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WWIII

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What part will your country play in World War III?

By Larry Romanoff, May 27, 2021

 

The true origins of the two World Wars have been deleted from all our history books and replaced with mythology. Neither War was started (or desired) by Germany, but both at the instigation of a group of European Zionist Jews with the stated intent of the total destruction of Germany. The documentation is overwhelming and the evidence undeniable. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)

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BRUTALITY

BRUTALITY IN ACTION

AND NO ONE REACTS AGAINST AND OPPOSES IT!!!....

BRUTALIDADE EM ACÇÃO

E NINGUÉM REAJE CONTRA ELA E SE OPÕE!!!...

https://twitter.com/backtolife_2023/status/1589485984361873408?s=20&t=7vdffgzpUFi2yeU4FxCHng

 



FREE JULIAN ASSANGE

Saturday, July 27, 2019

NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg's INF Response Is Inadequate



 Imagem relacionada
Authored by Daryl G. Kimball on July 15, 2019

Russian pursuit of the 9M729 intermediate-range missile, which is banned under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, is unacceptable and merits a strong response. But NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg’s formula, as expressed in a new op-ed published in the German-language 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, is inadequate.
In his July 14 essay, the Secretary-General embraces the Trump administration’s decision to terminate the treaty August 2 without a realistic plan to help resolve the long-running compliance dispute. This move, combined with the possibility of new U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe—is risky and unwise as it opens the door to a new phase of destabilizing INF missile competition with Russia.
Options that address Russian concerns about U.S. missile defense launchers in Romania and Poland—which are capable of firing offensive missiles—and that encourage the verifiable elimination of Russian noncompliant cruise missiles might have resolved the INF Treaty dispute. Failure by both sides to take such diplomatic engagement more seriously since the 9M729 (aka the SSC-8) missile was first tested five years ago has bought us to this point.
The Secretary-General reiterates his pledge that "NATO allies have no intention of developing and deploying medium-range nuclear land-based missiles in Europe. We will not reflect the behavior of Russia. Because we do not want a new arms race and we remain committed to effective arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.”
These words may sound reassuring, but Stoltenberg fails to mention that NATO will soon entertain an American scheme to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles and other intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The Trump administration is pressing Congress for $100 million for a program to develop and test the missiles. The Department of Defense plans to begin flight testing a ground-based variant of its Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) just a few weeks after it pulls out of the INF Treaty August 2.
By seeking to deploy new, intermediate-range missiles in Europe, the Trump administration wants to counter Russia's 50-75 nuclear-capable, but very likely conventionally-armed, 9M729 ground-launched cruise missiles that have been deployed so far. Given that the United States and NATO forces current can hold hundreds of key Russian military targets at risk using their existing array of sea-, land-, and air-based conventional strike weapons and missiles, new U.S. intermediate-range missiles are militarily unnecessary.
Contrary to Stoltenberg’s assurances, any agreement by NATO to deploy U.S. conventionally-armed, ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe would indeed “reflect the behavior of Russia."
Russia would undoubtedly see any such missile deployment, whether with conventional or nuclear warheads, as a direct threat to its leadership and command-and-control centers — and NATO’s eastward expansion allows these weapons to be placed on the Russian doorstep and where they could hit key targets within minutes.
Russia would very likely respond in kind with more intermediate-range missiles. If both sides begin to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, Europe will be less secure and the risk of a military incident or miscommunication leading to a full-scale war with Russia will increase.
Furthermore, Stoltenberg claims that NATO remains committed to effective arms control, but he fails to endorse the preservation of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which will expire in 2021 if Presidents Trump and Putin do not agree to extend it as allowed under Article XIV of the agreement. The treaty verifiably limits the long-range nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation and the United States to no more than 1,550 warheads and 700 delivery systems each.
Although Washington acknowledges Moscow is abiding by the treaty, Trump has not decided to extend the agreement, and his treaty-averse National Security Advisor John Bolton says an extension is “unlikely." Without INF and without New START, there would be no legally-binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972.
A new and more serious NATO commitment to arms control is needed to protect Europe and the United States. NATO could declare as a bloc that no alliance members will field any INF Treaty-prohibited missiles or any equivalent new nuclear capabilities in Europe so long as Russia does not deploy treaty-prohibited systems where they could hit NATO territory.
This would require Russia to dismantle or move at least some currently deployed 9M929 missiles. As the United States and Russia dispute the range of that missile, perhaps they could agree to bar deployments west of the Ural mountains. The U.S. and Russian presidents could agree to this “no-first INF missile deployment plan” through an executive agreement that would be verified through national technical means of intelligence and monitoring mechanisms available through the Open Skies Treaty and Vienna Document.
Finally, if the NATO secretary-general is truly “committed to effective arms control,” he, along with all NATO members, need to join the European Union—as well as leading independent nuclear security experts from around the world—in calling upon the United States work with Russia to extend New START by five-years and pursue new negotiations to further reduce excessive strategic, intermediate, and tactical nuclear weapons arsenals in Russia, the United States, and Europe.




Contact: Daryl KimballExecutive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107; Kingston ReifDirector for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy, (202) 463-8270 x104
Updated: February 2019
Over the past four decades, American and Soviet/Russian leaders have used a progression of bilateral agreements and other measures to limit and reduce their substantial nuclear warhead and strategic missile and bomber arsenals. The following is a brief summary.
Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements

Begun in November 1969, by May 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) had produced both the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited strategic missile defenses to 200 (later 100) interceptors each, and the Interim Agreement, an executive agreement that capped U.S. and Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) forces. Under the Interim Agreement, both sides pledged not to construct new ICBM silos, not to increase the size of existing ICBM silos “significantly,” and capped the number of SLBM launch tubes and SLBM-carrying submarines. The agreement ignored strategic bombers and did not address warhead numbers, leaving both sides free to enlarge their forces by deploying multiple warheads (MIRVs) onto their ICBMs and SLBMs and increasing their bomber-based forces. The agreement limited the United States to 1,054 ICBM silos and 656 SLBM launch tubes. The Soviet Union was limited to 1,607 ICBM silos and 740 SLBM launch tubes. In June 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM treaty.

SALT II
In November 1972, Washington and Moscow agreed to pursue a follow-on treaty to SALT I. SALT II, signed in June 1979, limited U.S. and Soviet ICBM, SLBM, and strategic bomber-based nuclear forces to 2,250 delivery vehicles (defined as an ICBM silo, a SLBM launch tube, or a heavy bomber) and placed a variety of other restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces. The agreement would have required the Soviets to reduce their forces by roughly 270 delivery vehicles, but U.S. forces were below the limits and could actually have been increased. However, President Jimmy Carter asked the Senate not to consider SALT II for its advice and consent after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and the treaty was not taken up again. Both Washington and Moscow subsequently pledged to adhere to the agreement’s terms despite its failure to enter into force. However, on May 26, 1986, President Ronald Reagan said that future decisions on strategic nuclear forces would be based on the threat posed by Soviet forces and not on "a flawed SALT II Treaty.”

START I
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), first proposed in the early 1980s by President Ronald Reagan and finally signed in July 1991, required the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,600 delivery vehicles, carrying no more than 6,000 warheads as counted using the agreement’s rules. The agreement required the destruction of excess delivery vehicles which was verified using an intrusive verification regime that involved on-site inspections, the regular exchange of information, including telemetry, and the use of national technical means (i.e., satellites). The agreement’s entry into force was delayed for several years because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and ensuing efforts to denuclearize Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus by returning their nuclear weapons to Russia and making them parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and START I agreements. START I reductions were completed in December 2001 and the treaty expired on Dec. 5, 2009.

START II
In June 1992, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin agreed to pursue a follow-on accord to START I. START II, signed in January 1993, called for reducing deployed strategic arsenals to 3,000-3,500 warheads and banned the deployment of destabilizing multiple-warhead land-based missiles. START II would have counted warheads in roughly the same fashion as START I and, also like its predecessor, would have required the destruction of delivery vehicles but not warheads. The agreement's original implementation deadline was January 2003, ten years after signature, but a 1997 protocol moved this deadline to December 2007 because of the extended delay in ratification. Both the Senate and the Duma approved START II, but the treaty did not take effect because the Senate did not ratify the 1997 protocol and several ABM Treaty amendments, whose passage the Duma established as a condition for START II’s entry into force. START II was effectively shelved as a result of the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty.

START III Framework
In March 1997, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed to a framework for START III negotiations that included a reduction in deployed strategic warheads to 2,000-2,500. Significantly, in addition to requiring the destruction of delivery vehicles, START III negotiations were to address “the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads…to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.” Negotiations were supposed to begin after START II entered into force, which never happened.

SORT (Moscow Treaty)
On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty) under which the United States and Russia reduced their strategic arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads each. The warhead limit took effect and expired on the same day, Dec. 31, 2012. Although the two sides did not agree on specific counting rules, the Bush administration asserted that the United States would reduce only warheads deployed on strategic delivery vehicles in active service, i.e., “operationally deployed” warheads, and would not count warheads removed from service and placed in storage or warheads on delivery vehicles undergoing overhaul or repair. The agreement’s limits are similar to those envisioned for START III, but the treaty did not require the destruction of delivery vehicles, as START I and II did, or the destruction of warheads, as had been envisioned for START III. The treaty was approved by the Senate and Duma and entered into force on June 1, 2003. SORT was replaced by New START on February 5, 2011.

New START
On April 8, 2010, the United States and Russia signed New START, a legally binding, verifiable agreement that limits each side to 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on 700 strategic delivery systems (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers), and limits deployed and nondeployed launchers to 800. The treaty-accountable warhead limit is 30 percent lower than the 2,200 upper limit of SORT, and the delivery vehicle limit is 50 percent lower than the 1,600 allowed in START I. The treaty has a verification regime that combines elements of START I with new elements tailored to New START. Measures under the treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. The treaty also provides for the continued exchange of telemetry (missile flight-test data on up to five tests per year) and does not meaningfully limit missile defenses or long-range conventional strike capabilities. The U.S. Senate approved New START on Dec. 22, 2010. The approval process of the Russian parliament (passage by both the State Duma and Federation Council) was completed Jan. 26, 2011. The treaty entered into force on Feb. 5, 2011 and will expire in 2021, though both parties may agree to extend the treaty for a period of up to five years. Both parties met the treaty’s central limits by the Feb. 4, 2018 deadline for implementation.
Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements
00

*On Feb. 2, 2019, both the United States and Russia announced they were suspending their obligations to the treaty.
**New START allows for the option to extend the treaty beyond 2021 for a period of up to five years.
Nonstrategic Nuclear Arms Control Measures
Signed Dec. 8, 1987, the INF Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to verifiably eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Distinguished by its unprecedented, intrusive inspection regime, including on-site inspections, the INF Treaty laid the groundwork for verification of the subsequent START I. The INF Treaty entered into force June 1, 1988, and the two sides completed their reductions by June 1, 1991, destroying a total of 2,692 missiles. The agreement was multilateralized after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and current active participants in the agreement include the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are also parties to the agreement but do not participate in treaty meetings or on-site inspections. The ban on intermediate-range missiles is of unlimited duration.
Both the United States and Russia have raised concerns about the other side’s compliance with the INF Treaty. The United States first publicly charged Russia with developing and testing a ground-launched cruise with a range that meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km in 2014.
Russia denies that it is breaching the agreement and has raised its own concerns about Washington’s compliance. Moscow is charging that the United States is placing a missile defense launch system in Europe that can also be used to fire cruise missiles, using targets for missile defense tests with similar characteristics to INF Treaty-prohibited intermediate-range missiles, and is making armed drones that are equivalent to ground-launched cruise missiles. On Oct. 20, 2018 President Donald Trump announced his intention to “terminate” the agreement citing Russian noncompliance and concerns about China’s missiles, and on Dec. 4, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared Russia in “material breach” of the treaty. The Trump administration provided official notice to the other treaty states-parties on Feb. 2, that it would both suspend its obligations to the treaty and withdraw from the agreement in six months—per the treaty's terms—and "terminate" the agreement. The administration has stated that it may reverse the withdrawal if Russia returns to compliance by eliminating its ground-launched 9M729 missile, which the United States alleges is the noncompliant missile which can fly beyond the 500-kilometer range limit set by the treaty. 
On Sept. 27, 1991, President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States would remove almost all U.S. tactical (nonstrategic) nuclear forces from deployment so that Russia could undertake similar actions, reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation as the Soviet Union dissolved. Specifically, Bush said the United States would eliminate all its nuclear artillery shells and short-range nuclear ballistic missile warheads and remove all nonstrategic nuclear warheads from surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev reciprocated on Oct. 5, pledging to eliminate all nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles, and nuclear landmines. He also pledged to withdraw all Soviet tactical naval nuclear weapons from deployment. Under these initiatives, the United States and Russia reduced their deployed nonstrategic stockpiles by an estimated 5,000 and 13,000 warheads, respectively. However, significant questions remain about Russian implementation of its pledges, and there is considerable uncertainty about the current state of Russia’s tactical nuclear forces. The Defense Department estimates that Russia possess roughly 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons and the numbers are expanding. The United States maintains several hundred nonstrategic B61 gravity bombs for delivery by short-range fighter aircraft. 

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Manifestações

2007 Speech

UKRAINE ON FIRE

Discurso do Presidente da Rússia, Vladimir Putin, na manhã do dia 24 de Fevereiro de 2022

Discurso do Presidente da Rússia, Vladimir Putin, Tradução em português




Presidente da Rússia, Vladimir Putin: Cidadãos da Rússia, Amigos,

Considero ser necessário falar hoje, de novo, sobre os trágicos acontecimentos em Donbass e sobre os aspectos mais importantes de garantir a segurança da Rússia.

Começarei com o que disse no meu discurso de 21 de Fevereiro de 2022. Falei sobre as nossas maiores responsabilidades e preocupações e sobre as ameaças fundamentais que os irresponsáveis políticos ocidentais criaram à Rússia de forma continuada, com rudeza e sem cerimónias, de ano para ano. Refiro-me à expansão da NATO para Leste, que está a aproximar cada vez mais as suas infraestruturas militares da fronteira russa.

É um facto que, durante os últimos 30 anos, temos tentado pacientemente chegar a um acordo com os principais países NATO, relativamente aos princípios de uma segurança igual e indivisível, na Europa. Em resposta às nossas propostas, enfrentámos invariavelmente, ou engano cínico e mentiras, ou tentativas de pressão e de chantagem, enquanto a aliança do Atlântico Norte continuou a expandir-se, apesar dos nossos protestos e preocupações. A sua máquina militar está em movimento e, como disse, aproxima-se da nossa fronteira.

Porque é que isto está a acontecer? De onde veio esta forma insolente de falar que atinge o máximo do seu excepcionalismo, infalibilidade e permissividade? Qual é a explicação para esta atitude de desprezo e desdém pelos nossos interesses e exigências absolutamente legítimas?

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ARRIVING IN CHINA

Ver a imagem de origem

APPEAL


APPEAL TO THE LEADERS OF THE NINE NUCLEAR WEAPONS' STATES

(China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States)

中文 DEUTSCH ENGLISH FRANÇAIS ITALIAN PORTUGUESE RUSSIAN SPANISH ROMÂNA

manlio + maria

MOON OF SHANGHAI site

LR on CORONAVIRUS

LARRY ROMANOFF on CORONAVIRUS

Read more at Moon of Shanghai

World Intellectual Property Day (or Happy Birthday WIPO) - Spruson ...


Moon of Shanghai

L Romanoff

Larry Romanoff,

contributing author

to Cynthia McKinney's new COVID-19 anthology

'When China Sneezes'

When China Sneezes: From the Coronavirus Lockdown to the Global Politico-Economic Crisis

manlio

James Bacque

BYOBLU

irmãos de armas


Subtitled in PT, RO, SP

Click upon CC and choose your language.


manlio

VP




Before the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.



The President of Russia delivered
the Address to the Federal Assembly. The ceremony took
place at the Manezh Central Exhibition Hall.


January
15, 2020


vp

President of Russia Vladimir Putin:

Address to the Nation

Address to the Nation.

READ HERE


brics


Imagem

PT -- VLADIMIR PUTIN na Sessão plenária do Fórum Económico Oriental

Excertos da transcrição da sessão plenária do Fórum Económico Oriental

THE PUTIN INTERVIEWS


The Putin Interviews
by Oliver Stone (
FULL VIDEOS) EN/RU/SP/FR/IT/CH


http://tributetoapresident.blogspot.com/2018/07/the-putin-interviews-by-oliver-stone.html




TRIBUTE TO A PRESIDENT


NA PRMEIRA PESSOA

Um auto retrato surpreendentemente sincero do Presidente da Rússia, Vladimir Putin

CONTEÚDO

Prefácio

Personagens Principais em 'Na Primeira Pessoa'

Parte Um: O Filho

Parte Dois: O Estudante

Parte Três: O Estudante Universitário

Parte Quatro: O Jovem especialista

Parte Cinco: O Espia

Parte Seis: O Democrata

Parte Sete: O Burocrata

Parte Oito: O Homem de Família

Parte Nove: O Político

Apêndice: A Rússia na Viragem do Milénio


contaminação nos Açores



Subtitled in EN/PT

Click upon the small wheel at the right side of the video and choose your language.


convegno firenze 2019