By David Swanson, World
BEYOND War, December 7, 2019
West Point Professor Tim
Bakken’s new book The Cost of Loyalty: Dishonesty, Hubris, and Failure
in the U.S. Military traces a path of corruption, barbarism, violence,
and unaccountability that makes its way from the United States’ military
academies (West Point, Annapolis, Colorado Springs) to the top ranks of the
U.S. military and U.S. governmental policy, and from there into a broader U.S.
culture that, in turn, supports the subculture of the military and its leaders.
The U.S. Congress and
presidents have ceded tremendous power to generals. The State Department and
even the U.S. Institute of Peace are subservient to the military. The corporate
media and the public help maintain this arrangement with their eagerness to
denounce anyone who opposes the generals. Even opposing giving free weapons to
Ukraine is now quasi-treasonous.
Within the military,
virtually everyone has ceded power to those of higher rank. Disagreeing with
them is likely to end your career, a fact that helps explain why so many
military officials say what they
really think about the current wars just after retiring.
But why does the public go
along with out of control militarism? Why are so few speaking out and raising
hell against wars that only 16% of the
public tell pollsters they support? Well, the Pentagon spent $4.7 billion
in 2009, and likely more in each year since, on propaganda and public
relations. Sports leagues are paid with public dollars to stage “rituals that
are akin to worship,” as Bakken appropriately describes the fly-overs, weapons
shows, troop honorings, and war hymn screechings that precede professional
athletics events. The peace movement has far superior materials but comes up a
little short of $4.7 billion each year for advertising.
Speaking out against war can
get you attacked as unpatriotic or “a Russian asset,” which helps explain why
environmentalists don’t mention one of the worst polluters, refugee aid groups
don’t mention the primary cause of the problem, activists trying to end
mass-shootings never mention that the shooters are disproportionately veterans,
anti-racist groups avoid noticing the way militarism spreads racism, plans for
green new deals or free college or healthcare usually manage not to mention the
place where most of the money is now, etc. Overcoming this hurdle is the work
being taken on by World BEYOND
War.
Bakken describes a culture
and a system of rules at West Point that encourage lying, that turn lying into
a requirement of loyalty, and make loyalty the highest value. Major General
Samuel Koster, to take just one of many examples in this book, lied about his
troops slaughtering 500 innocent civilians, and was then rewarded with being
made superintendent at West Point. Lying moves a career upward, something Colin
Powell, for example, knew and practiced for many years prior to his
Destroy-Iraq Farce at the United Nations.
Bakken profiles numerous
high-profile military liars — enough to establish them as the norm. Chelsea
Manning did not have unique access to information. Thousands of other people
simply kept obediently quiet. Keeping quiet, lying when necessary, cronyism,
and lawlessness seem to be the principles of U.S. militarism. By lawlessness I
mean both that you lose your rights when you join the military (the 1974
Supreme Court case Parker v. Levy effectively placed the
military outside the Constitution) and that no institution outside the military
can hold the military accountable to any law.
The military is separate
from and understands itself to be superior to the civilian world and its laws.
High-ranking officials are not just immune from prosecution, they’re immune
from criticism. Generals who are never questioned by anyone make speeches at
West Point telling young men and women that just by being there as students
they are superior and infallible.
Yet, they are quite fallible
in reality. West Point pretends to be an exclusive school with high academic
standards, but in fact works hard to find students, guarantees spots for and
pays for another year of high school for potential athletes, accepts students
nominated by Congress Members because their parents “donated” to the Congress
Members’ campaigns, and offers a community college-level education only with
more hazing, violence, and tamping down of curiosity. West Point takes soldiers
and declares them to be professors, which works roughly as well as declaring
them to be relief workers or nation builders or peace keepers. The school parks
ambulances nearby in preparation for violent rituals. Boxing is a required
subject. Women are five times more likely to be sexually assaulted at the three
military academies than at other U.S. universities.
“Imagine,” writes Bakken,
“any small college in any small town in America where sexual assault is
pervasive and the students are running virtual drug cartels while law
enforcement agencies are employing methods used to curb the Mafia to try to
catch them. There isn’t any such college or large university, but there are
three military academies that fit the bill.”
West Point students, who
have no Constitutional rights, can have their rooms searched by armed troops
and guards at any time, no warrant required. Faculty, staff, and cadets are
told to spot missteps by others and “correct” them. The Uniform Code of
Military Justice bans speaking “disrespectfully” to superior officers, which
creates an appearance of respect that one would anticipate fueling just what
Bakken shows it fueling: narcissism, thin skin, and general prima donna or
police-like behavior in those relying on it.
Of West Point graduates, 74
percent report being politically “conservative” as compared to 45 percent of
all college graduates; and 95 percent say “America is the best country in the
world” compared to 77 percent over all. Bakken highlights West Point Professor
Pete Kilner as an example of someone who shares and promotes such views. I’ve
done public debates with Kilner and found
him far from sincere, much less persuasive. He gives the impression of not
having spent much time outside of the military bubble, and of expecting praise
for that fact.
“One of the reasons for the
common dishonesty in the military,” Bakken writes, “is an institutionalized
disdain for the public, including civilian command.” Sexual assault is rising,
not receding, in the U.S. military. “When Air Force cadets chant,” writes
Bakken, “while marching, that they will use a ‘chain saw’ to cut a woman ‘in
two’ and keep ‘the bottom half and give the top to you,’ they are expressing
their world view.”
“A survey of the top echelon
of military leadership indicates widespread criminality,” Bakken writes, before
running through such a survey. The military’s approach to sexual crimes by top
officers is, as recounted by Bakken, quite fittingly compared by him to the
behavior of the Catholic Church.
The sense of immunity and
entitlement is not limited to a few individuals, but is institutionalized. A
gentleman now in San Diego and known as Fat Leonard hosted dozens of sex
parties in Asia for U.S. Navy officers in exchange for supposedly valuable
secret information on the Navy’s plans.
If what happens in the
military stayed in the military, the problem would be far smaller than it is.
In truth, West Point alumni have wreaked havoc on the world. They dominate the
top ranks of the U.S. military and have for many, many years. Douglas MacArthur,
according to a historian Bakken quotes, “surrounded himself ” with men who
“would not disturb the dreamworld of self-worship in which he chose to live.”
MacArthur, of course, brought China into the Korean war, tried to turn the war
nuclear, was in great part responsible for millions of deaths, and was — in a
very rare event — fired.
William Westmoreland,
according to a biographer quoted by Bakken, had a “perspective so widely off
the mark that it raises fundamental questions of [his] awareness of the context
in which the war was being fought.” Westmoreland, of course, committed
genocidal slaughter in Vietnam and, like MacArthur, attempted to make the war
nuclear.
“Recognizing the staggering
depth of MacArthur’s and Westmoreland’s obtuseness,” writes Bakken, “leads to a
clearer understanding of the deficiencies in the military and how America can
lose wars.”
Bakken describes retired
admiral Dennis Blair as bringing a military ethos of speech restriction and
retaliation into civilian government in 2009 and generating the new approach of
prosecuting whistleblowers under the Espionage Act, prosecuting publishers like
Julian Assange, and asking judges to imprison reporters until they reveal their
sources. Blair himself has described this as applying the military’s ways to
government.
Recruiters lie. Military
spokespeople lie. The case made to the public for each war (often made as much
by civilian politicians as by the military) is so routinely dishonest that
someone wrote a book called War Is A
Lie. As Bakken tells it, Watergate and Iran-Contra are examples of
corruption driven by military culture. And, of course, in the lists of serious
and trivial lies and outrages to be found in military corruption there’s this:
those assigned to guard nuclear weapons lie, cheat, get drunk, and fall down —
and do so for decades unchecked, thereby risking all life on earth.
Earlier this year, the
Secretary of the Navy lied to
Congress that over 1,100 U.S. schools were barring military recruiters. A
friend and I offered a reward if anyone could identify just one of those
schools. Of course, nobody could. So, a Pentagon spokesperson told some new
lies to cover up the old one. Not that anybody cared — least of all Congress.
None of the Congress Members directly lied to could be brought to the point of
saying one word about it; rather, they made sure to keep people who cared about
the issue out of hearings at which the Secretary of the Navy was testifying.
The Secretary was fired months later, just a couple of weeks ago, for allegedly
making a deal with President Trump behind the back of the Secretary of Defense,
as the three of them had varying ideas on how to acknowledge or excuse or
glorify some particular war crimes.
One way in which violence
spreads from the military to U.S. society is through the violence of veterans,
who disproportionately make up the list of mass shooters. Just this week, there have
been two shootings on U.S. Navy bases in the U.S., both of them by men trained
by the U.S. military, one of them a Saudi man training in Florida to fly
airplanes (as well as training to prop up the most brutal dictatorship on
earth) — all of which seems to highlight the zombie-like repetitive and
counterproductive nature of militarism. Bakken cites a study that in 2018 found
that Dallas police officers who were veterans were much more likely to fire
their guns while on duty, and that nearly a third of all officers involved in a
shooting were veterans. In 2017 a West Point student apparently prepared for a
mass shooting at West Point that was prevented.
Many have urged us to
recognize the evidence and not accept the media presentations of atrocities
like My Lai or Abu Ghraib as isolated incidents. Bakken asks us to recognize
not just the pervasive pattern but its origins in a culture that models and
encourages senseless violence.
Despite working for the U.S.
military as a professor at West Point, Bakken outlines the general failure of
that military, including the past 75 years of lost wars. Bakken is unusually
honest and accurate about casualty counts and about the destructive and
counterproductive nature of the senseless one-sided slaughters the U.S.
military perpetrates on the world.
Pre-U.S. colonists viewed
militaries much as people living near U.S. military bases in foreign countries
often view them today: as “nurseries of vice.” By any sensible measure, the
same view ought to be common in the United States right now. The U.S. military
is probably the least successful institution on its own terms (as well as
others’ terms) in U.S. society, certainly the least democratic, one of the most
criminal and corrupt, yet consistently and dramatically the most respected in
opinion polls. Bakken recounts how this unquestioning adulation creates hubris
in the military. It also maintains cowardice in the public when it comes to
opposing militarism.
Military “leaders” today are
treated as princes. “Four-star generals and admirals today,” Bakken writes,
“are flown on jets not just for work but also to ski, vacation, and golf
resorts (234 military golf courses) operated by the U.S. military around the
world, accompanied by a dozen aides, drivers, security guards, gourmet chefs,
and valets to carry their bags.” Bakken wants this ended and believes it works
against the ability of the U.S. military to properly do whatever it is he
thinks it should do. And Bakken courageously writes these things as a civilian
professor at West Point who has won a court case against the military over its
retaliation for his whistleblowing.
But Bakken, like most
whistleblowers, maintains one foot inside that which he is exposing. Like
virtually every U.S. citizen, he suffers from World War II
mythologizing, which creates the vague and unargued assumption
that war can be done right and properly and victoriously.
Like a huge number of MSNBC
and CNN viewers, Bakken suffers from Russiagatism. Check out this remarkable
statement from his book: “A few Russian cyber agents did more to destabilize
the 2016 presidential election and American democracy than all the weapons of
the Cold War put together, and the U.S. military was helpless to stop them. It
was stuck in a different mode of thinking, one that worked seventy-five years
ago.”
Of course, the wild claims
of Russiagate about Trump supposedly collaborating with Russia to try to
influence the 2016 election do not even include the claim that such activity
actually influenced or “destabilized” the election. But, of course, every
Russiagate utterance does push that ridiculous idea implicitly or — as here —
explicitly. Meanwhile Cold War militarism determined the outcome of numerous
U.S. elections. Then there’s the problem of proposing that the U.S. military
come up with schemes to counter Facebook ads. Really? Whom should they bomb?
How much? In what way? Bakken is constantly lamenting the lack of intelligence
in the officer corps, but what sort of intelligence would concoct the proper
forms of mass murder to stop Facebook ads?
Bakken regrets the U.S.
military’s failures to take over the world, and the successes of its supposed
rivals. But he never gives us an argument for the desirability of global
domination. He claims to believe that the intention of U.S. wars is to spread
democracy, and then denounces those wars as failures on those terms. He pushes
the war propaganda that holds North Korea and Iran to be threats to the United
States, and points to their having become such threats as evidence of the U.S.
military’s failure. I would have said that getting even its critics to think
that way is evidence of the U.S. military’s success — at least in the realm of
propaganda.
According to Bakken, wars
are badly managed, wars are lost, and incompetent generals devise “no-win”
strategies. But never in the course of his book (apart from his World War II
problem) does Bakken offer a single example of a war well-managed or won by the
United States or anyone else. That the problem is ignorant and unintelligent
generals is an easy argument to make, and Bakken offers ample evidence. But he
never hints at what it is that intelligent generals would do — unless it is
this: quit the war business.
“The officers leading the
military today appear not to have the ability to win modern wars,” Bakken
writes. But he never describes or defines what a win would look like, what it
would consist of. Everybody dead? A colony established? An independent peaceful
state left behind to open criminal prosecutions against the United States? A
deferential proxy state with democratic pretensions left behind except for the
requisite handful of U.S. bases now under construction there?
At one point, Bakken
criticizes the choice to wage large military operations in Vietnam “rather than
counterinsurgency.” But he does not add even a single sentence explaining what
benefits “counterinsurgency” could have brought to Vietnam.
The failures that Bakken
recounts as driven by officers’ hubris, dishonesty, and corruption are all wars
or escalations of wars. They are all failures in the same direction: too much
senseless slaughtering of human beings. Nowhere does he cite even a single
catastrophe as having been created by restraint or deference to diplomacy or by
excessive use of the rule of law or cooperation or generosity. Nowhere does he
point out that a war was too small. Nowhere does he even pull a Rwanda, claiming that a war that
didn’t happen should have.
Bakken wants a radical
alternative to the past several decades of military conduct but never explains
why that alternative should have to include mass murder. What rules out
nonviolent alternatives? What rules out scaling back the military until it’s
gone? What other institution can fail utterly for generations and have its
toughest critics propose reforming it, rather than abolishing it?
Bakken laments the separation
and isolation of the military from everyone else, and the supposedly small size
of the military. He’s right about the separation problem, and even partly right
— I think — about the solution, in that he wants to make the military more like
the civilian world, not just make the civilian world more like the military.
But he certainly leaves the impression of wanting the latter too: women in the
draft, a military that makes up more than just 1 percent of the population.
These disastrous ideas are not argued for, and cannot be effectively argued
for.
At one point, Bakken seems
to understand just how archaic war is, writing, “In ancient times and in
agrarian America, where communities were isolated, any outside threat posed a
significant danger to an entire group. But today, given its nuclear weapons and
vast armaments, as well as an extensive internal policing apparatus, America
faces no threat of invasion. Under all indices, war should be far less likely
than in the past; in fact, it has become less likely for countries throughout
the world, with one exception: the United States.”
I recently spoke to a class
of eighth-graders, and I told them that one country possessed the vast majority
of foreign military bases on earth. I asked them to name that country. And of
course they named the list of countries still lacking a U.S. military base:
Iran, North Korea, etc. It took quite a while and some prodding before anyone
guessed “the United States.” The United States tells itself it isn’t an empire,
even while assuming its imperial stature to be beyond question. Bakken has
proposals for what to do, but they do not include shrinking military spending
or closing foreign bases or halting weapons sales.
He proposes, first, that
wars be fought “only in self-defense.” This, he informs us, would have
prevented a number of wars but allowed the war on Afghanistan for “a year or
two.” He doesn’t explain that. He doesn’t mention the problem of that war’s
illegality. He provides no guide to let us know which attacks on impoverished
nations halfway around the globe should count as “self-defense” in the future,
nor for how many years they should bear that label, nor of course what the
“win” was in Afghanistan after “a year or two.”
Bakken proposes giving much
less authority for generals outside of actual combat. Why that exception?
He proposes subjecting the
military to the same civilian legal system as everyone else, and abolishing the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Good
idea. A crime committed in Pennsylvania would be prosecuted by Pennsylvania.
But for crimes committed outside the United States, Bakken has a different
attitude. Those places should not prosecute crimes committed in them. The
United States should establish courts to handle that. The International
Criminal Court is also missing from Bakken’s proposals, despite his account of
U.S. sabotage of that court earlier in the book.
Bakken proposes to turn the
U.S. military academies into civilian universities. I’d agree if they were
focused on peace studies and not controlled by the militarized government of
the United States.
Finally, Bakken proposes
criminalizing retaliating against free speech in military. For as long as the
military exists, I think that’s a good idea — and one that might shorten that
length of time (that the military exists) were it not for the probability that
it will reduce the risk of nuclear apocalypse (allowing everything in existence
to last a bit longer).
But what about civilian
control? What about requiring that the Congress or the public vote before wars?
What about ending secret agencies and secret wars? What about halting the
arming of future enemies for profit? What about imposing the rule of law on the
U.S. government, not just on cadets? What about converting from military to
peaceful industries?
Well, Bakken’s analysis of
what’s wrong with the U.S. military is helpful in getting us toward various
proposals whether or not he supports them.
--
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.