China’s Hidden Economic Time
Bomb
The China government
statistical agency just released economic data showing the poorest GDP growth
in almost 30 years for China. The problem goes far deeper than recent effects
of the US-China trade war or the impact of calamities such as African Swine
Fever that have decimated the nation’s pig herds. The underlying far more
serious problem is an emerging disaster that few are willing to discuss openly.
Since about 2017 China’s
population has begun to feel the real impact of the ill-conceived One Child
Policy imposed by the Communist Party in 1979, some 40 years ago. This
slow-growing problem, once seen as benefit, is undermining the entire basis of
the China Economic Miracle. The question is whether Beijing can make the
transition to an ageing population without major social and economic
dislocation.
On October 18 the China
State Statistics bureau released Third Quarter GDP which came in at 6.0%
compared with 6.2% the previous quarter. While there is great skepticism as to
how honest the reporting is, the fact the government must announce a slowing
growth at all suggests the situation in reality could be far worse.
The true data on China’s
economy remain opaque. In December 2018 the Shanghai University of Finance and
Economics published its annual transparency survey on the 31 provincial-level
regions. The average score was just above 53%. The study concluded, “[Unfortunately,]
the general level of transparency in China’s local governments remains poor.”
A more direct indicator of
the health of the economy comes from actual trade data. Bloomberg reports that
auto sales in China have fallen for the 15th month out of 16 months in
September. It’s the “worst slump in a generation”, according to Bloomberg. As well,
sales of new homes and apartments in Beijing, Shanghai and other major cities
fell dramatically to lows of 2014.
The deeper issue is not the
transparency of official economic data. The deeper issue is whether the China
Miracle, the remarkable rise from a Third World level backwardness in less than
three decades, is entering a structural crisis that will impact not only
China’s economy. The recent data on new car sales and new home buying could be
an ominous indicator that the China boom years are coming into a drastic
slowing with huge consequences not only for China but also for the world.
Golden Era Peaks
Like no other economy in
modern history, China’s remarkable economic rise has been facilitated by an
extraordinary short-term demographic blessing. That blessing has begun to turn
into a curse.
In the 1980’s as China
officially opened its economy to Western factories and investment, China had
what seemed to be an endless pool of low wage labor power from the countryside
to build its roads, new cities and assemble its goods in factories of the likes
of Nike or VW or Apple to be shipped to the world. In 1987, the early days of
China’s economic miracle, 64 percent of the population were of working age, and
only 4 percent were aged above 65. That meant a huge surplus of workers to feed
China’s low-cost manufacturing boom. This drove the average 10-11 percent
annual GDP growth seen between 1987 and 2007.
So long as globalization
with the rules of the newly-created World Trade Organization encouraged the
outsourcing of manufacture to China with its huge work force and ultra-low
wages, China was booming like no other.
In 1979, alarmed at a
population that had been increasing from 1950 to 1978, at a 20 percent annual
natural population growth rate, the Communist Party imposed a draconian One
Child Policy. Deng Xiaoping as part of the Four Modernizations, set a goal to
keep the population at 1.2 billion by 2000 as part of the formula for
quadrupling China’s GDP within the same period.
The longer term economic
consequences of that policy were not to emerge until some three decades,
roughly a generation later, around the time, significantly, of the 2008-9 world
economic crisis. A case can be made that the rising wages in China’s
manufacturing sector, occasioned by the first shortages of manpower beginning
around 2007-10, were more a factor for the severity of the world financial
crisis at that time than was merely the US real estate market.
China’s turn to what Deng
Xiaoping called “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” after 1979 was in fact
a state-controlled turn to western companies and investment to take advantage
of China’s seemingly unlimited low cost labor. That labor mostly came from
those born prior to 1979, before the One Child Policy. A worker in his mid-20s
in 1980 was in his 50s by the time of the 2008-9 crisis in the West.
Demographic change is a slow process and could be overlooked in the boom years
before 2008. Now, in the past decade, manufacturing wages across China are
rising and the population born under the One Child era are notably fewer,
adding to recent rising wage pressures.
As China’s manufacturing has
moved up the value-added chain as part of its development strategy of Made in
China, wages have risen significantly. The Economist Intelligence Unit
estimates that from 2013-2020 average manufacturing labor costs have risen on
average 12% a year. Today average factory wage costs in China are some three
times that of India and far higher than in Indonesia or Vietnam.
At the same time as higher
skilled labor is needed for China’s fast-developing manufacturing base,
especially under the mandates of the Made in China2025 transformation to a
world high-tech economy, the size of the overall workforce, once considered
nearly limitless, has begun to decline. China’s labor force peaked in 2015 and
has begun shrinking, albeit slowly at first. That decline now is pre-programmed
to accelerate as the pre-1979 workforce reaches retirement age and is not
replaced in equal numbers after 1979 due to the drastic decline in births.
According to Deutsche Bank estimates, the work force will shrink from 911
million in 2015, to 849 million in 2020, and to 782 million in 2030. Barring a
dramatic change in birth rates, beginning about 2025 China’s overall population
will begin a slow but accelerating decline as well.
In 2017 China had a
fertility rate well below population replacement levels of 2.1 needed to
sustain population size. Slowly realizing the long-term implications, in 2013
the Communist Party moved to slightly lift the limit to two children for some
families, and by 2016 to 2 children for all. Even if the result had been as
hoped, it would take at least a generation to change the dynamics. However, the
policy has yet to produce any major increase in birth rates for a complex of
reasons.
Ageing Shift
Not only is China’s labor
force declining and wages rising, China’s overall population is ageing faster
than any comparable country, owing to the combination of rapid economic growth
and the limits on children over the past four decades. With improving living
standards in rural areas the longevity of the population has improved
significantly. Life expectancy in China increased from
43 years in 1960 to 75 years in 2013.
China is ageing faster than
almost any other country because the number of new births has been blocked
while those born are living far longer. By 2016 China had the lowest fertility
rate in the world—1.05 according to China’s 2016 State Statistical Bureau data.
Social changes encourage young women to postpone marriage and pursue careers,
while rural practice encourages male over female births, all of which drive
fertility rates lower.
China’s elderly population
(over sixty), 14 percent in 2016, will grow to 24 percent of the population by
2030, and will reach 39 percent of the population by 2050. At that time,
China’s dependency ratio–the number of people below 15 and above 65 divided by
the total working population–is projected to increase to 70 percent, up from 37
percent in 2015. This means a dramatically smaller working-age population with
the responsibility of providing for both the young and old. In other words a
shrinking relative number of working age taxpayers is facing the growing number
of elderly retirees. To avert social unrest the government must somehow
undertake huge costs to provide for the elderly.
Traditionally, younger
Chinese have taken care of their elderly parents but now, with significantly
fewer working children to care for the older retirees, the government will be
forced to secure some improved form of social benefits, health care and income
support at a time trade surpluses are declining and state debt soaring. At the
same time young families are under pressure to increase family size which
increases family costs as well. An estimated 23 percent of the elderly in China
today cannot take care of themselves, while in 2010 only 43 percent of elderly
males and 13 percent of elderly females received any financial
pension. While Japan became rich before its population aged, China will
not. Ageing of China is a social ticking time bomb.
While all this might sound
similar to problems faced by many countries such as Italy or Germany, given the
scale of China’s role in the world economy and the dramatic shift in just a few
years from what was called a “demographic dividend” —acceleration of economic
growth following a decline in birth and death rates—to what might be now called
a “demographic disaster,” China is unique.
It becomes clear that the
urgency with which Xi Jinping and the Party leadership is promoting its Belt,
Road Initiative, as well as Made in China 2025, as an attempt to achieve a near
impossible economic feat. Yet the demographic shift is here, while the
hoped-for dividends from the BRI and Made in China2025 look far remote at this
point. The sharp declines in recent months in domestic consumption for cars and
housing could in fact be far more alarming than a mere cyclical downturn. It
could well be the first signs of the negative global economics of the huge
China demographic shift now unfolding.
F. William
Engdahl is strategic risk consultant and lecturer, he holds a degree
in politics from Princeton University and is a best-selling author on
oil and geopolitics, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
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