The US
military—specifically, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or
DARPA—announced plans in May to initiate a “gene tuning” program. Called “Prepare” (short
for “Pre-emptive Expression of Protective Alleles and Response Elements”), the
program aims to develop programmable modulators that temporarily boost
protective genes, either before or after exposure, to biological, chemical, or
radiological health threats. Inadvertently, however, the project may contribute
to rising international
tensions in the biological field. The program might push the limits of what
is allowable under international security treaties, particularly the 1972
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
The United States, as the
keeper of the largest biodefense enterprise in the world, has a special
responsibility to demonstrate its compliance with the multilateral
anti-bioweapons regime, whose foundation is the BTWC. Washington also has a
security interest in demonstrating compliance. The United States must be
sensitive to the way its biodefense activities may be perceived externally—that
is, in its strategy for defending against bioweapons, the United States must
factor in the role that mistrust can play in others’ attitudes and behaviors,
as well as the role that its own actions can play in provoking that mistrust.
It is not enough, therefore, for the United States to be self-confident about
its treaty compliance; to avoid arousing international suspicion, it must
proactively de-escalate threat perceptions associated with its biodefense
activities.
Expansion of “gray zone”
biodefense. Today, concerns about biological weapons do not simply involve
possession or non-possession of “weapons.” Indeed, few analysts believe that
any country is secretly stashing away weaponized pathogens, ready for launch.
Instead, concerns primarily involve the degree to which states have the
capacity and intent to threaten or perpetrate a biological attack. Capacity to
perpetrate an attack is widespread, given the ubiquity of biotechnology. But
intentions can be opaque. Security concerns therefore focus on dual-use
equipment, processes, and know-how. Such concerns are particularly acute where
biodefense programs are concerned.
Much biodefense work is
justifiable. Such work includes development of protective masks and clothing,
air and water filtration systems, detection and identification devices, and
decontamination systems. Some activities, however, fall into the gray area
between defensive and offensive work—the area where perceptions may differ
regarding what qualifies as defensive or offensive. Activities of most concern
have traditionally been those related to “threat assessment,” an area in which
possible offensive applications of pathogens are investigated as a way to
develop defenses and determine appropriate countermeasures.
The US National Biodefense
Analysis and Countermeasures Center has been particularly controversial. The
center, established following the September 11 and anthrax attacks, is intended
to prevent technological surprise. It works toward this goal by pursuing
capabilities within pathogenesis, genetic engineering, genomics, bioregulators,
and immunomodulators. It also investigates novel delivery of threats, novel packaging,
and aerosol dynamics. The language used by the center’s
deputy director to describe its work on pathogens—“acquire, grow, modify,
store, stabilize, package, disperse”—is uncomfortably close to language that
might describe the activities of an offensive bioweapons program.
The center’s activities
could create the impression that, though the United States might be conducting
biodefense activities to more fully understand the nature of hypothetical
threats, it could just as easily carry out such activities to gain the ability
to threaten or perpetrate a biological attack. And when the center’s activities
are coupled with the US Army’s Whole System Live Agent Test Chamber facility at
the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah—where experimenters can control temperature,
relative humidity, and wind speed to simulate a range of climatic conditions in
which pathogens might be released—the international community harbors understandable
concerns over the growing, technologically sophisticated, and increasingly
secret US biodefense enterprise.
The center and the Dugway
test chamber form the backdrop for the four-year Prepare program. The program
seeks to leverage insights from emerging gene-editing and genome engineering
technologies but—as highlighted in the program’s press release—it takes a new approach.
Much recent research has investigated the permanent modification of genomes,
achieved either by cutting DNA and inserting new genes or by changing the
underlying sequence to change the genetic code. The Prepare program, on the other
hand, focuses on temporarily modulating gene activity via the cellular messages
that carry out DNA’s genetic instructions inside cells: the epigenome,
transcriptome, and epitranscriptome. The program, inspired by advances in
understanding when and how genes express their traits, intends to “identify the
specific gene targets that can confer protection, develop in vivo technologies
for programmable modulation of those gene targets, and formulate cell- or
tissue-specific delivery mechanisms to direct programmable gene modulators to
the appropriate places in the body.”
Significant questions
surround the scientific feasibility of the program and the way in which gene
tuning would work in practice. The program also raises considerable health,
safety, and environmental concerns. Of particular concern to this article’s
authors, however, are the program’s implications for international security in
the current geopolitical climate. The Prepare program strives to gain knowledge
and develop technological capabilities that would protect warfighters, first
responders, and civilian populations and lead to greater public-health
preparedness for major incidents. But it would also, inevitably, entail greater
awareness of populations’ vulnerabilities and provide greater understanding of
how to deliver programmable gene modulators to reduce protections (that is, to
lower the human body’s natural defense).
How to communicate
intent. The Prepare program continues to expand US biodefense gray-zone
activities—and states keeping a close eye on the US biodefense enterprise may
well question the program’s intent. Some might feel threatened by it. A small
number—concerned about new threats highlighted by US activities, or in
preparation for a sudden change in the US attitude toward the absolute
prohibition of biological weapons—might even take reciprocal action, initiating
additional gray-zone biodefense activities of their own. The result could be a
downward security spiral in which greater offensive know-how on all sides leads
to increased danger of biological attack against more states.
Decades ago, the
international relations scholar John Herz defined what is now known as a
security dilemma—a situation in which efforts to improve security run the risk
of achieving the opposite. Herz’s words are particularly poignant in the
biodefense context: “Mutual fear of what initially may never have existed may
subsequently bring about exactly that which is feared most.” The proliferation
of increasingly sophisticated biodefense capacities, within and among states,
can cause nations to doubt one another’s intentions. Such doubts might
potentially result in bioweapons capabilities and, ultimately, bioweapons use.
Nations’ intent regarding
biological programs may ultimately be unknowable. Still, there are degrees of
ignorance. The international community should work toward two aims: First, to
reverse governments’ tendency to assume that security is enhanced by secrecy
and, second, to significantly enhance nations’ transparency and their
communication of intent. A good opportunity to bring these issues into
discussions of international security policy will come during the fourth
intersessional work program of the BTWC, which begins next month.
For projects or programs
with high potential for misuse, such as Prepare, efforts must be made to
proactively disclose information and to communicate intent. Issuing public
calls for proposals, awarding contracts to nongovernmental entities, and
issuing press releases all help to some degree, but on their own are insufficient.
The BTWC provides a useful forum for presenting dual-use disclosures to the
international community and for facilitating discussion about potential
misunderstandings, ambiguities, and misperceptions among allies and
adversaries. No perfect institutional mechanism for such interactions exists
within or under the BTWC at this juncture, but state parties can use and
enhance some existing means over the coming years.
One place to start is with
the compliance reports that any state party may submit prior to treaty review
conferences. Building on that foundation, states could engage independent
experts to conduct additional, annual compliance reviews focused specifically
on their biodefense activities, with the reviews explicitly describing how their
compliance judgments are reached. Some countries already do something similar.
Canada, for instance, publishes annual reports by a Biological and Chemical Defence
Review Committee, composed of three nongovernmental scientists. The
committee was established in 1990 to assure “the Canadian public, as well as
the international community… that the Government’s policy of maintaining only a
defensive capability in this field is fully respected at all times.”
A second approach would be
to encourage national endorsements of, and increased participation in, the ad
hoc peer reviews between national biodefense programs that have been initiated
recently. Over the last five years, a small number of states have invited peers
from other nations to visit their facilities and informally review their treaty
compliance. Some of these initiatives have involved visits to biodefense
facilities. Some have also been opened to civil society participation, allowing information about
the peer review exercises to be brought into the public sphere.
A reinvigorated and expanded
confidence-building process could form a third approach to enhancing
international communication regarding biodefense activities whose potential for
misuse is high. Confidence-building measures constitute the main formal
mechanism whereby BTWC member states, on an annual basis, exchange information
about their programs. The habit of disclosure sets up expectations of openness,
normalizes oversight, and in general makes for a less dangerous condition of
uncertainty. Confidence-building measures under the BTWC involve requests for
information on the objectives and funding of biodefense programs; principal
research and development activities; facilities involved; the organizational
structure and reporting relationships of the facilities; and details about any
sub-contracted parties from industry, academia, or other non-defense
institutions. Such confidence-building measures also provide states with an
opportunity to provide rationales and justifications for their biodefense
activities. The United States, alongside 30 other states, makes its
confidence-building measures publicly available; more than 40 states
still restrict access to their
submissions.
Yet little is known about
individual states’ interpretations and use of information derived from
confidence-building measures. Likewise, little is known about the extent to
which states feel that confidence-building measures provide necessary
transparency and actually build confidence. Under certain circumstances,
inadequate interaction and discussion regarding the information exchanged via
confidence-building measures could prove detrimental to confidence in compliance—that
is, misplaced or ambiguous information in a confidence-building measure could
be wrongly interpreted, even if it did not necessarily correspond with a
deliberate effort to “cheat.” In fact, there may be reasonable explanations for
indicators that hint at non-compliance. However, in order for such explanations
to be sought and presented, a safe space in which to ask questions must be
established.
One option could be an
interactive “public peer review” of confidence-building submissions. Through a
public peer review, states could demonstrate responsible biodefense—while
exchanging experiences and best practices with government and civil society peers
regarding the collection, collation, interpretation, and analysis of data from
confidence-building measures. Such a forum could normalize a process in which
biodefense activities are questioned and clarifications are sought. A process
of this sort could significantly enhance the value of confidence-building
measures.
Policy development cycles
for BTWC review conferences entail a two-year process for considering the
advantages and disadvantages of different courses of action. Proposals for the
review conference in 2021 will need to be in the public domain at the beginning
of that year so that states and actors can consider, review, and comment upon
them—if the review conference is to make strides in the right direction. The
complexities of communicating intent, however, are such that proposals from a
nation such as the United States will involve intensive consultations with
stakeholders (as well as consultations within the inter-agency process) in the
preceding year (2020). As a result, proposals would need to be formulated
throughout 2019. As one of the pre-eminent champions of the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention, the United States must lead from the front. It has little time to lose.
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