Manifest Destiny © F. William Engdahl, all rights reserved
Chapter Eight:
A Cold War Ended Not
“We gave categorical
assurances to Gorbachev back when the Soviet Union existed that if a united
Germany was able to stay in NATO, NATO would not be moved eastward.”
—US Ambassador in Moscow, 1987-1991, Jack Matlock
NATO Marches East
For
Washington and the US military–industrial complex, the Cold War in no way ended
in 1991 with the dissolving of the Warsaw Pact military alliance, along with
the disintegration of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Washington stepped up
efforts to push NATO expansion to the very door of Moscow, taking advantage of
the catastrophic economic chaos they had created in the Russian Federation
during the Yeltsin era.
In
February 1990, during highest-level talks between Moscow and US Secretary of
State James Baker III, the US made Mikhail Gorbachev, then President of the
Soviet Union, an offer. According to transcripts of meetings in Moscow on
February 9, 1990, US Secretary Baker suggested that in exchange for cooperation
on unification of Germany, East and West, into NATO, Washington would make
“iron-clad guarantees” to Moscow that NATO would not expand “one inch
eastward.”
As
with many of its promises in those days, Washington broke it.
PNAC: Rebuilding America’s
Defenses
In
September 2000, just weeks before the contentious November 2000 US presidential
election that saw the US Supreme Court unconstitutionally determine the victory
of the Bush–Cheney Republicans, an influential Washington think tank named the
Project for a New American Century (PNAC) issued an extraordinary report based
on the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance prepared by Dick Cheney, then President
George H.W. Bush’s Secretary of Defense. The members of the PNAC included
Cheney, his earlier assistant at the Pentagon, Paul Wolfowitz, Don Rumsfeld,
and other key members of what would be the Bush–Cheney neoconservative
presidency.
The
PNAC report, financed by the Bradley Foundation and the John M. Olin
Foundation, both linked with the US military industry, was prepared as a
military blueprint for the incoming administration. The report called for a
most aggressive US military agenda at a time when many were asking if the world
even needed NATO following the end of the Cold War and Russian moves to build
down her nuclear force. Among PNAC report recommendations were
- Remove Saddam Hussein, by war if necessary.
- Deploy global missile defense “to provide a
secure basis for US power projection around the world.”
- Control space and cyberspace, and create a “new
military service—US Space Forces—with the mission of space control.”
- Exploit the Pentagon’s “revolution in military
affairs,” including moving to high-tech, unmanned weaponry, such as
drones.
- Develop a new family of more effective nuclear
weapons.
- The US “should seek to establish a network of
‘deployment bases’ or ‘forward operating bases’ to increase the reach of
current and future forces.” It must move beyond western Europe and
northeast Asia to increased permanent military presence in southeast Asia
and east Asia “to cope with the rise of China to great-power status.”
- Redirect the US Air Force “toward a global
first-strike force.”
- End the Clinton administration’s “devotion” to
the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty with Russia.
- “Preserve Pax Americana” and a “unipolar 21st
century” through securing and expanding “zones of democratic peace, deter
rise of new great-power competitor, defend key regions (Europe, East Asia,
Middle East), and exploit transformation of war.”
Virtually
every item of that PNAC report was realized after 2000 during the George W.
Bush presidency. Dick Cheney, Don Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and the team around
Bush senior who had drafted the so-called Wolfowitz Doctrine in 1992
implemented that doctrine through the presidency of Bush’s son. They named it
the War on Terror.
Among
the members of that high-powered PNAC military think tank were key
neoconservative war hawks that would soon serve in key positions in the new
administration of George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, as well as run Bush’s War on
Terror after September 11, 2001
In
addition to Cheney—who, as Bush’s vice president, de facto ran foreign policy,
much as George H.W. Bush did for Reagan two decades before—the PNAC members
included Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan American who became George W. Bush’s
special envoy to Afghanistan after the US invasion in 2001 and later ambassador
to US-occupied Iraq. It included I. Lewis “Scooter’” Libby, who became chief of
staff for Vice President Dick Cheney.
Also
in PNAC was Peter W. Rodman, who in 2001 became the Bush administration’s
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The PNAC
also included Donald H. Rumsfeld, soon-to-be secretary of defense for the
Bush–Cheney presidency. The PNAC members signing the September 2000 report
included Paul D. Wolfowitz as well, as Rumsfeld’s undersecretary of defense.
Wolfowitz had authored the controversial 1992 Pentagon Defense Planning
Guidance, dubbed the Wolfowitz Doctrine, that called for US “preemptive” wars
against any potential challenger to America’s “sole superpower hegemony.”
NATO’s Fake Democracy
Promotion
Among
the more interesting little-noticed members of the 2000 PNAC was Vin Weber.
Weber, a former Minnesota congressman, was a registered lobbyist for Lockheed
Martin, then the world’s largest defense conglomerate. At the same time, Weber
was also chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the US
government–financed, “fake democracy” nongovernmental organization (NGO) that
was installing chosen pro-NATO regimes, one after the other, in former
Communist Eastern Europe.
Vin
Weber, the person responsible for the NGO that ostensibly brought democracy
into former Communist states, was, at the same time, a select member of the
PNAC, which drafted the precise military foreign policy of not only the George
W. Bush–Cheney administration but also the Obama–Biden administrations. The
same Vin Weber was a paid lobbyist for the world’s largest military–industrial
conglomerate, Lockheed-Martin. Little wonder that the “democracy” operations of
the NED paralleled the eastern expansion of NATO and its military agenda.
That
eastern expansion of NATO was a campaign politically led in Washington by Bruce
P. Jackson, from 1993 to 2002, a vice president for strategy and planning at
Lockheed Martin Corporation, the same company that Vin Weber, NED “democracy
promoter” was a paid lobbyist for. Further, Weber and Jackson both sat on the
board of the PNAC, the think tank devising the military strategy of the
Bush–Cheney presidency. Bruce Jackson also founded something he named the US
Committee on NATO in 1996 to promote the expansion of the North Atlantic
alliance eastward. Its motto was “Strengthen America, Secure Europe, Defend
Values, Expand NATO.”
As
Lockheed-Martin Vice President Bruce Jackson was busy in the 1990s creating one
after another well-funded newspaper front group to promote the NATO and US
military–industrial complex agenda for arms buildup. He did that despite the
fact that in the 1990s, the former states of the Soviet Union, especially the
Russian Federation, were in economic ruin and in no way a threat to NATO.
A
cofounder with Lockheed-Martin’s Bruce Jackson of these lobbyist newspaper
organizations from the US Committee on NATO was someone named Julie Finley. In
2003, as NATO’s eastward expansion was going forward with dramatic speed,
Finley and Jackson together created a successor to the no-longer-needed US
Committee on NATO, calling itself the Project for Transitional Democracies,
where Jackson was president and Finley chairman of the board. At the same time
Finley sat on the Project for Transitional Democracies board, she was a board
member and treasurer of Vin Weber’s NED. It was a tight-knit circle
promoting NATO side by side with Washington’s NGO-led fake democracy in former
Communist Eastern Europe.
NATO Moves East
By
1999, Washington was ready to begin its provocative expansion of NATO eastward,
violating those solemn assurances given the Soviet leader Gorbachev in 1990.
After almost a decade of Yeltsin’s looting of Russia’s economy, as well as his
nonpayment of pensions and other social benefits, the Russian Federation could
do little to stop NATO other than protest feebly.
To
call the policy reaction of the Yeltsin government to the US-led expansion of
NATO to former communist countries of Eastern Europe “confused” would be to put
it mildly. In the 1990s, Moscow had shown clear willingness to cooperate with
Washington in mutual nuclear arms reduction.
On
January 3, 1993, just days before leaving the presidency to incoming President
Bill Clinton, US President George H. W. Bush went to Moscow, where he and Boris
Yeltsin signed the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, popularly called START II. A skeptical Russian Duma refused to
ratify Start II. That same year, Washington proposed a Partnership for Peace
(PfP) as a loose diplomatic dialogue initiative and invited Russia to join,
which Russia did.
After
Washington money and support of the US-tied Russian oligarchs had secured
Yeltsin’s reelection in 1996, Washington brazenly escalated its moves to
formally expand NATO, secure in the conviction the corrupt Yeltsin would not
react. In 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined the NATO
organization over the feeble protests of the Yeltsin regime.
For
reasons of their financial dependency on US and Western banks and financiers,
the circle around Yeltsin tended to favor Washington on most issues. However,
the NATO issue was extremely unpopular among the vast majority of Russians,
who, rightly, saw no reason a decade after the end of the Soviet Union for NATO
to exist at all, let alone move eastward in the direction of Russia’s borders.
Yeltsin
himself, at different times, made contradictory statements on the NATO
expansion. At one point, he called the NATO expansion “a strategic mistake.”
Later, he tried to minimize the danger for Russian security noting, falsely,
“the negative consequences of NATO’s enlargement will be reduced to the minimum
through the NATO-Russia deal.”
For
Washington and the US military–industrial complex, it was a huge strategic
victory. The eastward expansion of NATO allowed the US to dominate and
effectively sabotage the EU’s attempts to create an independent-from-NATO EU
defense pillar, partly by locking the former communist states of Eastern Europe
into long-term US military equipment purchases as part of NATO, in effect
making them US client states.
US Missile “Defense”
NATO’s
expansion into the countries of the former communist Warsaw Pact in Eastern
Europe was by no means the only Washington move that raised alarm bells in
Moscow. In December 2000, just weeks after the admission of Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic into NATO and just days before Donald Rumsfeld became
Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon released a Strategy Report for
Europe and NATO. The report contained a section on “Theater Missile
Defense.” As an official US Defense Department policy paper, it was worth
careful study. It stated:
Theater
Missile Defense: As part of broader efforts to enhance the security
of the United States, Allied and coalition forces against ballistic missile
strikes and to complement our counter-proliferation strategy, the United States
is pursuing opportunities for TMD (Theater Missile Defense) cooperation with
NATO Partners. The objectives of United States cooperative efforts are to
provide effective missile defense for coalition forces...against short to
medium range missiles. In its Strategic Concept, NATO reaffirmed the risk posed
by the proliferation of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) weapons and
ballistic missiles, and the Alliance reached general agreement on the framework
for addressing these threats. As part of NATO’s DCI, Allies agreed to develop
Alliance forces that can respond with active and passive defenses from NBC
attack. Allies further agreed that TMD is necessary for NATO’s deployed forces.
Two
years earlier Rumsfeld, a former Secretary of Defense and NATO Ambassador, had
headed a presidential commission to look into the desirability of
reinvigorating the moribund US missile defense effort that had been largely set
aside after the collapse of the Soviet nuclear threat. The Rumsfeld Commission
vigorously advocated a revived US missile defense program.
Missile
defense projects first emerged in the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan
proposed developing systems of satellites in space, as well as radar bases as
listening stations, and interceptor missiles around the globe, all designed to
monitor and shoot down hostile nuclear missiles before they hit their intended
targets.
The
Reagan program was dubbed “Star Wars” by its critics as science-fiction
fantasy, but the Pentagon had officially spent more than $130 billion on
developing the system after 1983. President George W. Bush, beginning in 2002,
increased that amount significantly to $11 billion a year. That was double the
amount allocated during the Clinton years. And another $53 billion for the
following five years was budgeted, not even counting the untold billions which
were being diverted to missile defense under secret and unaudited Pentagon
“black box” budgets.
With
even a primitive missile defense shield, the US could theoretically attack
Russian missile silos and submarine fleets with far less fear of effective
retaliation; the few remaining Russian nuclear missiles would be unable to
launch a sufficiently destructive response. That, at least, was the idea behind
US missile defense. It was not defensive in any way, rather extraordinarily
offensive.
Upturning MAD
During
the Cold War, the ability of both sides—the Warsaw Pact and NATO—to mutually
annihilate one another had led to a nuclear stalemate dubbed by military
strategists as MAD—mutually assured destruction. It was scary but, in a bizarre
sense, more stable than what would come later with a unilateral US pursuit of
nuclear primacy. MAD was based on the prospect of mutual nuclear annihilation
with no decisive advantage for either side; it led to a world in which nuclear
war had been “unthinkable.”
Now,
after 2000 and the collapse of the threat from the Soviet Union and Warsaw
Pact, the US was pursuing the possibility of nuclear war as thinkable. That was
really and truly “mad,” as in insane. The first nation with a nuclear missile
“defense” (NMD) shield would de facto have “first strike ability.” Quite
correctly, Lt. Colonel Bowman, who had himself been director of the US Air
Force Missile Defense Program during the Reagan era, called missile defense
“the missing link to a First Strike.”
For
the time being, at the beginning of the Bush–Cheney administration, little was
discussed about Rumsfeld’s December 2000 defense policy document proposing a
new US ballistic missile defense effort. Moscow watched nervously.
However,
in one of its first official moves, in December 2001, just three months after
the September 11 World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, the Bush–Cheney
administration announced its decision to unilaterally withdraw from the
US-Russian Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
On
June 13, 2002, as the original treaty was up for renewal, the Bush–Cheney
administration let it expire to the alarm of Moscow, who rightly asked what
Washington now planned. Washington was now free to aggressively pursue missile
defense. In his official statement announcing the US withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty, President George W. Bush lied and claimed it was necessary after the
September 11, 2001, terror attacks. Back then, anything and everything was
justified as part of the Washington War on Terror.
That
ABM Treaty had been signed by Washington and the Soviet Union in 1972 to slow
the nuclear arms race. The ABM Treaty barred both powers from deploying
national defenses against long-range ballistic missiles and from building the
foundation for such a defense. Washington was preparing to launch an incredibly
aggressive missile defense shield aimed directly at Russia. The ABM Treaty had
to go.
The
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was a critical step if Washington seriously
planned to implement a working global network of “missile defense” capability
as the key to US nuclear primacy. Moscow protested that, contrary to assurances
from Washington that it was aimed at Iran, North Korea, or “rogue terrorists,”
the only serious target with remaining nuclear long-range missile delivery capability
was the Russian Federation. It was to be several more years before it became
clear how aggressive Washington’s missile defense deployments would be.
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