Recognizing the threat: origins of the NPT negotiations
Abstract
The first chapter describes the early attempts to regulate the spread of nuclear technology and the events that created the political will to negotiate a treaty to address the threat of nuclear proliferation. It discusses efforts in the UN, primarily led by Ireland, that proved critical in laying the groundwork to address nonproliferation and disarmament in the same treaty. This chapter also discusses the impact of the decision by the US to pursue a multilateral nuclear force in Europe, and the Soviet Union's rejection of any arrangement that would allow western European states to control US nuclear warheads. The final section briefly touches upon the role that two technologies, the gas centrifuge and the ballistic missile, played in underscoring the urgent threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
1.1. Early nonproliferation proposals
Sixteen hours after the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, US President Harry Truman described the weapon as a 'new and revolutionary increase in destruction.' (See figure 1.1). He said the atomic bomb 'is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe.... loosed against those who brought war to the Far East,' and building the bomb represented the 'greatest achievement of organized science in history.'
Yet in the same speech, Truman noted that the very nature of the atomic bomb demanded that the United States 'withhold from the world scientific knowledge' that led to its creation. Truman also said he would recommend the establishment of a commission to 'control the production and use of atomic power within the United States [1].'
Shortly after the end of World War II, Truman expanded his calls for the control of nuclear warheads, raising the idea of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons by placing existing warheads and nuclear research under international control.
Growing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union further fueled discussion in the Truman administration about how to address the current US monopoly over nuclear weapons. Some of Truman's advisors favored sharing weapons technology with the Soviets in the hope of quieting Moscow's suspicion that Washington would use its arsenal as a tool of coercion. Others, however, argued that the Soviets could not be trusted and the United States would be foolish to relinquish a weapon that ensured military dominance.
In addition to fostering debate over the future of US nuclear policy domestically, the United States sought to engage other powers over the future of nuclear weapons. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union agreed to form the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) during a meeting in Moscow, December 27, 1945. The three states agreed that the UNAEC would address the threat posed by the atom and the scientific possibilities of nuclear research. The UNAEC fell under the auspices of the newly-formed United Nations, which was finalized in October 1945 and set to begin work in January 1946. The UNAEC was to report to the UN Security Council, a condition that Moscow insisted upon and the other two states agreed to accept. Unlike the UN General Assembly, the 15 member Security Council has the power to pass resolutions that are legally binding for UN member states. The five victors of World War II, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and China, were given permanent membership in the body and the ability to veto any resolution put forward for consideration.
Shortly after the formation of the UNAEC, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution—the body's first—on January 24, 1946, which addressed nuclear disarmament and endorsed the creation of the commission. The resolution called for the commission to make specific proposals for the control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and the elimination of atomic weapons from national arsenals. The UNAEC took up this mandate following the passage of the resolution.
Despite support from the United States (the sole possessor of nuclear weapons), and the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union (both of which were pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs), UNAEC failed to gain traction during its two-year tenure and the commission did not provide meaningful guidance on the question of disarmament. Support for the UNAEC and the first UN resolution endorsing the commission's work did, however, demonstrate an interest by global powers to address the threat posed by nuclear weapons and a political commitment to disarmament.
As the UNAEC considered disarmament, the Truman administration also began examining options on how to abolish nuclear weapons and ensure a peaceful future for nuclear science and research. US Secretary of States James Byrnes appointed a special commission chaired by Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal to consider these questions. The work done by the commission played a critical role in setting disarmament as a benchmark from the beginning.
The commission produced a report in March 1946, now known as the Acheson–Lilienthal report, which laid the groundwork for US policy opposing the development of nuclear weapons by other states [2]. The report also called attention to the difficulties of controlling dual-use technologies as more states were likely to pursue nuclear programs for research. The report noted that 'development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and the development of atomic energy for bombs are in much of their course interchangeable and interdependent.'
The report concluded that inspections would not be enough ensure 'an otherwise uncontrolled exploitation of atomic energy by national governments' and that international authorities would be required to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
The report recommended that nuclear activities and fissile materials should be controlled by an international body that would license technology and distribute the results of nuclear-related research activities. Once this body was operational, the report recommended that the United States give up its nuclear weapons, but did not include a specific timeline for US disarmament.
Given the recommendations calling for an international body to regulate nuclear research and the existence of the UNAEC, Truman tasked Bernard Baruch to develop a proposal to take to the UN addressing concerns about an impending arms race with the Soviet Union and laying out an option for an international body to control the spread of nuclear technology (see figure 1.2).
Despite Truman's rhetorical support for disarmament, he had no intention of relinquishing the US arsenal while the Soviet Union was pursuing nuclear weapons. Because of the Soviet program, the United States continued to test additional nuclear devices and expand its nuclear arsenal while the Truman administration simultaneously pursued options to control nuclear technology.
Baruch, who had advised a number of presidents prior to Truman, opposed the option of sharing nuclear technology, particularly with the Soviets, which had been proposed by some of Truman's advisors at the end of World War II. Truman trusted that Baruch would not put forward a proposal to eliminate the US nuclear arsenal without assurance that the Soviet Union would forgo nuclear weapons. The proposal, now known as the Baruch Plan, drew largely from the Acheson–Lilienthal report's central conclusion that the spread of nuclear materials and technologies should be controlled.
Baruch presented his plan to the UNAEC June 14, 1946. The plan called for the creation of the Atomic Development Authority, a new body that would inspect nuclear sites to ensure that only peaceful activities were taking place and would monitor global supplies of uranium [3]. As part of the plan, Baruch said the United States would relinquish control of its nuclear weapons only when inspectors were in place in the Soviet Union, which was known to be pursuing a nuclear weapons program of its own, and the system of international control of fissile material production facilities was in place.
The plan also argued that the Atomic Development Authority should answer only to the Security Council, and that the P5 (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States) should be prohibited from exercising veto power if the Security Council was voting to impose sanctions against states that engaged in prohibited nuclear activities.
Baruch's proposal met with mixed reactions, even in the United States. Amongst the critics was J Robert Oppenheimer, a physicist who played a key role in the Manhattan Project, which developed the US atomic bomb. Oppenheimer, who also contributed to the Acheson–Lilienthal Report, considered the idea of international control of nuclear facilities an unrealistic plan for constraining the spread of nuclear weapons.
Outside of the United States the proposal also faced criticism. The Soviets rejected the Baruch Plan, as did a number of other states, on the basis that it would hand over significant power and authority to an international body. Given that the UN was still in its infancy and largely untested as an international authority, states were hesitant to trust it with the responsibility of arbiter over the sensitive security issues that might arise from nuclear research and development. Some states were also concerned that the proposed Atomic Development Authority would not grant fair and equitable access to nuclear technology.
Some states also pushed back over the plan's failure to lay out a timeframe for US disarmament. Forgoing nuclear weapons programs while the United States retained its arsenal raised serious concerns, particularly outside of Western Europe, over how the United States would wield these weapons. In particular, Joseph Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union, had no intention of giving up the aggressive nuclear weapons development program that he embarked on after the US bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The Soviets formally reacted to the Baurch Plan on June 19, 1946. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to the UN, said that his government rejected the sequence, namely that the control of nuclear facilities and materials should be in place before the United States would give up its nuclear weapons. Gromyko instead suggested an international convention to outlaw the manufacture of nuclear weapons and a requirement that the existing warheads be destroyed on a timeline determined by the convention. Under Gromyko's proposal the UNAEC could then develop international controls on nuclear materials and facilities to prevent any further weapons development. The United States, however, rejected the Soviet plan, citing it as inadequate to ensure that civil nuclear programs were not being used for weapons purposes.
Unsurprisingly, the Baruch Plan failed to garner the requisite unanimous support required to proceed with its implementation at a meeting of the UNAEC, December 30, 1946. Poland joined the Soviet Union in abstaining, citing similar concerns to those voiced by Moscow over the sequencing of the plan.
When it became clear that the Baruch Plan would fail, the Truman administration considered another approach that did not rely on international support—namely to create a monopoly over nuclear material and technology to prevent the further spread of weapons. By controlling access to key materials, the United States thought it could prevent other states from developing national capacities to produce the fissile material necessary for nuclear weapons.
Washington worked closely with key allies, the United Kingdom and Canada, to form a group of like-minded states that would corner the market on uranium and sell it only to states that met a high standard for ensuring that the material would only be used for peaceful purposes. Uranium, being a necessary component for uranium- or plutonium-based nuclear warheads, was only being mined in several states at the time and, given its rarity, judged to be the easiest part of the supply chain to control.
The result of these discussions was the Combined Development Agency. Under the auspices of this group, Washington, London, and Ottawa worked to purchase all uranium mined outside of Soviet territory.
The United States complemented its international supply-side approach with US legal requirements for nuclear cooperation, beginning with the McMahon Act in August 1946 (see figure 1.3). The McMahon Act, also known as the Atomic Energy Law, required that a third-party country have strict safeguards in place prior to the United States transferring sensitive information or technology related to nuclear activities. This would allow other states to engage in nuclear research, but prevent civil programs from diverting nuclear materials to weapons activities. The McMahon Act also put US nuclear weapons development under civilian, rather than military, control and created the Atomic Energy Commission to oversee the US nuclear development.
While Washington sought to control access to nuclear technology, the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons program accelerated in the late 1940s.
The Soviet nuclear weapons program was known to Washington, but Moscow's first nuclear test in 1949 took the United States by surprise. US military planners in the mid-1940s had estimated that the Soviet Union would need about 20 years to develop nuclear weapons. The sophistication and secrecy surrounding the Soviet program underscored the fact that attempts by the United States and its allies to control nuclear materials were unlikely to stop a state determined to develop nuclear weapons. The Soviet test also heralded the beginning of the arms race that would shape the global political order for the next 50 years and significantly motivate states without nuclear weapons to push for an end to the arms race in subsequent negotiations on the NPT.
Three years after the Soviet test, in 1952, the United Kingdom tested a nuclear explosive device, becoming the third nuclear-armed state. While the United States and the United Kingdom had reached an agreement in 1943 to collaborate on atomic research and London's pursuit of nuclear weapons was known, it was becoming increasingly apparent that other states were interested in pursuing nuclear weapons and that the Soviet Union was dramatically expanding its arsenal.
By the time US President Dwight D Eisenhower took office in 1953, it was clear that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons by controlling the technical means to acquire them was not a viable solution.
1.2. Atoms for peace
Under the Eisenhower administration, US nuclear policy shifted significantly. While Truman sought to regulate the spread of nuclear weapons and technology and the growth of the US stockpile, Eisenhower dramatically expanded the US nuclear arsenal—from 1050 warheads to more than 20 000 over his eight years in office—maintaining that such expansion was necessary to deter the Soviet Union's ambitious nuclear weapons program [4].
Eisenhower also shifted the US approach to nuclear research and energy cooperation. He sought to expand access to dual-use technologies so that states could pursue peaceful nuclear energy and research programs.
Eisenhower's new approach to US nuclear policy was based in part on the conclusions of a report authored by the 1952 Panel of Consultants on Disarmament. The US panel concluded that, given the rapidly expanding Soviet nuclear program, the President should inform the world about the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union and the danger posed by a rapid spread of nuclear weapons. The report also recommended that Washington provide clarity about the size of its fissile material stockpile, so as to not let the Soviet Union believe that a preventative strike could incapacitate the US and eliminate Washington's ability to respond with nuclear weapons.
The conclusions played a role in driving Eisenhower's rapid expansion of the US nuclear weapons stockpile. Eisenhower wanted to make it clear that the United States would be able to retaliate against a Soviet nuclear attack with a second strike. This became the basis of a mutually-assured destruction approach to deterrence with the Soviet Union that would dominate the relationship between the two states for the next 40 years.
To prevent further proliferation, his administration developed a proposal whereby the fissile material produced by the states with such capabilities would be held under international controls in a fuel bank. Any state could then access nuclear materials from the bank for peaceful purposes. Eisenhower thought his plan would address the growing demand for nuclear technology for research and energy purposes and simultaneously head off states from developing indigenous programs to produce fissile materials.
Eisenhower laid out his new approach to nuclear technology and fissile material control in an address to the UN General Assembly, December 8, 1953 (see figure 1.4). Eisenhower, in what has become known as the 'Atoms for Peace' plan, said his objective was to 'hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear [5].' Eisenhower proposed the creation of an 'international atomic energy agency' set up under the United Nations to collect, store and distribute fissile materials. Unlike the previously proposed Atomic Development Authority, Eisenhower's agency would not have ownership of the technology, nor the authority to punish violators for misuse of dual-use technology or covert nuclear activities.
The UN General Assembly endorsed Eisenhower's proposal to create a new international agency the following year, December 4, 1954.
In addition to the international element, Eisenhower's plan also had a domestic component. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was providing nuclear assistance without the same standard for safeguards, Eisenhower's administration contended that US safeguards standards made the US nuclear industry less competitive abroad.
To increase competition, his administration pushed the US Congress to pass the Atomic Energy Act in 1954. The Atomic Energy Act allowed the United States to sell nuclear technology abroad to states that committed not to use the materials and technology for nuclear weapons or weapons-related purposes. Most of the agreements to transfer nuclear-related technologies and materials to third-party countries required that the United States conduct safeguards to ensure that the use of such materials and technologies was peaceful, until the international body proposed by Eisenhower was set up and could assume responsibilities for inspections. The United States also began to train scientists from other countries at its newly developed School of Nuclear Science and Engineering.
Eisenhower's proposal for an international authority and subsequent revision of US law was not without controversy. Critics of the Eisenhower approach raised concerns that the decision to share nuclear technology might lead to a proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly without strong safeguards. The benefit of hindsight proves that the critics were right to be concerned about Eisenhower's decision. The Atoms for Peace plan facilitated not only peaceful nuclear development, but also inadvertently assisted in the nuclear weapons programs of states like India and Pakistan. Even in the states that did not abuse the assistance, it created the risk and challenge of securing weapons-grade nuclear material, a security threat that increased in the 21st century with the rise of terrorism.
While the United States moved quickly to achieve Eisenhower's vision, the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) took more time to establish, even after the UN General Assembly endorsed the plan in 1954. Following approval from the UN, Washington presented the Soviet Union with a draft statute for the IAEA in March 1954. Initially, the Soviet Union wanted to prioritize the elimination of nuclear weapons as part of any discussion surrounding the new body. Moscow expressed its concern that the Atoms for Peace approach would result in the spread of fissile materials usable for weapons, and eventually nuclear weapons, particularly if states that already possessed nuclear arsenals were not viewed as reducing dependence on deterrence.
Rather than broaden the discussion to address Soviet concerns, the United States persevered with Eisenhower's original concept and worked closely with other states over the next several years, but with less cooperation from Moscow.
The mandate agreed upon in 1956 tasked the IAEA to work with member states to 'accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world' and to ensure that 'assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose [6].' Thus, the dual purpose of the IAEA—to promote and control the atom—was established; although at the time of creation, accepting IAEA safeguards was voluntary for states with nuclear programs. This dual role paved the way for discussions a decade later about requiring safeguards for all non-nuclear weapons states as a condition for the NPT. The IAEA mandate did not, however, establish the fuel bank that Eisenhower envisioned.
After a mandate was agreed by the United States and its negotiating partners, the statute establishing the IAEA was open for approval. By October 1956, 81 states approved it, enough to establish the IAEA in July 1957. Creation of the IAEA proved critical to the NPT negotiations the following decade. The agency's role in conducting safeguards, which Moscow later conceded to help shape, provides the necessary verification tools to provide assurances that non-nuclear weapon states are only pursuing peaceful nuclear programs (see figure 1.5).
The initial IAEA safeguards, however, were quite limited in scope and have been described as 'amateurish [7].' They were applied only to materials and facilities transferred between states rather than entire civil nuclear programs. It was not until the Soviet Union took a firmer stance opposing proliferation and began to work with the IAEA and member states to develop more stringent safeguards that the measures improved in 1965 [8]. The Soviet Union's support and engagement with IAEA safeguards development proved to be critical for establishing the agency's role in verifying peaceful nuclear activities under NPT.
1.3. The impact of the Irish resolution
After the initial UN resolution in 1946 to address the threat of nuclear weapons failed to develop a workable proposal, diplomatic efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons at the UN were largely pushed by non-nuclear weapons states, building from the 1946 resolution.
Ireland, in particular, emerged as a key player in spurring discussions at the UN on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Resolutions introduced in the First Committee by Ireland between 1958–61 helped to lay the groundwork for negotiating the NPT by building consensus that the spread of nuclear weapons posed a threat to international security and by generating political support for a treaty. The Irish resolutions also eventually linked nonproliferation and disarmament, which proved to be crucial for establishing a commitment in the NPT for the states possessing nuclear weapons to take steps toward dismantlement.
Frank Aiken, the Irish Minister for External Affairs, drove the development of the Irish position and efforts at the UN (see figure 1.6). He was motivated by 'the slowness with which negotiations towards general disarmament were proceeding' and the acknowledgment that 'failure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons during a long period of negotiation on general disarmament was likely to make those negotiations abortive [9].' Aiken argued it was essential that the nuclear powers 'undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons to other States.'
Based on Aiken's leadership, Ireland introduced a resolution in the UN First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in 1958 that had two principle goals. First, it sought to establish an ad hoc committee to study the dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and provide recommendations on how to avert the risks of proliferation. Ireland viewed the creation of such a committee as raising awareness about the risk of additional nuclear-armed states, a crucial step toward a permanent ban on nuclear weapons.
The second principle element in the resolution called for negotiations to suspend nuclear testing, and declared that states possessing nuclear weapons 'shall not supply other states with nuclear weapons' during the negotiations [9].
The United States initially opposed the resolution, particularly the new committee to study the risks of proliferation, which it viewed as unnecessary. Other states, such as Argentina and France, criticized the very advisability of preventing states from acquiring nuclear weapons. They argued that freezing the status quo would lock-in inequality between states possessing nuclear weapons—at that time the United States, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom—and those without. France, at the time, had an active nuclear weapons development program, but had yet to test a device.
The second element, the commitment not to transfer nuclear weapons while negotiations to suspend nuclear testing were underway, met with greater support and less outright opposition from states possessing nuclear weapons. Due to the disparate reactions to the two main elements of the resolution, the Irish requested a separate vote on the paragraph prohibiting transfer of nuclear weapons while negotiations on suspending testing were underway. No state voted against that paragraph, although the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members abstained. The final vote was 37–0, with 44 abstentions.
The decision by the US to abstain from voting on the no-transfer provision was not fueled by ambivalence toward nonproliferation. Rather, the US position was driven primarily by rising concern over deployment of Soviet missiles capable of targeting Western Europe. Recent advances by the Soviet Union in ballistic missile technology called into question the ability of the US nuclear deterrent to prevent aggressive Soviet actions in the European theater. These concerns prompted a decision by Washington to deploy warheads and nuclear-capable delivery systems in Europe and begin conversations about nuclear sharing arrangements with NATO, an intergovernmental military alliance between North American and European states that was formed in 1949 to counter the Soviet Union. For the United States, supporting a nonproliferation resolution in 1958 may have created a political impediment to the negotiation of the NATO nuclear sharing arrangements that were critical to countering the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union supported the no-transfer paragraph in the Irish resolution in 1958, despite not having established a clear policy on nonproliferation. Nor was the Soviet Union pursuing nuclear sharing arrangements with its Warsaw Pact allies, although Moscow did have nuclear weapons deployed in the satellite states. The Warsaw Pact, formed in 1955 after West Germany was integrated in NATO, included the Soviet Union and seven additional states. It was designed to be a collective security alliance and military counterweight to NATO.
The Soviet Union's support for the Irish resolution was somewhat at odds with its activities. In 1957, Moscow and Beijing signed an agreement allowing the transfer of nuclear technology and sample materials from the Soviet Union to China to assist Beijing's nuclear development. The October 1957 agreement proved beneficial to China's nuclear weapons program, although it was short-lived. The Soviet Union abrogated the agreement in June 1959 following China's dispute with Taiwan over an island in the Pacific. The Taiwan incident awakened Soviet fear of being dragged into a future dispute between a nuclear-armed China and the United States, which supported Taiwan. This incident marked a turning point for the Soviet Union and helped to solidify its opposition to nuclear proliferation [15].
Although Ireland ultimately withdrew the 1958 resolution, the fact that no states voted against the second perambulatory paragraph prohibiting transfer highlighted the recognition that member states viewed nuclear proliferation as an urgent threat that required an international solution. Aiken considered that a success.
The following year, the United Nations created a body that would prove critical to the NPT's efforts. After a meeting in Berlin between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France, the four states decided to establish a new international forum for negotiations on disarmament-related issues. On September 9, 1959, the UN passed a resolution creating the mandate for the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament. The ten participating states included Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union (see figure 1.7). The choice of states was designed to balance five Warsaw Pact states with five NATO states. The Committee only met twice for two short periods before it was enlarged in 1962 to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), which received a mandate from the UN to negotiate with the NPT in 1965.
Ireland put forward another resolution in 1959 that drew on the 1958 effort and the newly created Disarmament Committee. The resolution recommended that the Disarmament Committee also consider the dangers of proliferation and the feasibility of an international agreement 'subject to inspection and control, whereby the Powers producing nuclear weapons would refrain from handing over the control on such weapons to any nation not possessing them.' Aiken also linked the concept of nonproliferation to security guarantees. Under Aiken's formula, states renouncing the pursuit of nuclear weapons and abiding by the charter of the UN would receive security guarantees from the existing nuclear powers. The security guarantees would free states from the fear of nuclear attack or coercion, reducing the incentive to pursue independent nuclear arsenals.
The 1959 effort won more support in the First Committee, including the United States, which was coming to realize that more robust safeguards were necessary to guard against states appropriating peaceful nuclear programs for weapons purposes. Washington also reacted more favorably to the resolution's prohibition on transferring 'control' of nuclear weapons, as opposed to 'possession' which was emphasized in 1958 [9]. The Eisenhower administration interpreted 'control' as allowing the United States to continue discussions on nuclear sharing within NATO. At that point in the discussions, Washington intended to retain control over the nuclear weapons, although the warheads, by virtue of being deployed in NATO member states, would be outside of the 'possession' of the United States.
The Soviet Union, however, did not support the 1959 resolution for the very reason that the United States supported it. Moscow rejected the use of 'control' on the grounds that it did not prohibit states from positioning nuclear weapons in third-party states. The Soviet Union viewed US nuclear weapons stationed in NATO alliance states and the ongoing discussions on nuclear sharing as a threat to its security and interests. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia joined the Soviet Union in criticizing the resolution, driven by the fear of Western European states having access to nuclear weapons.
Despite its concerns about the text, the Soviet Union abstained from voting on the resolution, which went on to pass the General Assembly, November 20, 1959, by a vote of 68–0, with 12 abstentions. In addition to the Soviet Union, France also abstained. France, which tested its first nuclear device the following year, was still not convinced that preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons was the best course for international policy.
Aiken viewed the vote as a success, as it established that further dissemination of the nuclear weapons constituted a threat and addressing the threat required negotiating an international agreement.
At the 1960 meeting of the UN, Ireland resumed its push to address the threat of proliferation. Joined by Japan, Ghana, Mexico and Morocco, Ireland introduced a resolution that moved beyond the process recommendations of 1959 and introduced greater substance into the debate over nonproliferation. The resolution called on 'all governments to make every effort to achieve permanent agreement' to halt the spread of nuclear weapons through an agreement to prevent nuclear proliferation. The resolution called for states that had not yet acquired nuclear weapons to declare intentions not to pursue nuclear warheads and refrain from acquiring or manufacturing them. The states that possessed nuclear arsenals would refrain from relinquishing control of their weapons.
The 1960 resolution met with mixed reactions. The Soviet Union and several other Warsaw Pact states came out in support of the text. NATO, however, was divided, with Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland supporting the measure and the United States and Italy in opposition [9]. Washington said that while it could not support the resolution because the United States opposed an indefinite commitment not to transfer nuclear weapons and the resolution contained weak language on the responsibility of the nuclear powers, it would abstain during voting out of support for the motivation behind Ireland's proposal.
While the resolution was ultimately approved by the General Assembly 68–0 with 26 abstentions, it failed to jumpstart negotiations on the agreement to prevent the proliferation that it called for. Several nonaligned states, such as Peru and Brazil, also abstained during the final vote on the resolution over the absence of control measures.
It was not until 1961 that what has become known as the 'Irish Resolution' succeeded in outlining the central tenets of what would become the basis of the agreement for the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Ireland, which had been working closely with the United States, introduced the resolution, titled the Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons, during the UN First Committee session.
When Aiken introduced the resolution, he referenced the debate on preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons at the prior three meetings of the General Assembly and referenced the growing recognition that the further spread of nuclear weapons constituted a global threat. He also noted that when the United States and the Soviet Union met, September 20, 1961, to discuss the principles for disarmament negotiations, each state released a statement with nearly identical language on preventing proliferation. The statements both emphasized that states not owning nuclear weapons should undertake commitments not to manufacture or obtain nuclear weapons and states possessing nuclear weapons should not relinquish such control over nuclear weapons [10]. The two basic premises in this statement would become the first two articles of the NPT.
The 1961 resolution introduced by Ireland proposed an agreement based on these principles: 'under which the nuclear state would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to states not possessing such weapons, and provision under which states not possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons.' It contained an operative paragraph that called on all governments to make every effort to achieve a permanent agreement based on those commitments.
In urging states to support the resolution, Aiken argued it was critical to 'strike while the iron is hot' and negotiate an agreement to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. In addition to the co-sponsors, the United States also worked to garner support for the resolution amongst NATO. Simultaneously, the United States sought to assure NATO partners that supporting the resolution was consistent with US defense commitments.
While several states, including Ukraine and India, still objected to the resolution's failure to specify the physical transfer of nuclear weapons as a threat, they too ultimately supported the resolution.
On December 4, 1961, the General Assembly unanimously approved Resolution 1665, the 'Irish Resolution.' While Resolution 1665 did not carry the weight of a treaty or a legally-binding Security Council resolution, its importance should not be understated. Resolution 1665 set the precedent that responsible nuclear behavior included preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and prohibiting the transfer of control of nuclear warheads. It also demonstrated international support for nonproliferation efforts.
In addition to the Irish Resolution, the General Assembly unanimously passed Resolution 1722, sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, the Resumption of Negotiation and Composition of the Disarmament Committee. The resolution grew out of the aforementioned September meeting between Moscow and Washington during which the two states agreed on principles to guide disarmament efforts in the so-called McCloy–Zorin statement, named for John McCloy, Director of the US Disarmament Commission, and Vaerian Zorin, Soviet Ambassador to the UN (see figure 1.8).
The McCloy–Zorin statement included agreement on the goal of eliminating stocks of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in timed stages, with agreed upon verification and each stage [10]. The principles also called for equitably balanced measures that ensured no one state retained a strategic advantage over the other.
Resolution 1722 recommended negotiations take place based on the principles agreed to in the September meeting, which included commitments by non-nuclear weapon states not to manufacture or obtain nuclear weapons that Aiken called attention to in advancing the Irish Resolution. The resolution also enlarged the ten states at the Committee on Disarmament, equally divided between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, to eighteen. When the new Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) convened again under the expanded mandate, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic joined the ten original states in Geneva.
Passage of both resolutions in 1961 was critical for paving the way to negotiations on the NPT in both substance and process. In linking proliferation to disarmament, Resolution 1665 provided a basis for negotiating both issues simultaneously in the same text, whereas Resolution 1722 provided a mandate for pursuing talks at the ENDC supported by the UN and based on agreed-upon principles by the Soviet Union and the United States. Unanimous support for both resolutions also provided a critical political endorsement for the subsequent negotiations.
While the Irish Resolution is now seen as a catalyst for the NPT negotiations, it was not the only resolution put forward at the time to address the states' concern about the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. Some of these other efforts later influenced elements of the NPT. For instance, in 1961, Sweden pushed a nonproliferation resolution at the UN General Assembly known as the Unden Plan. The Swedish proposed that the nonproliferation challenge be handled on a regional basis, with groups of countries coming together to create regions free of nuclear weapons [15]. The plan also called for states without nuclear weapons in these regional blocks to refuse to receive and store such weapons. The Soviet Union supported the Swedish resolution, but the United States and several of Washington's key allies opposed the plan. The United States saw the regionally based approach as incompatible with extended deterrence requirements and urged NATO partners to oppose the measure. Still, the Unden Plan raised the concept of zones free of nuclear weapons, which would later be incorporated into the NPT.
1.4. The threat from new technologies
Advances in technology in the 1950s and 1960s also served as an impetus for nonproliferation efforts. Development in both the means of producing fissile material and long-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads in the 1950s spurred concern about the threat of proliferation and influenced states possessing nuclear weapons—primarily the United States and the United Kingdom—to take a more proactive approach to supporting nonproliferation efforts.
The development of the gas centrifuge was one of the noteworthy advances that changed the proliferation landscape. Prior to the invention of the centrifuge, fissile material for warheads, either uranium with greater than 90 percent concentration of the isotope uranium-235, or separated plutonium, were produced using gaseous diffusion (uranium) or spent nuclear-fuel reprocessing facilities (plutonium). Both types of facilities were costly and difficult to conceal.
Centrifuges, however, increased the risk of illicit nuclear weapons activities. Developers feared that because of its compact size, the relative ease of manufacture, and cost-effectiveness, the centrifuge would enable states to develop covert nuclear programs in facilities that would be difficult to detect (see figure 1.9).
In 1954, for instance, the United States stopped West Germany from selling gas centrifuges to Brazil. A US official noted at the time:
'Should the gas centrifuge process be successfully developed on an unclassified basis, it could be utilized in a number of countries either openly or secretly and in either event complicate the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons [11].'
West Germany did, however, succeed in selling centrifuge technology to South Africa. Throughout the 1960s, South Africa developed a gas centrifuge program in secret based on the acquisition. While South Africa did not launch its formal nuclear weapons program until the 1970s, the US prediction that centrifuge technology could be utilized secretly to advance nuclear weapons programs was already being realized [12].
The 1960s saw further advances in the gas centrifuge. Austrian émigré Gernot Zippe began working on the gas centrifuge in a sustained manner for the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1960. He later published details about his research in an unclassified report that demonstrated how centrifuges could be manufactured more easily and cost effectively. Based on Zippe's research, the AEC noted that 'the gas centrifuge process lends itself to the construction of small plants and may, therefore, present nuclear weapons proliferation potential; further, small centrifuge plants would be relatively easy to conceal [13].'
The UK, in particular, voiced concern that states without nuclear weapons might be hesitant to sign up to a nonproliferation treaty out of concern that safeguards would not be adequate to ensure that non-nuclear weapon states were not pursuing production of fissile material for military purposes. During negotiations on the NPT, British officials raised the point with their US counterparts, arguing that centrifuge development could be a 'real and irreversible threat' to entry into force of the treaty and sought US support for developing a solution to explicitly address the question of whether or not production of nuclear materials would be permitted under the treaty. By the time the treaty text was finalized in 1967, however, the United States felt that the dual commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons along with safeguards put in place by the IAEA would be sufficient to ensure that any diversion would be detected.
Another technological driver that influenced US thinking about nonproliferation negotiations was the growing missile gap between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1950s.
Following World War II, both countries embarked on ambitious programs to replicate and build on the successes of Nazi Germany's rocket program. The Nazis' ability to hold targets hostage at a greater distance to rocket fire without endangering pilots was attractive to both states.
The US long-range missile program, however, was poorly funded and a lower priority through 1954. The United States relied on its superior air force for the delivery of its nuclear deterrent and initially nuclear warheads were too heavy and bulky to be deliverable via missile. It was not until the AEC succeeded in developing a lighter nuclear warhead that could be placed on a missile, known as a 'miniaturized' warhead, that the Atlas missile program was given priority status in the Air Force in 1954 [14].
The Soviet Union, however, invested more resources during the early years of its rocket program. Unlike the United States, which had the advantage of geography, the Soviet Union's proximity to NATO made ballistic missiles an attractive option for deterring the alliance. Moscow also viewed long-range missiles as a way to offset US air power superiority.
The Soviet investment paid off. While the United States had beaten the Soviet Union to the development of the atomic bomb, Moscow was the first to test a ballistic missile with a range capable of reaching the United States, a system now classified as an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM (range greater than 5500 km). On August 26, 1957, the Soviet Union announced it had tested a missile, the R-7, capable of reaching 'anywhere in the world.'
The 1957 Soviet announcement sparked fear amongst US officials of a 'missile gap' that would give Moscow a strategic advantage over the United States. The successful launch of the satellite Sputnik, less than two months after the ICBM test using a modified version of the R-7, further fueled US fears and accelerated Washington's efforts to achieve similar technological successes. Nearly a year later, in November 1958, the United States achieved a full range test of its Atlas ICBM (see figure 1.10).
While the United States may have overreacted to the Sputnik and the Soviet Union's missile advantage, the ability to use missiles to deliver nuclear warheads over long distances did change the strategic environment. Both of these technologies, the centrifuge and the ballistic missile, increased the threat of proliferation and contributed to the political impetus to negotiate a nonproliferation treaty.
1.5. The multilateral nuclear force
Despite having fought on the same side during World War II, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated quickly in the years following the war. By 1951, the United States determined that the Soviet Union could overwhelm Western Europe militarily, an unacceptable risk to the United States and its allies [15].
In July 1953, to address the Soviet threat, the Eisenhower administration committed to provide NATO with nuclear weapons to deter the Soviet Union's military advantage in the European theater, a commitment that would later complicate negotiations on the NPT. When the first nuclear weapons arrived in Europe in September 1954, significant questions still persisted for US nuclear planners about arrangements between the host states and Washington over the storage, custody, and authority to launch nuclear weapons.
The launch of Sputnik in October 1957 and the build-up of medium-range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe further accelerated the US nuclear planning. The Soviet Union's advantage lay in its medium-range ballistic missiles, an estimated 600–800 by the early 1960s, most of which were targeted at Western Europe. The United States at that time was relying primarily on its nuclear-capable Polaris submarines to deter the Soviet Union (see figure 1.11), as US missiles in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey were becoming obsolete and scheduled for dismantlement [16].
In response to the aggressive Soviet buildup, the US Joint Chiefs recommended pursuing custodial arrangements with NATO partners to ensure the availability of nuclear weapons for timely and effective defense of the alliance.
Discussions over nuclear sharing arrangements began in earnest with the NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC), the political decision-making body of the alliance, in December 1957. That month, the NAC agreed on a formal arrangement to 'establish stocks of nuclear warheads which will be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need [17].' The weapons would be deployed under US control and remain in US custody. Warheads would be mated with delivery systems only after the United States released the warheads for launch. At that point, NATO would take over command and control of the nuclear weapons, including the decision to launch.
Within the next several years, the United States deployed thousands of warheads in Western Europe. Despite these steps, some NATO allies still expressed concern that the Soviet Union could use its medium-range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles to hold Western Europe hostage to demands from Moscow. Several European states also expressed dissatisfaction with the US nuclear monopoly in NATO and wanted a more direct role in the control and conduct of NATO nuclear strategy.
In response to European allies' desire to play a greater role in NATO's nuclear strategy, the United States raised the idea in December 1960 of creating a multilateral force (MLF) within NATO to field the alliance's nuclear deterrent. US Secretary of State Christian Herter recommended at the NATO ministerial meeting that year that five nuclear submarines with Polaris ballistic missiles be committed to a NATO force, if the alliance could develop a way to manage the deterrent.
The United States was motivated to pursue this approach for two primary reasons. First, the United States saw a NATO nuclear force as a means of quelling allies' concerns about Washington's commitment to nuclear deterrence in Europe in light of the Soviet missile superiority. Secondly, the United States assessed that pursuing this approach might head off some NATO states from pursuing independent nuclear deterrents. At that point, both the United Kingdom and France had tested nuclear weapons, while other NATO states were pursuing nuclear research and had not ruled out weapons programs.
West Germany in particular was pushing for inclusion in nuclear planning and deployment and both the United States and the Soviet Union were concerned Bonn might pursue its own nuclear weapons program, which would have a destabilizing impact. Both Moscow and Washington also assessed that West Germany's pursuit of nuclear weapons would likely set off a proliferation cascade in the region. The United States saw NATO and the MLF as a way to ensure that West Germany, and to a lesser extent Italy, did not use security concerns as a justification to develop national nuclear forces.
The initial concept for the MLF that the United States presented to NATO included the development of mixed nationality crews that would oversee and man strategic submarines and tactical nuclear weapons under the command of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Europe. The mixed nationality crews were designed to prevent any one state from monopolizing a crew and creating de-facto national nuclear arsenals, which could be destabilizing. The proposal also called for a 'two-key system' under which the United States would need to give any consent for the use of nuclear weapons, although some allies pushed for Washington's role to be a temporary condition, and eventually sole authority would lie with NATO.
The response to the MLF concept was mixed. France objected to the entire concept, based in part on its current view of NATO. In the early 1960s, Paris had begun withdrawing from the NATO alliance integrated military command structure and France's relationship with London was strained over French President Charles DeGaulle's opposition to the United Kingdom's desire to join the European Common Market. France also viewed the MLF as a tool that would further empower the US within the NATO structure. The French wanted to see the creation of what it termed the 'third force' of Europe, based on France's own evolving nuclear arsenal, that would give more equity to multilateral control of nuclear warheads. The United States saw the French position as a challenge to the integration of NATO.
For states that desired a greater role in NATO nuclear planning, the MLF proposal allowed more involvement, but the United States retaining a 'veto' over launch did not arrest existing concerns that Washington would not risk an attack on its own soil to defend Western Europe from a Soviet strike or nuclear blackmail. Compounding that concern was the US decision to modify the MLF proposal in February 1963. At that time, Kennedy cut back the scope of the force to only include naval surface vessels armed with nuclear-capable Polaris A-3 missiles [17]. Kennedy's decision was driven in part by a reluctance to allow even allied states access to US nuclear submarines, which were initially to be part of the MLF. Given that Congress would need to amend the Atomic Energy Act to allow for shared possession of nuclear weapons, the Kennedy administration believed that the sensitive technology on US nuclear-submarines would likely complicate, or even prevent, the amendment from passing Congress. The MLF had its critics in the United States, including members of the US military, who thought it unnecessary and undesirable.
While the reduced scope of the MLF proposal was judged to be more palatable in Washington, several NATO allies argued that surface ships alone were inadequate to deter the Soviet threat and that they were vulnerable to a first-strike. France openly rejected the modified MLF proposal and in a speech in January 1963 offered an alternative to West Germany, under which Bonn and Paris could collaborate on nuclear and conventional forces to create a 'European Force.'
Despite these concerns and France's objections, Kennedy pushed for formal negotiations on the MLF to begin. A working group composed of eight NATO states met in 1963 in Paris to discuss the technical elements that would be required to advance the MLF concept, including a charter to define the roles of participating states and develop a training experiment to test the viability of mixed nationality crews on the US surface ships that Washington committed for the MLF. All of the NATO allies except Belgium agreed to participate in the demonstration and contribute personnel to man the mixed crews, although several, such as Greece and Turkey, conditioned participation on the United States funding the MLF, rather than pursuing the proposed 10 percent increase in contributions to NATO to support the nuclear force [17].
These talks continued throughout 1964. At the end of that year, Johnson announced a halt to the US 'pressure tactics' to develop the MLF. Johnson desisted, in part, due to the United Kingdom's introduction of a different configuration, the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). Under the British plan, the United Kingdom and the United States would contribute submarines, manned by their own crews, and mixed-nationality surface ship crews. The United Kingdom and the United States would both have to give authority to launch.
With no consensus on a path foward after years of discussion, the MLF concept seemed destined to remain on the drafting table. Ultimately, the United States would drop the MLF proposal as part of a compromise with the Soviet Union to advance the NPT.
1.6. The Soviet reaction to NATO nuclear sharing
On the Soviet side, the US build-up of nuclear weapons in Europe and the possibility of multilateral control of the NATO nuclear deterrent was alarming. In addition to the geographic advantage that favored the United States, Washington's push to expand NATO nuclear forces was now challenging the Soviet Union's military advantage in the European theater. Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies were particularly concerned about how the decision for mixed nationality crews to oversee NATO's nuclear deterrent could empower West Germany and possibly spur Bonn to develop a national nuclear weapons capability or use its access to NATO nuclear weapons for coercive aims.
The Soviet Union sought to partially negate the US geographic advantage by deploying nuclear weapons in Cuba. When Fidel Castro seized control of Cuba in the 1959 revolution, he quickly sought ties with the Soviet Union and became dependent on Moscow for military aid. After the Central Intelligence Agency backed the Bay of Pigs invasion, when anti-Castro Cubans attempted to overthrow Castro, he further strengthened the country's relationship with the Soviet Union, which led to an agreement to deploy medium and intermediate range nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles on the island to deter further attack.
Soviet efforts to transfer nuclear-capable missiles to the island were discovered by US intelligence efforts in October 1962 (see figure 1.12) and subsequently led to diplomatic condemnation and a naval blockade. The commensurate crisis, now known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, brought the two countries to the brink of nuclear war. De-escalating the crisis, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba. In return, the United States pledged to respect the territorial integrity of Cuba. Kennedy also quietly assured the Soviet Union that the United States was planning to withdraw its medium-range nuclear-capable Jupiter ballistic missiles from Turkey, which the Soviet Union viewed as a threat.
The Cuban Missile Crisis was instructive to future NPT efforts for several reasons. First, it demonstrated to the United States and the Soviet Union that nuclear risk reduction was a critical necessity to avert an escalating conflict that could lead to nuclear use. Second, the agreement that ended the crisis, which both sides abided by, highlighted that the two states could work together to de-escalate nuclear issues and abide by agreed-upon measures.
After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet position on nonproliferation and NATO nuclear sharing began to shift. In a significant deviation from the hard-line approach that the Soviet Union was taking toward the MLF and NATO, Khrushchev informed the Warsaw Pact that the Soviet Union would not oppose NATO nuclear sharing, so long as West Germany would not have any control over nuclear warheads in peacetime. If the United States was prepared to make that guarantee, Khrushchev said the Soviet Union would agree to negotiations to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons [15]. Ironically, after the Soviet Union had provided Beijing with access to nuclear materials and technologies in the previous decade, Khrushchev also saw a nonproliferation accord as a means to pressure China to abandon its nuclear program. At this point, the Soviet–Chinese relationship was deteriorating, and Moscow was beginning to view China's nuclear weapons program as a growing threat to Soviet interests and more broadly, the bipolar world order.
Khrushchev, however, faced resistance in the Warsaw Pact states, particularly from East Germany and Poland, both of which opposed West German access to nuclear weapons, even under NATO constraints, and resented being perceived as a conduit for Soviet foreign policy, rather than helping guide the Warsaw Pact's position on nuclear issues.
In particular, Wladyslaw Gomulka (see figure 1.13), leader of Poland's communist party, took a hardline approach, insisting that negotiations on a nonproliferation treaty ban any multilateral nuclear forces outright [19]. He feared improved relations between Moscow and Bonn as potentially threatening the security and stability of communism in Poland. In a letter to Khrushchev in October 1963, Gomulka accused the Soviet Union of making a unilateral concession to the United States. It was well-known at this point that the MLF had its critics within NATO, and he argued that Khrushchev's position would undermine opposition to the MLF within NATO, if the Soviet Union was seen as accepting limited nuclear sharing. He also expressed the fear that Bonn would use the MLF for coercive purposes, even without peacetime control.
The fear of West German access to nuclear weapons existed prior to Khrushchev's announcement. Concern about West German control over nuclear weapons had actually led Poland to propose a nuclear-free zone in central Europe in 1957. Poland also hoped to avoid the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons on Polish territory. Known as the Rapacki Plan, the zone would cover East and West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The proposal, which coincided with the US push on NATO nuclear sharing, generated debate but no real action [18]. Gomulka revived the proposal in 1963, and attempted to get the four states to agree to freeze nuclear weapons stationed in their respective states at existing levels. The proposal, however, met with resistance from Poland's Warsaw Pact partners, undermining any chance of success before Poland could truly pursue the idea.
Gomulka also opposed using any negotiations on nonproliferation to pressure China to abandon its nuclear program. He stressed that a divide between China and the Soviet Union could have negative implications for socialism in the Warsaw Pact states.
East Germany prioritized different concerns about the Soviet position on NATO nuclear sharing. Walter Ulbricht told Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasili Kuznetsov in October 1963 that East Germany feared that creation of the MLF would empower West Germany and undermine efforts to persuade Bonn to recognize East Germany, a key priority for Ulbricht [19]. Unlike Poland, East Germany supported the Soviet Union's hardline approach to China.
Romania also became a vocal critic within the Warsaw Pact of the approach that the Soviet Union was taking. Romania's position was forged in part by a closer relationship with China than other Warsaw Pact states. Both Romania and China opposed any nonproliferation agreement at that time, which was unsurprising given that Beijing had yet to test a nuclear device, but was advancing rapidly toward that capability. Romania also wanted to see greater emphasis on disarmament. Gomulka would later accuse Romania of deliberately attempting to undermine Warsaw Pact unity by insisting on tying conditions to nonproliferation that other states could not accept, such as universal disarmament.
Ultimately China's first nuclear test in 1964 and Khrushchev's fall from power later that year forged a common stance between East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union, paving the way for a common Warsaw Pact policy toward a nonproliferation treaty. With Khrushchev out, Ulbricht and Gomulka pushed the new General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, to oppose the MLF more forcefully [19]. Brezhnev had opposed Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, arguing that Khrushchev had 'folded' to Kennedy's demands to remove the missiles. Thus, he was more inclined to take a hardline on countering US nuclear sharing in NATO.
Gomulka and Ulbricht's push was inadvertently assisted by West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard who, in October 1964, suggested that if NATO could not come to an agreement on the MLF, West Germany and the United States would establish a joint nuclear force. Despite Erhard later clarifying his remarks to indicate there were no plans for a US–West German nuclear deterrent, his initial remarks pushed Gomulka to call for a concrete response from the Warsaw Pact. He opposed an empty declaration condemning the MLF, which prompted East Germany and the Soviet Union to collaborate on specific text to define the Warsaw Pact's position on nonproliferation. The text backtracked on Khrushchev's concession to the United States regarding nuclear sharing and linked nuclear forces in alliance states to proliferation, which was a key sticking point for Poland. Ultimately by January 1965, the Warsaw Pact had unified its stance on nonproliferation and the parameters it would accept for NATO nuclear sharing. Only Romania rejected pursuing a nonproliferation treaty agreement.
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