Authored by Daryl G. Kimball on July
15, 2019
Russian pursuit of the 9M729 intermediate-range missile, which is banned under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, is unacceptable and merits a strong response. But NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg’s formula, as expressed in a new op-ed published in the German-language Frankfurter Allgemeine, is inadequate.
In his July 14 essay, the
Secretary-General embraces the Trump administration’s decision to terminate the
treaty August 2 without a realistic plan to help resolve the long-running
compliance dispute. This move, combined with the possibility of new U.S.
ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe—is risky and unwise as it opens the
door to a new phase of destabilizing INF missile competition with Russia.
Furthermore, Stoltenberg fails to
mention that U.S. officials have refused thus far
to take up Russia’s offer to discuss “any mutually beneficial proposals that
take into account the interests and concerns of both parties.”
Options that address Russian concerns
about U.S. missile defense launchers in Romania and Poland—which are capable of
firing offensive missiles—and that encourage the verifiable elimination of
Russian noncompliant cruise missiles might have resolved the INF Treaty
dispute. Failure by both sides to take such diplomatic engagement more seriously
since the 9M729 (aka the SSC-8) missile was first tested five years ago has
bought us to this point.
The Secretary-General reiterates his
pledge that "NATO allies have no intention of developing and deploying
medium-range nuclear land-based missiles in Europe. We will not reflect the
behavior of Russia. Because we do not want a new arms race and we remain
committed to effective arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.”
These words may sound reassuring, but
Stoltenberg fails to mention that NATO will soon entertain an American scheme to deploy
ground-launched cruise missiles and other intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The Trump administration is pressing Congress for
$100 million for a program to develop and test the missiles. The Department of
Defense plans to begin flight testing a ground-based variant of its Tomahawk
ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) just a few weeks after it pulls out of the
INF Treaty August 2.
By seeking to deploy new,
intermediate-range missiles in Europe, the Trump administration wants to
counter Russia's 50-75 nuclear-capable, but very likely conventionally-armed,
9M729 ground-launched cruise missiles that have been deployed so far. Given
that the United States and NATO forces current can hold hundreds of key Russian
military targets at risk using their existing array of sea-, land-, and
air-based conventional strike weapons and missiles, new U.S. intermediate-range
missiles are militarily unnecessary.
Contrary to Stoltenberg’s assurances,
any agreement by NATO to deploy U.S. conventionally-armed, ground-launched
cruise missiles in Europe would indeed “reflect the behavior of Russia."
Russia would undoubtedly see any such
missile deployment, whether with conventional or nuclear warheads, as a direct
threat to its leadership and command-and-control centers — and NATO’s eastward
expansion allows these weapons to be placed on the Russian doorstep and where
they could hit key targets within minutes.
Russia would very likely respond in
kind with more intermediate-range missiles. If both sides begin to deploy
intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles,
Europe will be less secure and the risk of a military incident or
miscommunication leading to a full-scale war with Russia will increase.
Furthermore, Stoltenberg claims that
NATO remains committed to effective arms control, but he fails to endorse the
preservation of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which
will expire in 2021 if Presidents Trump and Putin do not agree to extend it as
allowed under Article XIV of the agreement. The treaty verifiably limits the
long-range nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation and the United States to
no more than 1,550 warheads and 700 delivery systems each.
Although Washington acknowledges
Moscow is abiding by the treaty, Trump has not decided to extend the agreement,
and his treaty-averse National Security
Advisor John Bolton says an extension is “unlikely." Without INF and without New START, there would
be no legally-binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals for
the first time since 1972.
A new and more serious NATO
commitment to arms control is needed to protect Europe and the United States.
NATO could declare as a bloc that no alliance members will field any INF
Treaty-prohibited missiles or any equivalent new nuclear capabilities in Europe
so long as Russia does not deploy treaty-prohibited systems where they could
hit NATO territory.
This would require Russia to
dismantle or move at least some currently deployed 9M929 missiles. As the
United States and Russia dispute the range of that missile, perhaps they could
agree to bar deployments west of the Ural mountains. The U.S. and Russian presidents
could agree to this “no-first INF missile deployment plan” through an executive
agreement that would be verified through national technical means of
intelligence and monitoring mechanisms available through the Open Skies Treaty
and Vienna Document.
Finally, if the NATO
secretary-general is truly “committed to effective arms control,” he, along
with all NATO members, need to join the European Union—as well as leading independent nuclear security experts
from around the world—in calling upon the United States work with Russia to
extend New START by five-years and pursue new negotiations to further reduce
excessive strategic, intermediate, and tactical nuclear weapons arsenals in
Russia, the United States, and Europe.
Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270
x107; Kingston Reif, Director for Disarmament and Threat
Reduction Policy, (202) 463-8270 x104
Updated: February 2019
Over the past four decades, American
and Soviet/Russian leaders have used a progression of bilateral agreements and
other measures to limit and reduce their substantial nuclear warhead and
strategic missile and bomber arsenals. The following is a brief summary.
Strategic Nuclear Arms Control
Agreements
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