this path? Obviously, it will be difficult
for anyone to keep going. Naturally, the way to extricate oneself from this
predicament is to develop a different approach.
Therefore, new-concept
weapons have emerged to fill the bill. However, what seems unfair to people is
that it is again the Americans who are in the lead in this trend. As early as
the Vietnam war, the silver iodide powder released over the "Ho Chi Minh
trail" that resulted in torrential rains and the defoliants scattered over
the subtropical forests put the "American devils" in the sole lead
with regard to both the methods and ruthlessness of new-concept weapons. Thirty
years later, with the dual advantages of money and technology, others are
unable to hold a candle to them in this area.
However, the Americans are
not necessarily in the sole lead in everything. The new concepts of weapons,
which came after the weapons of new concepts and which cover a wider area, were
a natural extension of this. However, the Americans have not been able to get
their act together in this area. This is because proposing a new concept of
weapons does not require relying on the springboard of new technology, it just
demands lucid and incisive thinking. However, this is not a strong point of the
Americans, who are slaves to technology in their thinking. The Americans invariably
halt their thinking at the boundary where technology has not yet reached. It
cannot be denied that man-made earthquakes, tsunamis, weather disasters, or
subsonic wave and new biological and chemical weapons all constitute new
concept weapons [16], and that they have tremendous differences with what we
normally speak of as weapons, but they are still all weapons whose immediate
goal is to kill and destroy, and which are still related to military affairs,
soldiers, and munitions. Speaking in this sense, they are nothing more than
non-traditional weapons whose mechanisms have been altered and whose lethal
power and destructive capabilities have been magnified several times over.
However, a new concept of
weapons is different. This and what people call new-concept weapons are two
entirely different things. While it may be said that new-concept weapons are
weapons which transcend the domain of traditional weapons, which can be
controlled and manipulated at a technical level, and which are capable of inflicting
material or psychological casualties on an enemy, in the face of the new
concept of weapons, such weapons are still weapons in a narrow sense. This is
because the new concept of weapons is a view of weapons in the broad sense,
which views as weapons all means which transcend the military realm but which
can still be used in combat operations. In its eyes, everything that can
benefit mankind can also harm him. This is to say that there is nothing in the
world today that cannot become a weapon, and this requires that our
understanding of weapons must have an awareness that breaks through all
boundaries. With technological developments being in the process of striving to
increase the types of weapons, a breakthrough in our thinking can open up the
domain of the weapons kingdom at one stroke. As we see it, a single man-made
stock-market crash, a single computer virus invasion, or a single rumor or
scandal that results in a fluctuation in the enemy country's exchange rates or
exposes the leaders of an enemy country on the Internet, all can be included in
the ranks of new-concept weapons. A new concept of weapons provides direction
for new-concept weapons, while the new-concept weapons give fixed forms to the
new concept of weapons. With regard to the flood of new-concept weapons,
technology is no longer the main factor, and the true underlying factor is a
new concept regarding weapons.
What must be made clear is
that the new concept of weapons is in the process of creating weapons that are
closely linked to the lives of the common people. Let us assume that the first
thing we say is: The appearance of new-concept weapons will definitely elevate
future warfare to a level which is hard for the common people -- or even
military men -- to imagine. Then the second thing we have to say should be: The
new concept of weapons will cause ordinary people and military men alike to be
greatly astonished at the fact that commonplace things that are close to them
can also become weapons with which to engage in war. We believe that some
morning people will awake to discover with surprise that quite a few gentle and
kind things have begun to have offensive and lethal characteristics.
The Trend to
"Kinder" Weapons
Before the appearance of the
atom bomb, warfare was always in a "shortage age" with respect to
lethal power. Efforts to improve weapons have primarily been to boost their
lethal power, and from the "light-kill weapons" represented by cold
steel weapons and single-shot firearms to the "heavy-kill weapons"
represented by various automatic firearms, the history of the development of
weapons has almost always been a process of continuing to boost the lethal
power of weapons. Prolonged shortages resulted in a thirst among military men
for weapons of even greater lethal power that was difficult to satisfy. With a
single red cloud that arose over the wasteland of New Mexico in the United
States, military men were finally able to obtain a weapon of mass destruction that
fulfilled their wishes, as this could not only completely wipe out the enemy,
it could kill them 100 or 1000 times over. This gave mankind lethal
capabilities that exceeded the demand, and for the first time there was some
room to spare with regard to lethal power in war.
Philosophical principles
tell us that, whenever something reaches an ultimate point, it will turn in the
opposite direction. The invention of nuclear weapons, this "ultra-lethal
weapon" [17] which can wipe out all mankind, has plunged mankind into an
existential trap of its own making.
Nuclear weapons have become
a sword of Damocles hanging over the head of mankind which forces it to ponder:
Do we really need "ultra-lethal weapons"? What is the difference
between killing an enemy once and killing him 100 times? What is the point of
defeating the enemy if it means risking the destruction of the world? How do we
avoid warfare that results in ruin for all? A "balance of terror"
involving "mutually-assured destruction" was the immediate product of
this thinking, but its by-product was to provide a braking mechanism for the
runaway express of improving the lethal capabilities of weapons, which was
continually picking up speed, so that the development of weapons was no
longer careening crazily down the light-kill weapons -- heavy-kill weapons --
ultra-lethal weapons expressway, with people trying to find a new approach to
weapons development which would not only be effective but which could also
exercise control over the lethal power of the weapons.
Any major technological
invention will have a profound human background. The "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights" passed by the United Nations General Assembly
in 1948 and the more than 50 subsequent pacts related to it have established a
set of international rules for human rights in which it is recognized that the
use of weapons of mass destruction -- particularly nuclear weapons -- is a
serious violation of the "right to life" and represents a "crime
against mankind."
Influenced by human rights
and other new political concepts, plus the integration trend in international
economics, the interlocking demands and political positions involving the
interests of various social and political forces, the proposal of the concept
of "ultimate concern" for the ecological environment, and
particularly the value of human life, have resulted in misgivings about killing
and destruction, forming a new value concept for war and new ethics for
warfare.
The trend to
"kinder" [18] weapons is nothing other than a reflection in the
production and development of weapons of this great change in man's cultural
background. At the same time, technological progress has given us the means to
strike at the enemy's nerve center directly without harming other things,
giving us numerous new options for achieving victory, and all these make people
believe that the best way to achieve victory is to control, not to kill. There
have been changes in the concept of war and the concept of weapons, and the
approach of using uncontrolled slaughter to force the enemy into unconditional
surrender has now become the relic of a bygone age. Warfare has now taken leave
of the meat-grinder age of Verdun-like campaigns.
The appearance of
precision-kill (accurate) weapons and non-lethal (non-fatal) weapons is a
turning point in the development of weapons, showing for the first time that
weapons are developing in a "kinder," not a "stronger"
direction. Precision-kill weapons can hit a target precisely, reducing
collateral casualties, and like a gamma knife which can excise a tumor with
hardly any bleeding, it has led to "surgical" strikes and other such
new tactics, so that inconspicuous combat actions can achieve extremely notable
strategic results. For example, by merely using one missile to track a mobile
telephone signal, the Russians were able to still forever the tough mouth of
Dudayev, who was a headache, and at the same time eased the enormous trouble
that had been stirred up by tiny Chechnya. Non-lethal weapons can effectively
eliminate the combat capabilities of personnel and equipment without loss of
life [19]. The trend that is embodied in these weapons shows that mankind is in
the process of overcoming its own extreme thinking, beginning to learn to
control the lethal power that it already has but which is increasingly
excessive. In the massive bombing that lasted more than a month during the Gulf
War, the loss of life among civilians in Iraq only numbered in the thousands
[20], far less than in the massive bombing of Dresden during World War II.
Kinder weapons represent the latest conscious choice of mankind among various
options in the weapons arena by which, after the weapons are infused with the
element of new technology, the human component is then added, thereby giving
warfare an unprecedented kind-hearted hue. However, a kinder weapon is still a
weapon, and it does not mean that the demands of being kinder will reduce the
battlefield effectiveness of the weapon. To take away a tank's combat
capabilities one can use cannons or missiles to destroy it, or a laser beam can
be used to destroy its optical equipment or blind its crew. On the battlefield,
someone who is injured requires more care than someone who is killed, and
unmanned weapons can eliminate increasingly expensive protective facilities.
Certainly those developing kinder weapons have already done cold
cost-effectiveness calculations of this. Casualties can strip away an enemy's
combat capabilities, causing him to panic and lose the will to fight, so this
may be considered an extremely worthwhile way to achieve victory. Today, we
already have enough technology, and we can create many methods of causing fear
which are more effective, such as using a laser beam to project the image of
injured followers against the sky, which would be sufficient to frighten those
soldiers who are devoutly religious. There are no longer any obstacles to
building this kind of weapon, it just requires that some additional imagination
be added to the technical element.
Kinder weapons represent a
derivative of the new concept of weapons, while information weapons are a
prominent example of kinder weapons. Whether it involves electromagnetic energy
weapons for hard destruction or soft-strikes by computer logic bombs, network
viruses, or media weapons, all are focused on paralyzing and undermining, not
personnel casualties.
Kinder weapons, which could
only be born in an age of technical integration, may very well be the most
promising development trend for weapons, and at the same time they will bring
about forms of war or revolutions in military affairs which we cannot imagine
or predict today. They represent a change with the most profound implications
in the history of human warfare to date, and are the watershed between the old
and the new forms of war. This is because their appearance has been sufficient
to put all the wars in the age of cold and hot weapons into the "old"
era. Nonetheless, we still cannot indulge in romantic fantasies about
technology, believing that from this point on war will become a confrontation
like an electronic game, and even simulated warfare in a computer room
similarly must be premised upon a country's actual overall capabilities, and if
a colossus with feet of clay comes up with ten plans for simulated warfare, it
will still not be sufficient to deter an enemy who is more powerful with regard
to actual strength.
War is still the ground of
death and life, the path of survival and destruction, and even the slightest
innocence is not tolerated. Even if some day all the weapons have been made
completely humane, a kinder war in which bloodshed may be avoided is still war.
It may alter the cruel process of war, but there is no way to change the
essence of war, which is one of compulsion, and therefore it cannot alter its
cruel outcome, either.
Footnotes:
[1] Engels said, "In
the age of barbarism, the bow and arrow was still a decisive weapon, the same
as the iron sword in an uncivilized age and firearms in the age of
civilization." (Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 4,
People's Press, 1972, p. 19)
With regard to how stirrups
altered the mode of combat, we can refer to the translation and commentary by
Gu Zhun [7357 0402] of an article entitled "Stirrups and Feudalism -- Does
Technology Create History?" "Stirrups...immediately made hand-to-hand
combat possible, and this was a revolutionary new mode of combat...very seldom
had there been an invention as simple as the stirrup, but very seldom did it
play the kind of catalytic role in history that this did." "Stirrups
resulted in a series of military and social revolutions in Europe." (Collected
Works of Gu Zhun, Guizhou People's Press, 1994, pp 293-309).
[2] "Compared to the
development of any advanced new weapons technology, the invention of the rifle
and the conical bullet between 1850-1860 had the most profound and immediate
revolutionary impact.....The impact on their age of high-explosive bombs,
airplanes, and tanks, which appeared in the 20th century, certainly does not
compare to that of the rifle at the time." For details, see T. N.
Dupuy's The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, part 3, section 21,
"Rifles, Conical Bullets, and Dispersed Formations." (Military
Science Publishing House, 1985, pp 238-250).
[3] In the engagement of the
Somme river in World War I, on 1 July 1916 the English forces launched an
offensive against the Germans, and the Germans used Maxim machine guns to
strafe the English troops, which were in a tight formation, resulting in 60,000
casualties in one day. From that point, mass formation charges gradually began
to retreat from the battlefield. (Weapons and War -- The Historical
Evolution of Military Technology, Liu Jifeng [0491 2060 6912], University
of Science and Technology for National Defense Publishing House, 1992, pp
172-173).
[4] If Wiener's views on war
game machines are not taken as the earliest discussion of information weapons.
Then, a comment by Tom Luona [as published 5012 6719] in 1976 to the effect
that information warfare is a "struggle among decision-making
systems" makes him the first to come up with the term "information
warfare" (U.S., Military Intelligence magazine, 1997,
Jan-Mar issue, Douglas Dearth, "Implications, Characteristics, and Impact
of Information Warfare"). Through independent research, in 1990, Shen
Weiguang [3088 0251 0342], a young scholar in China who has over ten years of
military service, published Information Warfare, which is probably
the earliest monograph on information warfare. On the strength of his Third
Wave, in another best-seller entitled Power Shift, Toffler gave
information warfare a global look, while the Gulf War happened along to become
the most splendid advertisement for this new concept of combat. At that point,
discussing "information warfare" became fashionable.
[5] Foreign experts hold
that "high technology" is not a completely fixed concept and that it
is also a dynamic concept, with different countries emphasizing high technology
differently. Military high technology mainly includes military microelectronic
device technology, computer technology, optoelectric technology, aerospace
technology, biotechnology, new materials technology, stealth technology, and
directed-energy technology. The most important characteristic of military high
technology is "integration," i.e., each military high technology is
made up of various technologies to form a technology group. (For details, see
"Foreign Military Data," Academy of Military Sciences, Foreign
Military Research Dept., No. 69, 1993).
[6] Regarding the definition
of "information warfare," to date opinions still vary. The definition
by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is: Actions
taken to interfere with the enemy's information, information processing,
information systems, and computer networks to achieve information superiority
over the enemy, while protecting one's own information, information processing,
information systems, and computer networks. According to U.S. Army
Field Manual FM100-6, "the DOD's understanding of information warfare
leans toward the effects of information in actual conflicts," while the
Army's understanding is that "information has already permeated every
aspect, from peacetime to military actions in global warfare" (Military
Science Publishing House, Chinese translation, pp 24-25). "In a broad sense,
information warfare constitutes actions which use information to achieve
national goals." That is the definition given to information warfare by
George Stein, a professor at the U.S. Air University, reflecting a somewhat
broader vision than that of the Army. In an article in the 1997 summer edition
of "Joint Force Quarterly," Col. Brian Fredericks proposed that
"information warfare is a national issue that goes beyond the scope of
national defense," and perhaps this is the most accurate description of information
warfare in the broad sense.
[7] Running precisely
counter to the situation in which the implications of the concept of
"information warfare" are getting broader and broader, some of the
smart young officers in the U.S. military are increasingly questioning the
concept of "information warfare." Air Force Lt. Col. James Rogers
points out that "information warfare really isn't anything new...whether
or not those who assert that information warfare techniques and strategies will
inevitably replace 'armed warfare' are a bit too self-confident." (U.S.
Marines magazine , April, 1997). Navy Lieutenant Robert Guerli [as
published 0657 1422 0448] proposed that "the seven areas of
misunderstanding with regard to information warfare are: (1) the overuse of
analogous methods; (2) exaggerating the threat; (3) overestimating one's own
strength; (4) historical relevance and accuracy; (5) avoiding criticism of
anomalous attempts; (6) totally unfounded assumptions; and (7) non-standard
definitions." (U.S., Events magazine, Sep 97 issue). Air Force Major Yulin
Whitehead wrote in the fall 1997 issue of Airpower Journal that
information is not all-powerful, and that information weapons are not
"magic weapons." Questions about information warfare are definitely
not limited to individuals, as the U.S. Air Force document "The
Foundations of Information Warfare" makes a strict distinction between
"warfare in the information age" and "information warfare."
It holds that "warfare in the information age" is warfare which uses
computerized weapons, such as using a cruise missile to attack a target,
whereas "information warfare" treats information as an independent
realm and a powerful weapon. Similarly, some well-known scholars have also
issued their own opinions. Johns Hopkins University professor Eliot Cohen
reminds us that "just as nuclear weapons did not result in the elimination
of conventional forces, the information revolution will not eliminate guerilla
tactics, terrorism, or weapons of mass destruction."
[8] Macromolecular systems
designed and produced using biotechnology represent the production materials
for even higher order electronic components. For example, protein molecule
computers have computation speeds and memory capabilities hundreds of millions
of times greater than our current computers. (New Military Perspectives for
the Next Century, Military Science Publishing House, 1997 edition, pp
142-145).
[9] Even in the Gulf War,
which has been termed a testing ground for the new weapons, there were quite a
few old weapons and conventional munitions which played important roles. (For
details, see "The Gulf War -- U.S. Department of Defense Final Report to Congress
-- Appendix")
[10] Starting with
"Air-Land Battle," weapons development by the U.S. military has
mainly been divided into five stages: Propose requirements, draft a plan, proof
of concept, engineering development and production, and outfitting the units.
Development regarding the equipping of digitized units is following this same
path. (U.S. Army magazine, Oct 1995). In March, 1997, the U.S. Army
conducted a brigade-size high-level combat test, testing a total of 58 kinds of
digitized equipment. (U.S. Army Times, 31 March, 7 April, 28 April
1997). According to John E. Wilson, commander of the U.S. Army's Materiel
Command, his mission is to cooperate with the Training and Doctrine Command,
thinking up and developing bold and novel advanced technology equipment for
them which meets their needs. (U.S. Army magazine, October 1997).
[11] Slipchenko [si li pu
qin ke 2448 0448 2528 3830 4430], chairman of the Dept. of Scientific Research
at the Russian General Staff Academy, believes that war and weapons have
already gone through five ages, and we are now heading toward the sixth. (Zhu
Xiaoli, Zhao Xiaozhuo, The New U.S. and Russian Military Revolution,
Military Science Publishing House, 1996 edition, p 6).
[12] The Journal of
the National Defense University, No. 11, 1998, carried an article on Chen
Bojiang's interview of Philip Odeen, chairman of the U.S. National Defense
Panel. Odeen mentioned "asymmetrical warfare" several times,
believing that this is a new threat to the United States. Antulio Echevarria
published an article in Parameters magazine in which he proposed that "in
the post-industrial age, the thing that will still be most difficult to deal
with will be a 'people's war.'"
[13] U.S. defense
specialists believe that Orgakov already saw that electronic technology would
result in a revolution in conventional weapons, and that they would replace
nuclear weapons with respect to their effects. However, Orgakov's foresight and
wisdom with regard to the issue of a revolution in military affairs ran aground
because of structural problems. "If, in keeping up with the extremely high
costs of the revolution in military affairs, a country exceeds the limits that
can be borne by its system and material conditions, but it keeps engaging in
military power contests with its opponents, the only outcome can be that they
will fall further behind with regard to the military forces that they can use.
This was the fate of Russia during the czarist and Soviet eras: the Soviet
Union undertook military burdens that were difficult to bear, while in turn the
military was unwilling to accept the need for strategic retrenchment."
(See U.S., Strategic Review magazine, spring 1996, Steven
Blank, "Preparing for the Next War: Some Views on the Revolution in
Military Affairs").
[14] In 1981, the U.S. Air
Force estimated that it could produce 132 B-2s with an investment of $22
billion. However, eight years later, this money had only produced one B-2.
Based on its value per unit weight, one B-2 is worth three times its weight in
gold. (See Modern Military, No. 8, 1998, p 33, and Zhu
Zhihao's Analysis of U.S. Stealth Technology Policy.)
[15] The U.S. Dept. of
Defense conducted an analysis of the 13 January 1993 air attack on Iraq and
believes that there are numerous limitations to high-tech weapons, and that the
effect of the combined effect bombs was at times better than that of precision
bombs. (U.S., Aviation Week and Space Technology, 25 January 93).
[16] New-concept weapons
primarily include kinetic-energy weapons, directed-energy weapons, subsonic
weapons, geophysical weapons, meteorological weapons, solar energy weapons, and
gene weapons, etc. (New Military Perspectives for the Next Century,
Military Science Publishing House, 1997 edition, p 3).
[17] The point in
substituting the concept of "ultra-lethal weapons" for the concept of
"weapons of mass destruction" is to stress that the lethal power of
such weapons exceeds the needs of warfare and represents a product of man's
extremist thinking.
[18] The "kind" in
"kinder weapons" mainly refers to the fact that it reduces slaughter
and collateral casualties.
[19] The April 1993 issue of
the British journal International Defense Review revealed that
the United States was energetically researching a variety of non-lethal
weapons, including optical weapons, high-energy microwave weapons, acoustic
beam weapons, and pulsed chemical lasers. The 6 March 1993 issue of Jane's
Defense Weekly reported that a high-level non-lethal weapons steering
committee at the Dept. of Defense had formulated a policy regulating the
development, procurement, and use of such weapons. In addition, according to
the 1997 World Military Yearbook (pp 521-522), the U.S. Dept.
of Defense has established a "non-lethal weapons research leading
group," whose goal is to see that non-lethal weapons appear on the weapons
inventory as soon as possible.
[20] See Military Science
Publishing House Foreign Military Data, 26 March 1993, No. 27, p 3
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