December 30, 2019
Twenty years ago a not very well-known Vladimir Putin
published an essay “Russia at the turn of the millennium”. It was printed in
Nezavisimaya Gazeta and at the Russian government website. The only copy that I
can find on the Net in English now is here but I will be referring to the official English
translation and Russian text that I downloaded at the time.
Putin had been Prime Minister for about five months
and, when Yeltsin resigned the day after the publication of this essay, he
became Acting President. Since that day his team has been running Russia. It is
reasonable to regard this essay as his program and, on its twenty-year
anniversary, appropriate to see how well he (and his team – it’s not a one-man
operation) have done.
I concluded that he outlined four main projects:
- Improve the
economy.
- Re-establish
central control.
- Establish a rule of law.
- Improve Russia’s position in the world.
Putin took power at a time when people were seriously
saying Russia is
Finished. And,
however silly this may look now when we are hysterically told every day that “Putin’s Russia”
is infiltrating, controlling, interfering, attacking, hacking, conquering, violating, cheating it is worth running over what the author said.
Assassinations, mafiya, corruption, kryshas, oligarchs, unpaid salaries,
military collapse: “the Russians are likely to face a long, slow, relatively
peaceful decline into obscurity – a process that is well under way”. The author
acknowledged the changing of the guard – the piece was published in May 2000 –
but believed Putin was picked only because he had the “security connections to
protect” Yeltsin’s entourage; he was just another centraliser building a
personality cult in “Zaire With Permafrost.”
The author – like almost everyone else – got Putin
wrong but generally he was describing the reality of Russia in 2000. It was a
mess. In Putin’s own words last June:
But I must note that during that time our social
sphere, industry and the defence sector collapsed. We lost the defence
industry, we practically destroyed the Armed Forces, led the country into a
civil war, to bloodshed in the Caucasus, and brought the country to the verge
of losing sovereignty and collapse.
As far as I know, most Western intelligence agencies
(but not the one I was involved with) would have agreed with his prediction
that Russia was, inevitably, going down to “obscurity”. The fear then was of
chaos – rogue generals, nuclear weapons gone missing (remember suitcase nukes, “red mercury“?): Russia’s weakness was the threat, not its
strength. We appreciated how badly off Russia was but also knew that Russia in
its thousand years has often been down but never out. We also knew that there
was more to Putin than the absurdities that were said about him of which I
especially remember this:
In my group we took note that he had been the trusted
disciple of Anatoliy Sobchak who was, in the terminology of the time, a
“reformer” and therefore a “good Russian”. We had also read the millennium
paper and saw the program. I am not pretending that, in 1999, I or my
colleagues expected him to do all this but at least we saw the possibilities.
We, as it were, saw a half full glass where others saw a glass quickly
emptying.
************************************
He and his team were trying to make Russia prosperous,
united, law-governed and internationally significant. A formidable program from
the perspective of 1999 to be sure. How well have they done?
Taking the economy first. One of the famous quotations
from the millennium paper was this:
It will take us approximately fifteen years and an
annual growth of our Gross Domestic Product by 8 percent a year to reach the
per capita GDP level of present-day Portugal or Spain.
That mission has been accomplished and much more than
merely accomplished. According to the World Bank Russia’s GDP in purchasing power parity in
2018 (4.0 billion) was nearly 12 times as high as Portugal’s (339 million) and
twice Spain’s (1.8 billion). It was in fact larger than France’s (3.0 billion)
or the UK’s (3.0 billion), two other countries he mentioned. (By comparison,
China 25 billion and USA 20 billion). Valuations of Russia’s GDP in US
dollars contradict
reality: as I have argued elsewhere, Russia’s
economy is in fact full-service and it is one of four potential autarkies on the
planet. And, the way things are going, it won’t become any less so: as Awara points out it is one of the
most independent economies in the world, well positioned to survive a world recession. While
individual Russians could certainly be richer, the improvement from the
desperate situation in 2000 is extraordinary. Ironically, Western sanctions
(and Moscow’s adroit response) have strengthened the Russian economy; as Putin
said in his last direct
line program:
Look, if ten years ago I or anyone else in this hall
had been told that we would be exporting agricultural products worth $25.7
billion, like we did last year, I would have laughed in the face of the person
who said this.
An outstanding success.
The second point was re-centralising power. In 2000
there were concerns that the federation might break up: the CIA in 2004 (has there ever been an organisation with a
worse track record of Russia predictions?) thought it could break into as many
as eight different parts by 2015. Many of the “subjects of the federation” had
negotiated sovereignty pacts with Moscow and, as of 2000, Chechnya was
effectively independent. So, in fact, the CIA’s prediction was not, of itself,
idiotic but it assumed a temporary weakness to be a permanent condition: a
longer view of Russia’s track record shows weak periods but it always comes
back. As Putin said in the millennium paper:
For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly which
should be got rid of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor
of order and the initiator and main driving force of any change.
Russia is a civilisation state – President
Macron’s expression –
Europe by contrast has always been a series of (quarrelling) independent
states. For much of the time, the state – the King’s power – was something to
be resisted or limited. Russia, on the other hand, during its “prey-fish” period, learned to value the state as the guarantor
of its existence. And so, to Russians, state power is much more important than
it is to most Europeans. Western commentators have to understand this or else
they look like fools to Russians: Russians think centralisation is good, they
respect state power, not slavishly as Western prejudice would have it, but
because Russia has fought for its existence too many times for them to want to
risk anarchy. Putin and his team have re-established state power; that someone
like David Satter
thinks Putin is a dictator or the Western media calls his elections fake, matters nothing to Russians. Russia exists again and
it’s full of Russians. A rather interesting illustration can be seen in this
video when the Chechen MP in
Syria says we are all Russians. The Russian language has two words that would be
translated as “Russian”: one for ethnic Russians, the other for citizens of the
country. A Chechen can’t be the first (and wouldn’t want to be) but he can be
proud of being the second. Again, we have to agree that the Putin Team achieved
its second aim.
The third aim was rule of law. And here assessment is
on more uncertain grounds. The first question to ask is whether any country
actually does have a “rule of law”. Britain is holding Assange in jail on rape charges jumping bail… what charges? What exactly did Maria Butina
do? Why did Canada seize a
Chinese executive? Whataboutism they call this but it establishes the base of
reality – all countries have corruption, all countries have one law for the
powerful and another for the weak; it’s not absolute, it’s a matter of degree.
Certainly, by any standards, twenty years ago Russia was very lawless; how
lawless is it today and how successful has the Team been? I don’t know know of
any good study on the matter – I don’t take Transparency International
seriously: Ukraine less corrupt than Russia? – but it does appear that things are much better
than they were. Certainly we hear very little about businesses needing
criminals’ protection today and Russia’s ranking on ease of doing
business is continually improving and is respectable today. This guide
indicates some remaining problems but generally assumes that it’s possible for
foreigners to do business there as does this guide. Recently we learned that “Nearly one in
six Russian mayors have faced criminal prosecution over the past decade” which is either evidence of a lot of corruption or a
lot of success combatting it. The construction of a new cosmodrome has
involved much theft but
other mega projects – like the Crimea Bridge or the new Moscow-St Petersburg
highway – seem to have been carried out with little. A balanced
(and sourced) piece argues
that there has been considerable improvement in the rights of the accused in
the twenty years. But a frequent complaint in Putin’s Q&A sessions are
over-zealous officials destroying businesses – perhaps for venal purposes. So a
cautious conclusion would suggest that the two decades have seen a reduction in
criminality and an improvement in rule of law. How much of each is debatable
and the argument is not helped by tendentious pieces asserting that the
imitation of the American foreign agents law was “a landmark on
the journey towards the end of the rule of law in modern-day Russia.” So some success in this aim but some distance to go
still.
The fourth aim was to improve Russia’s standing in the
world. Here another enormous turnaround is seen – even if not much to the
liking of those who ruled the world in 2000. There’s no need to spell it out –
despite the West’s efforts to isolate and weaken Russia, Putin is a welcome
visitor in many places. The delirium over Russia’s imagined influence and
control proves that it is hardly “decline[d] into obscurity”. Moscow’s status
is, of course, especially recognised in Beijing where the Russia-China alliance
grows stronger day by day. When we see the NYT, after years of “Trump and
Putin: A Love Story“,
solemnly opining “President
Trump is correct to try to establish a sounder relationship with Russia and
peel it away from China” or President Macron suggesting that Russia shouldn’t want to be “a minority
ally of China”
we see the belated realisation that twenty years’ of pushing around an
“insignificant” Russia has not turned out so happily for the pushers. The NYT
and Macron are too late: why would Moscow or Beijing ever trust the West again?
Meanwhile Moscow manages to have, for example, good relations with Iran, Iraq
and Syria as well as with Saudi Arabia and Israel; quite a contrast with
Washington and much of the West.
************************************
So, in conclusion, twenty years later the program has
been very successful.
Improve economy? Yes, dramatically, extra marks.
Re-centralise control? Yes, full marks.
Rule of law? Considerable progress, part marks.
Improve Russia’s role in the world? Yes, dramatically, extra marks.
The West resents this achievement and has been in an
economic (sanctions) and diplomatic (ditto) war with Russia. But, many would
argue, that the only Russia the West has ever liked is a weak one (except, of
course, in times of war against Napoleon, the Kaiser or Hitler); enmity is a
given and the only way the West would like Russia would be if the Putin Team
had failed and it had remained, poor, divided, lawless and insignificant.
A remarkably successful achievement; not accomplished
by accident or luck: a good plan, intelligently and flexibly carried out.
************************************
As an afterword, given the repetitive scare stories
about the return of
Stalin, here’s
what Putin said about the Soviet period (Note: this is the official English
translation; it takes some liberties with the original but is true to the
spirit).
For almost three-fourths of the outgoing century
Russia lived under the sign of the implementation of the communist doctrine. It
would be a mistake not to see and, even more so, to deny the unquestionable
achievements of those times. But it would be an even bigger mistake not to
realise the outrageous price our country and its people had to pay for that
Bolshevist experiment. What is more, it would be a mistake not to understand
its historic futility. Communism and the power of Soviets did not make Russia a
prosperous country with a dynamically developing society and free people.
Communism vividly demonstrated its inaptitude for sound self-development,
dooming our country to a steady lag behind economically advanced countries. It
was a road to a blind alley, which is far away from the mainstream of
civilisation.
Hardly an endorsement is it?
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